Contribution of offset to defence industrialisation in Indonesia by Savitri, C M
 CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
CURIE MAHARANI SAVITRI 
 
CONTRIBUTION OF OFFSET TO DEFENCE 
INDUSTRIALISATION IN INDONESIA 
 
 
CRANFIELD DEFENCE AND SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
PhD THESIS 
Academic Year 2016 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Ron Matthews 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
“This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD” 
 
@Cranfield University, 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be 
reproduced without the written permission of the copyright holder 
the page is intentionally left blank
i 
ABSTRACT 
Offset is compensation given to a buyer country for an arms sale.  Initially perceived 
as ‘necessary evil’ in an imperfect defence market, it now serves dual purposes: a 
marketing strategy for defence industry and a procurement policy for buyer country 
to generate add on benefits from arms import. Offsets proliferate, and so are stricter 
mandatory government policies. Still evaluation of offset has been difficult, mostly 
done in a country-based setting using anecdotal evidence that result in mixed 
findings. Following the issuance of mandatory offset policy in Indonesia through 
Law on Defence Industry in 2012, evaluation of past and current offset practice have 
become not only relevant but also critical to provide policy feedback. This 
dissertation provides an empirical examination on how offset has been understood 
and practised in Indonesia, and its contribution to defence industrialisation. The 
timeframe chosen is 1988-2014, when countertrade has been used to support the 
lifecycle of strategic industries: development (1988-1998), survival (1999-2009), and 
revitalisation (2010-2014).   
This study derives its validity and reliability from triangulation, comprising 
secondary data, survey, and case study. Three variables are analysed: technology 
development through ‘strategic industries’, defence offset, and defence 
industrialisation. Technology development focuses on how technology policy 
centred on a strategic industries paradigm and ladder of production to initiate 
industrialisation push. Defence offset discusses the conceptual and practical aspects 
of offset in Indonesia, including strategic objectives, regulation and institution 
frameworksin the defence procurement context, and offset life cycle and financing. 
Defence industrialisation discusses the impact of offset through employment, skill 
enhancement, transfer of technology, export promotion, domestic supply chain 
creation, and R&D. Field works were conducted in three firms representing different 
industrial sectors: PT DI (aerospace), PT Pal (shipbuilding), and PT Pindad 
(landsystem). 
Research findings indicate that, first, offset practice has mostly taken place on an ad 
hoc basis, with no clear reference to strategic objectives, as well as long-term 
management and financing- that mirror deficiencies in defence procurement. Second, 
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as result of the deficiencies, offset results have been varied from one firm to another, 
across the different industrial sectors of aerospace, maritime, as well as ammunition 
and land system. While offset has a positive impact on skill enhancement and 
technology transfer, it seldom translates into new employment, supply chain 
creation, export, or R&D.  
This study generates the following recommendations. First, Indonesia needs to 
strengthen the management of offset through pre-offset planning and preparing 
practical guidelines for offset stakeholders in parallel with human resources to 
support the programme. This means identification of offset potential in procurement 
(convergence of long term technology policy and long term defence procurement 
plan), estimation of offset premium cost, allowing participation of industry in the 
early stage of the offset cycle, as well as devising methods of evaluating offset. 
Second, Indonesia needs to formulate strategic objectives for offset that relate closely 
to the dual purposes of defence modernisation and industry revitalisation. Third, 
Indonesia must strengthen the technology absorptive capability in industry in order 
to sustain the benefit of offset. 
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11. THE PHENOMENON OF DEFENCE OFFSET 
1.1 Making the Case for Study 
The study attempts to evaluate the contribution of defence offset to Indonesian 
defence industrial strategy. In pursuit of this goal, the study needs to overcome the 
challenge of clarifying the true contribution of offset in the midst of the complex 
economic-political-military settings of Indonesia. Thus, the study will focus on two 
key issues. The first is to examine technology development in Indonesia where 
strategic industries are used as vehicle for accelerated industrialisation, and defence 
offset is used as part of a conduit for technology transfer to support them. The 
second is to evaluate the contribution of offset to strategic industries across three 
different periods of industrialisation: development (1988-1998), survival (1999-2009), 
and revitalisation (2010-2014). 
The study begins with an explanation of the major methodological and conceptual 
issues necessary to address the fundamental questions in this theoretical and 
empirical study. These questions include the research question/problem, why it is 
important, and what is the potential contribution the research makes to the existing 
academic body of knowledge and professional practice. This introductory chapter 
will also review the overall process of research, from defining the question/problem 
to choosing the appropriate methods, collecting and analysing data, and finally, to 
offering conclusions and providing recommendations. In a nutshell, this chapter will 
provide the essential academic fundamentals for the reader to understand the 
purpose, significance, and method of the study. 
1.2 Growing Phenomenon of Offset 
The birth and proliferation of offset, defined as industrial compensation required by 
government in the procurement of arms, is closely related to the United States’ need 
to transfer military technology to its transatlantic allies for the purpose of defence 
readiness and standardisation in the post World War II period.1 Co-production and 
offset that emerged in the 1970s in Europe then grew considerably as European 
countries – enjoying raised economic performance after the impact of war- were 
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willing to pay a premium cost associated with licensed-production for technology 
transfer.2 Demand for offset continued to rise as developing countries across the 
world sought to use offset as an industrial policy tool, hoping that technology 
transfer to domestic industry would produce a trickle-down effects to the whole 
economy. Transfer of technology through licensed-production, and later co-
production, became the major offset requirement for both European and developing 
country defence industries alike.3 By the 1990s, the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) -pioneered by the US and soon adopted by its counterparts- also affected the 
way offset proliferated. RMA emphasised the importance of technology in military 
hardware, while the gap in defence research and development between the US and 
the rest of the world was widening. As a consequence, defence industries in smaller 
economies found it unaffordable to operate a self-sufficient defence industry. 
Countries were beginning to seek cost reduction in the form of collaboration and 
access to expert networks. Hence, offset started to be used to establish partnership in 
research and production network.  
The value and significance of offset have increased overtime, a testimony to its 
growing importance in the arms trade. Between 1993-2008, the US Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) reported that the number of 
countries demanding offset and the numbers of companies entering into offset 
agreements had increased, as had the value of offset agreement as a percentage of 
contract value.4 Some 48 US firms were reported to have entered into 677 offset 
arrangements with 45 different countries, all linked to defence export sales totalling 
US$97.13bn.5  The European Defence Agency (EDA) also acknowledged growing 
offset practices, as they became the preferred choice of EU member states,6 but then 
the EU in 2009 decided to ban the practise among its members.  
Countries used different terms to refer to offset activities in country policies, such as 
Industrial Participation Programmes (United Kingdom), Industrial Benefits 
(Belgium), Industrial Cooperation (Denmark, Taiwan), National Industry 
Participation (South Africa), Industrial Capability Programmes (Australia), and so 
on. However, this is a semantics issue, as regardless of differences in the designation, 
offset is offset, whatever the terminology used. Some countries codify offset policy; 
some have not, instead relying on negotiation skills to generate optimal benefits. 
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Offset policy normally consists of a minimum offset requirement, minimum value of 
contract, an agreed delivery term, multipliers, penalties, a focus on particular 
activities, direct or indirect and eligible offset activities; and, if applicable, a 
dedicated agency specially formed to manage offset. Offset requirements also vary, 
with some countries like Denmark, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland aiming for 
100% of the procurement contract value, or even higher, whereas others like New 
Zealand, Norway, Israel, South Korea and Saudi Arabia aim for a more modest offset 
target of around 30%.    
The US Bureau of Industry and Security report on offset and the EDA report identify 
a correlation between the levels of development of the buyer country with the kind 
of offset it demands.7 These Reports argue that developed countries tend to negotiate 
for direct offset- that is offset related to the purchased arms - rather than indirect – 
that is offset unrelated to the purchased article - whereas the developing countries 
prefer the latter indirect offset.  
For the purpose of generalisation, this study assumes that the correlation between 
the level of development and offset demand is as follows:  
1. Developed countries with established defence industries use offset to channel 
work or technology to their domestic defence companies; research on European 
countries’ offset policies has revealed that offset provides industrial opportunities to 
create partnerships with large foreign system integrators.8 
2. Newly industrialising economies use offset for both military and development 
purposes. Research on East Asian countries’ offset practices have shown that they 
use offset to channel technology into their defence industrial base, which they view 
as a means of injecting advanced technologies and providing trickledown effects into 
the economy as a whole.9 
3. Developing countries with less industrialised economies generally pursue indirect 
offset to help create profitable commercial business and to build their infrastructure, 
mostly because these countries do not have sufficient defence industrial base to 
absorb the benefits of direct offset. 
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The term NICs was first coined in the 1970s with the rise of the four Asian tigers with 
vibrant economies: Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Later on, the 
term was also used to describe a larger group of countries enjoying thriving 
industrialisation, including South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Indonesia has been mentioned as well as part of 
this dynamic group, but not in a consistent manner.10 There is no common definition 
for NICs despite attempts to generalise their economic characteristics and 
performance. These characteristics include an export-oriented economy, 
diversification of export, and a growth rate of manufacturing that exceeds that of 
developed and lower-income developing countries.11 LDCs is a term used to refer a 
group of country that lag behind the NICs in terms of output and income.   
1.3 Offset: The ‘Third Way’ for Developing Countries? 
Offset is relevant to industrialising countries, especially in Asia, for a number of 
significant reasons. First, defence industry is important for some NICs that have 
experienced a different politico-military context in the post Cold War period from 
that of developed economies in the western hemisphere. As contrary to the peace 
dividend in Europe, East Asian NICs remain concerned with security issues that 
were suppressed under US-Soviet rivalry but re-emerged soon after the Great 
Power’s force reductions that created a vacuum of power. In Southeast Asia, 
longstanding territorial disputes kept countries on guard. Hence, for Asian states, 
arms industries remained strategic to ensure self-reliance and security of arms 
supply. South Korea and Taiwan, for instance, have been facing constant external 
threats that more or less justify the need to maintain a strong defence industrial base. 
Indonesia’s experience with embargos (1960s and 1992-2005) crippled its disaster 
relief in the aftermath of 2004 Tsunami, and ignited sentiment for self-sufficiency 
through revitalisation of defence industry.  
Second, there has been a significant rise in arms procurement spending in Asia due 
to strong economic performance that coincided with military modernisation 
programmes, as well as a changing strategic environment mainly affected by the rise 
of China. IISS recorded that the planned global defence expenditure in 2014, Asia 
and Australasia accounted for 21.4 percent or second only after North America.12 
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Bigger purchasing power and access to more advanced technology provides more 
opportunity for offset. Frost and Sullivan noted that a number of high value military 
offset deals are expected to flow from massive procurement programmes in Asia 
Pacific and the Middle East.13 In the past, Asian NICs like South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Indonesia, have used offset to support the indigenisation of defence 
industries. It is suggested that direct offset and indirect military offset helped to 
quicken the process of defence industrialisation and arms manufacturing to some 
extent.14  As a consequence of past experience and current opportunity, offset is 
predicted to grow bigger and bolder in Asia.  
Going further than just utilising offset for indigenising defence production 
capability, NICs also seek to transfer new technologies gained from defence offset 
into the broader domestic economy.  Many developing countries have seen defence 
spending in another light, not as a ‘burden’ of an unproductive sector, but on the 
contrary, as a facilitator of economic growth.15 In addition to the political motive of 
strategic sovereignty, developing countries seek to obtain the economic benefits from 
sustaining a defence industrial base: defence programme potentially contributes to 
the strength of the overall economy through ‘spin-off’, which assists in technology 
transfer, and upgrade skills and the productivity of labour.16 In this light, offset has 
been seen as ‘third way’ for industrialisation.  
There are number of ways in which offset can help economic development: offset can 
bring in fresh flows of investment capital, create opportunities for work that would 
increase skills, channel the transfer of technology from advanced to developing 
country, and so on.17 According to the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS), the trend of offset during 1993-2008 showed that 
approximately sixty percent of offset is in the form of indirect offset, as opposed to 
forty percent in direct offset. This distribution of offset is linked to strategic economic 
development policy, where countries try to divert the benefits of offset to construct 
comparative advantages in sectors with greater income elasticity and growth 
potential. 18  The same preference is shared by new and small European Union 
countries, which prefer to acquire greater civil offset compared to their more 
advanced counterparts. 19  The use of offset in Saudi Arabia, for example, has 
channelled the transfer of technology to commercial sectors, helping to broaden the 
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country’s export portfolios beyond petroleum. Another interesting case is Indonesia, 
where the transfer of technology into dual-industries was used as part of a grand 
strategy to enable an economic ‘take-off’ from an agricultural and manufacture-based 
economy into a high tech-based society to escape from dependency on oil exports.  
1.4 Indonesia’s Offset: the Tale of Habibie, Soeharto, and Strategic Industry 
Champions 
Until recently, offset was not a familiar term for Indonesian defence stakeholders. 
This is intriguing because Indonesia had been hailed as a pioneer in countertrade 
and offset since the 1970s, and was among the first developing countries outside the 
Soviet Union to establish comprehensive countertrade regulations in 1982.20 While 
countertrade found its way into the Indonesian language as ‘imbal dagang’, offset 
cannot be found anywhere in recent government policy aimed at regulating 
procurement. The closest terms to offset are ‘transfer teknologi‘ (technology transfer) 
and ‘kandungan lokal’ (local content).21 
To understand offset practice and dual-use policy in Indonesia’s industrial strategy, 
one cannot neglect the influence of B.J. Habibie and Suharto. Suharto was the former 
Indonesian president (1966-1998), who envisioned a giant leap in order to short cut 
the development process so that he could create a high-tech based economy by the 
end of the fifth term of five-year development plans (1994-1998). It was Habibie who 
turned Suharto’s idea into a great experiment and gave birth to the creation of the 
Indonesian research and development sector and high-tech industry. If Suharto was 
hailed as the ‘father of Indonesian development’ - despite controversy surrounding 
his family corruption - Habibie was hailed as the ‘father of Indonesian technology’. 
Being a devoted Muslim, Habibie delighted the Muslim majority with his concept of 
embracing science and technology together with what Islam believes as ‘imtaq and 
imtek’ (faith and devotion are inseparable from science and technology). An engineer by 
training, Habibie brought with him a new approach to economic thinking that 
emphasised investment into high-tech sectors and the creation of competitive 
advantage, known as ‘Habibienomics’. 
23 
Habibie’s strategy encompassed four components: technology transfer through 
offset; a product portfolio emphasizing ‘dual-use’ technology; the creation and 
sustainability of key industrial growth poles - termed ‘strategic industries’ within the 
defence economy; and an institutional arrangement for technology development. 22 
The first strategy was encapsulated in Habibie’s philosophy “begin at the end, end at 
the beginning”,23 meaning that technology development in the production cycle and 
design process should be the first priority in setting up industry. The quickest way to 
get transfer of technology would be through license-production; in other words, 
offset.  
The second strategy was about having a dual-use industry. Indonesia does not have 
an exclusive defence industry, but rather an industry with dual-use products for both 
commercial and military purposes, commonly categorised as ‘dual-use industry’. It 
was understood that in peacetime, the commercial leg of the industry would account 
for eighty percent of production capacity whereas the defence leg would represent 
the other twenty percent. During war this arrangement would be reversed, with 
defence divisions accounting for most of the production capacity. For example, PT 
IPTN manufactured transport aircraft that could be used for both civil and military 
purposes, PT Pindad produced commercial explosives for mining and petroleum 
industries, and PT PAL built merchant ships.  
The third element of Habibie’s strategy was aimed at creating a pool of strategic 
industries. Suharto himself handpicked fourteen industries deemed as ‘strategic’ 
through Presidential Decree No.44/1989, some of which used to be under the 
management of the Armed Forces to support the maintenance of military systems. 
Two industries were to be the spearhead of the ‘transformation’ process: aerospace 
(PT IPTN) and shipbuilding (PT PAL). The argument behind this was the vital role of 
Indonesian transportation to overcome the geographical barriers of the archipelago. 
Other industries like metal, chemical, heavy machineries, communication and so on, 
were considered as supporting industries or part of the supply chain for the strategic 
industries, which in turn were treated as infant industries, enjoying protection and 
subsidy until strong enough to stand on their own feet.24 
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The fourth element was concerned with establishing the research and development 
sector in Indonesia, and also the techno-nationalism ideology. The Agency for 
Assessment and Application of Technology (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan 
Tecknologi, hereafter referred to as BPPT) was created in 1974, with responsibility to 
formulate the technology development roadmap and conduct research and 
development. Through the strategic industries, Indonesia would shorten the 
industrialisation course and speed-up development while at the same time, securing 
sovereignty and security through indigenous arms provision.25 
1.5 The Rise and Demise of Offset in Indonesia 
Indonesia presents an interesting case study for many reasons. It is a democratic 
country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, yet also a pluralistic state, 
embracing over 200 different ethnic races. It is an archipelagic state stretching along 
the equator, with more than 17,000 islands strategically located between two regions 
(Asia and Australia), and two oceans (Indian and Pacific Ocean). Indonesia is also the 
biggest country in Southeast Asia, in terms of territorial size and population. In every 
way, be it population, geography or ethnicity, Indonesia is a unique nation-state. In 
terms of economic progress, Indonesia has moved from a newly independent 
country to enter the exclusive club of growth-leading NICs during the 1990s, and 
then back to the status of a low-income developing country in the post-1997 
economic crisis.26 Today, Indonesia has gained the status of the world’s 16th biggest 
economy and joined the exclusive G-20, and potentially could surpass Germany and 
UK to become the world’s 7th biggest economy in the next 15 years.27 
Due to its size and population, it is imperative that Indonesia plays a significant role 
in the regional and international arena. Indonesia has a long history of leading 
diplomacy in anti-colonialism in the post World War II era, pioneering the non-
alignment movement during the Cold War period and the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference, as well as being the founding father of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is only natural to see Indonesia’s diplomatic role growing 
hand-in-hand with its military power, through which Indonesia can contribute to 
UN peacekeeping operations, as has happened in Cambodia, Congo, Lebanon and 
many others. With a free-and-active philosophy underpinning its foreign policy 
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(Politik Luar Negeri Bebas-Aktif), Indonesia refuses to tie itself to alliances and insists 
on self-reliance. To ensure this strategic sovereignty is maintained, the government 
established state-owned dual-use industries in the 1970s to produce both defence 
equipment and commercial products, using offset as one of the strategies. 
Through government-to-government purchases under the Foreign Military Sales 
scheme and development aid since the 1970s, Indonesia has been able to extract 
offset arrangements - ranging from license-production to buy-back - to support 
defence industrialisation. Three main strategic industries within the defence sector, 
PT IPTN (later renamed as Indonesian Aerospace), PT Pal (shipbuilding) and PT 
Pindad (land systems), entered into collaborative agreements with US, European and 
Asian countries. Throughout 1983-1993, the three industries accounted for IDR 
1.1trillion (USD1.2bn) worth of defence procurement, supplying fixed wing aircraft 
and helicopters, fast patrol boats, attack rifles and ammunition. 28  Furthermore, 
Indonesia was also listed among the major arms exporting developing countries in 
the world in the SIPRI yearbook during 1981-1985.29 
The demise of offset began when Indonesia was hit by a ‘multi-dimensional’ crisis in 
1997, which started as economic in nature but delivered a devastating blow to 
political stability, hence giving birth to reformasi. The Rupiah currency rate to the US 
dollar plunged 70% in a one-year period (1998-1999), and Jakarta lost much of its 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).30 Jakarta was also forced to cut off funding for IPTN 
and other state-run industries to meet conditions set by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for a $43 billion bail-out of the financially stricken Indonesian economy.31 
Suffering from a sharp decline in defence spending, from 9% to 3.7% of the 
government budget, Jakarta was forced to scale back, reschedule and even cancel 
defence procurement.32 This source of revenue for strategic industries was severely 
cut, and the strategic industries had no choice but to look to overseas markets. Some 
strategic industries, like PT DI, still had competitiveness to secure overseas open bid 
tenders.33The subsequent years had been painful, though, as the strategic industries 
were forced to undergo rationalisation, reduce thousands of employees and shut 
down facilities to the point that PT IPTN and PT PAL were declared in court to be 
bankrupt.  
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Between 1993 and 2006 there were no offset contracts reported, suggesting that the 
Indonesian government may have decided to abandon offset. Putting aside the 
modest procurement that Jakarta had made through this period, challenging 
economic pressures had forced the Indonesian government into looking at 
alternative payment methods- most prominently export credit. Indeed the ‘strategic 
gap’ between procurement demand and approved defence spending expanded in 
subsequent years, despite efforts to raise the budget as a percentage of GDP. To 
turnaround the financial barrier, the government started to use other mechanisms 
other than foreign currency reserves, such as countertrade, export credits (from 
foreign banks) and loans from local banks, to support defence procurement funding.  
Belatedly, there has been an effort to rejuvenate offset policy. The impetus for this is 
the government programme to revitalise the ailing defence industry under President 
Yudhoyono. His administration viewed the modernization plan as an opportunity to 
provide work for the local industry. A twelve year US arms embargo had crippled 
Indonesian Armed Forces capability, i.e. none of the naval vessels were combat ready 
in 2002.34 Also, the modernisation plan of TNI meant that huge amounts of arms 
spending would likely go abroad if local industry were not to act as a supplier. The 
revitalisation of defence industry became a priority under Yudhoyono’s second 
Presidency term (2010-2014). The Committee for Defence Industry Policy (Komite 
Kebijakan Industri Pertahanan, hereafter referred to as KKIP) was created to manage 
the revitalisation, importantly to formulate a national strategic policy in the defence 
industrial sector. This led to pressure for the government to issue a mandatory offset 
clause, with a view to creating a package of essential regulations.  
1.6 Research Aim and Enabling Objectives 
Every research proposal needs either a research question or a research problem, 
depending on the purpose of the research itself. This study chooses to employ a 
research question. The specified research question is basically an attempt to answer 
the ‘what’ aspect of this study.  
The general question that encompasses this study is “how is offset implemented in 
Indonesian arms procurement and what contributory role does it play in support of 
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technology indigenisation in three strategic firms in Indonesia through 1980s-2014?”. 
The study specifically aims to evaluate the implementation of offset in the strategic 
industries by using three case studies of the lead industry integrators in arms 
production, namely: PT IPTN/DI, PT PAL and PT Pindad. Analysis will be divided 
into three time periods in accordance with the growth stages of the strategic 
industries: development (1988-1998), survival (1999-2009) and revitalisation (2010-
2014). This stage methodology also highlights the timing of when offset was on the 
rise, in the process of decline, and finally during the upswing period. 
The specific aspects that this study will explore are listed as the enabling objectives 
as follows:  
A. Critically review the concepts of development, industrialisation and 
technology transfer borrowed from the development economics discipline, 
revolving around the need for developing countries to pursue a catch-up 
industrialisation strategy (ch 2) 
B. Critically review the literature on the conceptual and empirical aspects of 
offset as well as the methods to evaluate offset implementation against policy 
objectives and strategies (ch 3) 
C. Conduct an appraisal of Indonesian development strategy and government 
policy towards technology development through the targeting of strategic 
industries (ch 4) 
D. Analyse the Indonesian version of catch-up industrialisation, dubbed as the 
Progressive Manufacturing Plan, and the military modernisation context 
which becomes the pretext for offset utilisation through defence procurement 
policy (ch 4) 
E. Evaluate the practice of offset in the Indonesian defence sector, and identify 
the actors, policy and processes that shape the implementation of offset (ch 5) 
F. Examine the implementation of offset to the strategic industries through nine 
sub case studies (ch 5) representing aerospace, land systems, ammunition and 
maritime, and analyse the contribution of offset to Indonesia’s industrial 
indigenisation (I3) (ch 5) 
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G. Contribute recommendations to inform the implementation of Indonesia’s 
upcoming offset policy (ch 6). 
1.7 Study Value: The Contribution to Knowledge 
The study attempts to answer the ‘why’ question. Why is the topic deemed 
appropriate, and what is the potential contribution of the study? There are three 
general areas that a study can be of significance: first, to contribute to knowledge in 
the research area (defining the current literature gap in particular, and the body of 
knowledge, in general, including the theoretical contribution); second, to contribute 
to policy considerations through the listing of recommendations for government 
action; third, to contribute to practitioners by exposing them to lessons learned from 
the past implementation of offset in Indonesia, as well as lessons learned from other 
countries.35 
The study seeks to fill in the gap in the literature on offset as a tool of industrial 
policy for NICs and LDCs, in general, and to contribute to offset policy that the 
Indonesian government is formulating at the time the study was conducted. A study 
on offset in Indonesia is important as a means of obtaining a clearer picture of offset 
effectiveness in developing countries. Studies on offset usually takes form of case 
studies of individual countries, aims at providing idiographic explanation rather 
than a general explanation. Only few studies have attempted to approach offset by 
using a cross-countries analysis.36 The study does not seek to do the latter, arguing 
that a case study would already be difficult enough to undertake due to the 
contextualised political and cultural settings in acountry. The contribution of a single 
case study on Indonesia to the body of literatures on offset is therefore akin to 
adding a piece to an incomplete mosaic: it may not solve the riddle yet, but it will 
give a better understanding on the overall offset conundrum.  
Many of the publications on the Indonesian strategic industries are focused on the 
centrality of Habibie’s role and technonationalism debate37 between two opposing 
‘development schools’ in Indonesia known as Widjojonomics and Habibienomics 
(although the latter is actually an engineer not an economist)38, and study on the 
competitiveness and offset exclusively focused on the Indonesian Aerospace 
industry.39  Perhaps this lack of literature can be attributed to the failure among 
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academics to see strategic industries beyond being Suharto’s toy or prestigious 
project; hence there is limited genuine interest to study the topic. But most 
importantly, the difficulty of getting quantitative data definitely contributes to the 
constrained interest among academics.  
In the past years, there are two catalysts for more research in the offset area: first, 
more transparency has been introduced into state-owned companies, thus opening 
up access to primary data; second, the creation of the Indonesian Defence University 
has led to a greater empirical quest for defence data. During the course of this 
research, three Masters Theses have been written on offset, a testimony to the 
growing significance of the subject. The thesis by Seszy Yunioritta and Annisa 
Febriyanti attempted to evaluate offset contribution to PT Indonesian Aerospace and 
PT Pindad,respectively, while the thesis by Sriyanto aimed to evaluate the readiness 
of PT Pal in receiving offset linked to the procurement of the guided missile escort 
destroyer. 40 These theses share similar weaknesses: trying to evaluate offset’s 
contribution to Indonesian defence industry in the absence of ‘context’.  
First, no thesis has yet been able to explain what is the strategic objective of offset 
throughout different defence industrialisation periods in Indonesia. Without this 
knowledge, evaluation of offset effectiveness will have no reference. Most theses 
focused only on the first stage of defence industrialisation. Second, these theses did 
not offer explanation on the offset lifecycle: how offset was planned, executed, and 
evaluated against the context of procurement. In other words, the explanation from 
cradle to grave regarding the decision to use offset has been missing in prior 
research. This is one of the important lacunas that this research seeks to address. 
Second, it is important to make a contribution to the ongoing offset policymaking in 
Indonesia. As mentioned earlier, the revitalisation of defence industry has become 
the priority of the incumbent President’s cabinet and supported by the parliament. 
This plan is inseparable from the Armed Forces long-term development plan issued 
in 2009, which became the basis of defence procurement for the next twenty years. 
Transfer of technology, co-production and joint collaboration are said to be the 
prioritised strategy for defence industry revitalisation. Following unsuccessful 
attempts to generate offset from the procurement of four corvettes from the 
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Netherlands in 2007,41 there was concern that without a clear offset policy in place, 
Indonesia would not be able to optimise the benefits for local industry from arms 
imports. 
The first official statement on offset as a mandatory policy imposed on foreign arms 
suppliers was stated in 2010, when the incumbent Deputy Defence Minister Sjafrie 
Sjamsudin said that “Indonesia will insist on tying every weapon purchase from 
foreign countries with a transfer-of-technology and joint-production scheme”. 
Furthermore, he stated, “Indonesia would demand a 40 percent share in the 
production of the weapon’s component or parts”. 42  The statement was bold, 
considering the absence of offset-related policy and the lack of socialisation of the 
idea within the Department of Defence at the time of the announcement. 43 In 
December 2010, the Ministry of Defence initiated the first seminar on offset, aiming 
to produce a policy paper as inputs for KKIP. Jakarta aimed to have an offset policy 
by 2011, but in stages. It is hoped that the result of this study should be a valuable 
contribution to governmental attempts to formulate an offset policy, as it will shed 
light on the practice of offset over many years.  
Third, the study hopes to deliver a contribution to practitioners. In this case, 
practitioners refer to the civil servants and workers in the defence industry, who will 
be involved in the offset negotiation and implementation process in the future. 
Preliminary interviews suggest that despite decades of offset experience, there is 
only minimal or even no knowledge of ‘lessons learned’ regarding past offset 
negotiations incorporated into the knowledge system of Indonesia’s MoD. 44 
Furthermore, the unsuccessful offset project in 2007 with PT PAL revealed a 
discouraging fact: that the negotiators of offset and industry could have different 
views on which type of offset activity should be obtained from the corvette deal.45 
Clearly, then, there is need to evaluate the objectives set by the government and the 
expectations of industry, and how the gap between them can be addressed to help 
revitalise local industry. 
1.8 Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is an elaboration of the research question in relation to the 
relevant literature. Figure 1.1, below, offers a conceptual model for this study. It has 
generic application, in the sense that all defence industrialising countries face the 
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same dilemma between “make” (represented by autarky) and the more cost effective 
“buy off the shelf” option (represented by globalisation). In the past decades the 
policy resolution to this dilemma has been technology absorption or using public 
procurement for innovation policy. At the heart of this concept has been an emphasis 
on a government interventionist role; that is, targeting specific sectors in defence for 
protection and subsidy. However, in light of rising unit production cost of arms and 
a tighter IPR regime, the autarky choice comes with high cost, risk and is a lengthy 
process.  
Indonesia pursued this model of technology development in the 1980s, targeting 
strategic industries with infant industry protection, transfer of technology through a 
progressive manufacturing plan, and a dual-use portfolio. This model was halted by 
the 1998 economic crisis that diminished the state’s financing ability. In the search for 
cutting edge weapon systems at low unit cost, the Indonesian authorities had been 
made to realise the high opportunity costs imposed by the pursuit of local defence 
industrial development. However, there was an even more important policy 
recognition in the latter part of the 2000s that globalisation, whilst bringing the 
benefits of cost effective acquisition, also carried the inevitable downside of the 
erosion of national autarky; that is, the loss of defence industrial sovereignty.  
The current international arms market, characterised as ‘buyer’s market’, offers an 
alternative pathway to resolving the globalisation-autarky dilemma, and that is by 
focusing on offset policy. Offset in arms procurement is the combination of 
synchronised strategic objectives between arms procurement and domestic 
technology development, supported by regulation and an institutional framework, 
with adequate financing to provide scale, implemented in parallel with the 
procurement life cycle. Here, expenditure on defence technologies also represents 
expenditure on broader industrial and technological development both in defence 
and the commercial sector. This is illustrated in figure 1.1 as a rightward movement 
from technology development to technology indigenisation in defence firms, using 
offset in arms procurement as the conduit. 
It is assumed that defence offset can contribute to the process of defence 
industrialisation, serving both the needs for autarchy and benefiting from defence 
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globalisation. The progress in defence industrialisation will arguably expand defence 
industrial sovereignty over time, hence serving the strategic interests of state 
defence. Defence industrialisation also enables the industry to connect with 
international players; for example, through joint-ventures and as part of a global 
supply chain, hence amassing more opportunity to enhance competitiveness and 
close in the technology gap with more advanced countries. This in turn will also 
have positive impact on technology development in general. 
Figure 1.1 Indonesia’s Defence Industrial Model 
 
Source: Author 
Thus, at the core of the Figure 1.1 conceptual model is an analytical framework 
aimed at profiling the impact of defence offset on the development of a national 
defence industry. It can be seen that the pursuit of defence industrialisation via an 
offset policy can be directed towards six variables: employment creation; skill-
enhancement; the transfer of technology; export promotion; the development of local 
supply chains; and R&D.  
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This analytical framework represents the structure of Chapter 5. The academic 
building blocks to this analysis are provided by the discourse set out in Chapter 2 
(‘technology development’ literature), Chapter 3 (‘defence offset’ strategies), as well 
as Chapter 4 (Indonesia’s ‘technology development’ context).   
1.9 Research Methodology 
This section attempts to answer the ‘how question’ by explaining what kind of 
research methodology is employed in the study. In order to undertake this task, the 
study will first explain the epistemological debate in research methodology and 
continue to peel each layer of research onion, from the most abstract (research 
philosophy) to the most operational (data collection methods). For this purpose, the 
study employs a research ‘onion’ process proposed by Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill (Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.2 The Research ‘Onion’ 
 
Source: Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A. (2003) Research methods for Business Students. Pearson 
Education Limited. 
Research goes beyond collecting and assembling facts; it involves a series of 
systematic methods in data collection and interpretation in a scientific way, so that 
the results can be scientifically justified. Methodology is a body of methods, rules 
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and postulates employed by a discipline, a particular procedure or a set of 
procedures;46 it is the fundamental thing by which research can be differentiated 
from other kinds of inquiry, because methodology gives the scientific basis to 
research. Putting all this together, research methods aims   
“... to effect a link between the empirical world and its theoretical conceptions. By examining 
the world in a systematic way we can access the adequacy, plausibility, accuracy, fruitfulness, 
truth even, the theories about the world.”47 
There are two great traditions of research methods in scientific endeavour; 
quantitative and qualitative. Both traditions offer the potential means of addressing a 
research problem, in different ways. Quantitative methodology emphasises the use 
of numbers as measurement or indicators of relevant variables to help researchers 
make sense of their research problem. The qualitative method emphasises making 
sense of a problem in its natural setting, through interpretation of meaning, which 
relies on the researcher. As the position of the researcher is not clearly separated 
from the setting he/she researches on, qualitative methods have been associated 
with subjectivity. However, one should not confuse qualitative with subjectivity, and 
quantitative with objectivity.  
Each method has its own strengths and weaknesses. The qualitative method can be 
criticised for being less scientific, unrepresentative, and open to bias and, even to 
manipulation, whether conscious or unconscious,48 whereas the quantitative method 
can be criticised for oversimplifying and being less capable in explaining abstract 
terms like fascination, justice, peace, and so on. Hammersley argued that rather than 
being derived from philosophical or methodological commitment, the choice of 
method should be based on the goals and circumstances of the research being 
pursued.49 In other words, it is the nature of the research problem that should dictate 
the appropriate research method; accordingly, sometimes quantification is required, 
sometimes it is not. 
It is also possible to employ the two methods side-by-side in the same research 
project. Hammersley and Bryman offered a continuum of choices when combining 
both quantitative and qualitative under one research approach, among them are 
triangulation, facilitation and combination50 First, triangulation of both approaches, 
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and emphasis on the mutual assessment of results, and less on the mutual extension 
of knowledge potential. Second, facilitation that highlights the supportive function of 
the other approach, providing hypotheses and inspiration for pursuing analyses of 
the single approach. Third, the combination of both approaches as complementary 
research strategies. Regardless of how the two research methods will be combined, it 
is necessary to spell out explicitly the theory, methodology, research practice and 
interpretation of findings.  
1.9.2 Research Philosophy 
Positivism originally came from the natural sciences, which assumed that only 
knowledge of phenomena confirmed by the senses could be warranted as knowledge 
(phenomenalism). Theories are used to generate hypotheses that can be tested and 
allow explanations of laws to be assessed (deductivism). Knowledge can be 
produced by collecting facts that provide the basis for laws (inductivism). Science 
must and can be conducted in a way that is value-free and objective,51 with emphasis 
on highly structured methodology to facilitate replication, 52  and quantifiable 
observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis. 
Positivism was criticised by interpretivist, who argued that the world is too complex 
to be generalised into definite laws in the same way as the physical sciences.  There is 
a necessity to discover the details of the situation to understand the reality or 
perhaps a reality working behind them (Constructivism). For them, generalisability 
is not of crucial importance, as the value of generalisation can be lost in a changing 
world. Generalisation also neglects the fact that the world is unique, thus trying to 
generalise it may cost the value of the generalisation itself. 
Realism is based on the belief that a reality exists that is independent of human 
thoughts and beliefs. It recognised the importance of understanding people’s socially 
constructed interpretations and meanings, or subjective reality, within the context of 
seeking to understand broader social forces, structures or processes that influence, 
and perhaps constrain, the nature of people’s view and behaviours.  
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1.9.3 Research Approaches 
Silbergh 53  explained that two main epistemological frameworks have driven 
scientific inquiry, being the deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive 
approach uses theory as the starting point for research: it progresses from a 
theoretical position initially adopted and proceeds to analyse the empirical setting to 
test the theory. On the other end of the spectrum, the inductive approach uses the 
empirical setting as its starting point for research: it progresses from the inquiry of 
the empirical setting, in which a problem is found, and attempts to find a pattern and 
construct generalisation to finally come to the creation of a theoretical explanation (or 
not). The deductive approach is used for testing a theoretical preposition, whereas 
the inductive approach can be used to generate a new theory. 
1.9.4 Research Strategies 
It is useful to explain different kinds of research strategies in the simplest way 
possible, but at the same time capturing the core of the strategy, in what kind of 
setting it is usually applied, and the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the 
strategy.  
Experiment is commonly used in natural sciences. The strategy subjects samples to 
different experimental conditions, introducing planned changes to one or more of the 
variables, measuring a small number of the variables and controlling other variables. 
In the social sciences, experiments are frequently used in psychological studies. 
Survey is commonly used in the deductive approach. A survey allows a massive 
quantity of data to be collected and standardised to produce a comparison, thus 
providing a ‘bird’s eye view’. 54  It can be carried out through questionnaire, 
structured observation and structured interviews. A survey complements qualitative 
studies in two ways: it can help to frame questions or identify cases for in-depth 
study; it can also provide context for confirming the findings of qualitative 
work.55The strength of this approach lies in its ability to collect a large amount of 
data from a sizeable population in a highly economical way, whereas its weakness 
lies in the limited width and depth of the collected data. For example, putting too 
many questions in a questionnaire would run the risk of discouraging respondents 
from participating. 
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Case study is commonly used in the inductive approach. It aims to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between 
the two are not clearly evident, by using multiple sources of evidence. 56It can be 
undertaken through questionnaires, interviews, observation and documentary 
analysis. A case study is valuable in testing a hypothesis and particularly useful for 
theory development, especially regarding its potential for achieving high conceptual 
validity, strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses, as a useful means to 
closely examine the hypothesised role of causal mechanisms in the context of 
individual cases, and its capacity for addressing causal complexity. It is not without 
weaknesses, however. The case study is often criticised as being prone to “selection 
bias”; that is when some form of the selection process in either the design of the 
study or the real-world phenomena under investigation, results in findings that 
contain systematic error.57 
Grounded theory is a response to the overemphasis of theory testing or falsification 
as the objective of empirical research, which leaves no room for epistemological 
explanation or practical guidelines concerning the development of plausible ideas.58 
It is also considered as a “third way” between induction and deduction; a study is 
not commenced with a defined theoretical framework, instead relationships between 
data are identified as the basis to develop questions and a hypothesis to test, this way 
a theory may emerge from the process of data collection analysis.59 Because the 
ability to identify themes or issues emerging in collected data (coding) is crucial in 
grounded theory, it is not a good strategy for the inexperienced researcher. In 
addition, grounded theory can be very time and resource consuming.  
Ethnography is part of the inductive approach commonly used in anthropology and 
sociology. It aims to interpret the social world the research subjects inhabit and the 
way in which they interpret it. The most common approach is through participant 
observation, in which the researcher becomes immersed in the culture as an active 
participant, recording extensive amounts of notes, complemented by interviews, 
questionnaires and so on. A major criticism of this strategy is that the effect of the 
researcher’s presence on the research subject and the missing important picture that 
the researcher fails to see could lead to the production of an ‘incomplete picture’. 
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Similar to grounded theory, ethnography is a time-consuming and resource-draining 
research strategy not to be employed by an inexperienced researcher.   
Action research is distinctive from other kinds of research strategies because of its 
orientation and purpose. Action research does not stop at applied research, but seeks 
to democratise the conduct of research (design, implementation strategies, 
evaluation) by engaging stakeholders that traditionally are excluded from the 
process. The ultimate objective is to understand various social problems and seek the 
best responses to address them. Action research is normally undertaken through 
different spirals of steps, each of which consists of a circle of planning, an 
action/intervention, and evaluation of the action. Subsequent circles work to revise 
the action using feedback from the previous circle and taking into account 
unforeseen changes, to devise a better intervention plan. One of the best examples of 
research action is Paulo Freire’s Participatory Action Research, which has helped 
many international researchers shape their programme to help underprivileged 
communities.60 
1.9.5 Time Horizons 
According to Saunders, the cross sectional approach is akin to a ‘snapshot’ taken at a 
particular time, and longitudinal approach is akin to a ‘diary’ that represents events 
over a given period.61 The distinction between cross-sectional and longitudinal study 
is based on the number of empirical contacts within the field.62 In a cross-sectional 
study, comparison of a number of cases are mostly made on one occasion, whereas 
the longitudinal study returns to the field twice or more often to do the same data 
collection again in order to cover development and changes in the field and in the 
issue under study.63 Longitudinal research can be undertaken in different ways, such 
as taking a retrospective perspective, looking back on a development or process in a 
narrative or biographical study or ethnographic study with a prolonged participation 
in the field. Longitudinal study can also be introduced into a literature study, 
provided there is sufficient amount of published data collection over time. 
Obviously, longitudinal research demands more time and cost allocation than cross-
sectional research, which can be impractical for university students conducting 
research under time and resource constraints. However, it offers the benefit of more 
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control over variables under study and enabling researchers to study change and 
development. 
1.9.6 Data Collection Methods 
Sampling can be defined simply as a selection of representative cases from the whole 
population. There are various methods of sampling, but they can be divided under 
two broad categories: probability and non-probability sampling (purposive). 
Probability sampling means the cases are selected by using probability theory, and 
this can be random or systematic (determining the ‘nth’ case). Probability sampling 
requires a researcher to possess a list of all cases in a total population. Different to 
probability sampling, cases in non-probability sampling are chosen based on 
reasoning, not mathematical probability. This can be done through several 
approaches, such as quota, convenience, theoretical and snowball sampling. The 
most common issue that arises from sampling is how big the sample should be. 
While quantitative research usually needs more sampling than qualitative research, it 
has been suggested that for interviews following ethnography and grounded theory 
studies, a number between 30 and 50 should be sufficient.64 
Table 1.1 Approaches in Non-Probability Sampling 
Quota Population is divided into relevant categories, and quotas are 
allocated to every type of respondent 
Convenience Selection of cases on the basis of availability, useful when 
researching hard-to-access population. Danger of selection bias.  
Theoretical Selection of cases on the basis of the researcher’s judgement. 
Usually employed in grounded theory and analytical induction. 
Snowball Selection of cases on the basis of information given by a 
‘gatekeeper’. Usually employed in situations whereby the 
researcher does not have a sample frame of an access-stricken 
population. 
Source: Bloor, M. and Wood, F. (2006). Keywords in Qualitative Methods: a Vocabulary of the Research 
Concept.London: Sage. 
Secondary datais where quantitative and qualitative data that have been collected for 
a purpose are re-used by other than the first user. Secondary data comprise many 
types: documentary (written and unwritten materials), multiple source (area-based 
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and time-series based) and survey (censuses, continuous and regular surveys and ad 
hoc surveys). Using secondary data means economy of effort; that is, the researcher 
does not have to start from scratch to collect all data required for research. However, 
the researcher needs to be cautious in re-using secondary data as such data were 
organised, analysed and measured according to the first user’s goal, and this does 
not necessary translate to reliability and validity.  
Observation in natural science is about collecting information through minimal or nil 
interaction with the subject of research, and therefore the influences that arise from 
the presence of the researcher on the data can be minimised. In social sciences, 
observation is much more than that. Basically there are two kinds of observation: 
participant observation and structured observation. In participant observation, the 
researcher immerses into and becomes part of the research setting through several 
roles such as a complete participant, complete observer, observer as participant and 
participant as observer. The latter two roles are less problematic in terms of research 
ethics, because the researcher will have to reveal his or her purpose. Structured 
observation refers to a structured and systematic way of doing observations. This, 
however, will limit the data to be taken because it needs to refer to pre-determined 
indicators and can be more time-consuming.  
Interview is about collecting information through questioning of the respondents. It 
is employed in both quantitative and qualitative research, with different 
characteristics. Quantitative research employs a ‘structured’ type of interview using 
semi-formal approach and a standardised schedule, whereas qualitative research 
employs a more laid back ‘semi-structured’ type of interview, which allows room for 
altering the course of the interview should important key terms arise during the 
interview. 
Questionnaire is using a set of questions with respondents to obtain a set of data. It 
can be administered by the researcher him/herself (interviewer-administered) or by 
the respondent (self-administered). Questionnaires are flexible, and can be 
administered through various communication means such as telephone, email, on-
line, postal, delivery and collection as well as through a structured interview, 
requiring the presence of both interviewer and respondents. The design of a 
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questionnaire has a causal relationship with the degree of validity and reliability of 
the data, as does the appropriateness of the respondent’s familiarity with the 
research issue (which includes the size of the sample, characteristics of the 
respondent, types and numbers of questions). A questionnaire is not suitable for 
exploratory research, but can help to interpret the data because it is gathered in a 
standardised way.  
1.9.7 Research Design 
Research design is defined as a: 
“Plan for collecting and analysing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to 
answer whatever questions he or she has posed. The design of an investigation touches almost 
all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the selection of the 
techniques of data analysis”.65 
There is a difference between research design in quantitative and qualitative 
research. If the first is usually elaborated prior to research plan, the latter is more of a 
process that runs through the whole length of a project. It begins as a description of 
the researcher’s original view of the problem, theoretical and methodological 
commitments, and the way these affect the research and are affected by it as the 
research proceeds. 66  A good research design will contain a purpose, conceptual 
context, methods and validity, all of which connect to the research question. The 
research design of this study is illustrated below (Figure 1.3).  
1.9.8 Triangulation 
Because both quantitative and qualitative data will be required, a combination of 
research strategies and methods is necessary. Triangulation is defined as  
“mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic... 
to help in validating ...” 67 
In this research, triangulation is used primarily to ensure that as much data can be 
gathered to complement the lack of data when only one method is used. Three 
methods and strategies will be used in this research: secondary data, survey, and 
case study. 
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Figure 1.3 Research Design 
 
Source: Author 
Type of Data 
There are two kinds of data needed for the study: primary and secondary. Secondary 
literature - documents, statistics, policy documents - can be obtained from national 
archives, government websites, industry websites, and so on. Primary data were 
collected through a survey, in the form of questionnaires, interviews and case 
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studies. Group discussion will also be used to discuss and find the deeper meaning 
behind questionnaire data.  
Time Horizon  
In terms of time horizon, a longitudinal study was employed as it was not sufficient 
to study different periodisation by using cross-sectional approach. The reason for 
this was the need to capture the dynamics of offset implementation during 1986-
2014, spanning across the three periods when the strategic industries were in a state 
of development (1988-1998), survival (1999-2009), and revitalisation (2010-2014). 
Hereafter, these periods have been termed Stage One, Stage Two and Stage Three, 
respectively, as shown in Table 1.2. below. 
Table 1.2 Principal Case Studies with Selected Sub Case Studies 
Period 
Sub Case Study 
Aerospace Shipbuilding Land systems 
First Offset Stage  F-16 fighter jet 
programme 
FPB 57 Fast Patrol 
Boat (FPB) 
programme 
Scorpion light 
tank programme 
Second Offset Stage KT-1 Wong Bee 
trainer aircraft 
programme 
Landing Platform 
Dock (LPD) 
programme 
Tarantula IFV 
programme 
Third Offset Stage N295 transport 
aircraft 
programme 
Guided missile 
destroyer escort 
(PKR) 
programme 
Caesar howitzer 
155 and Mistral 
Source: Fieldwork research at PT DI, PT Pindad, PT Pal, April 2014-August 2015  
Embedded Case Study Design  
The case study approach was conducted in each of three principal strategic 
industries. The purpose is to achieve a level of validation that cannot be obtained 
through a general survey. This study addressed offset implementation across three 
sectors of Indonesian defence industry, comprising aerospace (Indonesian 
Aerospace, PT DI), maritime (PT Pal), and land systems/ammunition (PT Pindad). 
The three case study firms represent the sectoral lead integrator of arms production 
and biggest contributor to defence procurement. PT DI represents 100% of the 
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aerospace sector, and while PT Pal and PT Pindad possess lower sectoral shares, they 
do represent the biggest company in each of their respective defence sectors. Due to 
their status as state-owned ‘strategic industries’ they have also been prioritised as the 
major receivers of offset programmes. 
This research employed an embedded case study design; meaning that within a 
single case, attention is given to subunits (sub case studies). For example, for the case 
study of aerospace, attention is given to three different offset programmes across 
three different stages of offset development. Subunits were selected on the basis of 
their representativeness in each offset development period and the availability of 
near-complete data.  
Stage Sampling of Offset Development and the Selection of Sub Case Studies  
Sampling is necessary as a means of choosing the appropriate case, group and 
material in a way that the study can be conducted within the resources constraint. 
This study used purposive sampling, through a combination of quota and snowball 
sampling. The first sampling frame for analysis related to the population of 
government institutions which were or are linked to offset policy-making and 
practice, these are the Agency for Strategic Industry Management (BPIS), as the 
former lead agency and the Committee for Defence Industry Policy (KKIP), as the 
current lead agency. The implementation of offset through procurement is conducted 
by the Directorate of Defence Technology and Industry (Direktorat Tekinhan, DIT 
TEKINHAN) under the Directorate General of Defence Potential (Direktorat Jendral 
Potensi Pertahanan, DITJEN POTHAN) and the Defence Facilities Agency (Badan 
Sarana dan Prasarana Pertahanan, BARANAHAN) at the Ministry of Defence 
(Kementerian Pertahanan, KEMHAN). Defence industrialisation is closely related to 
technology policy, which falls under the authority of the Ministry for Research and 
Technology/ Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (Badan 
Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi,BPPT), and development policy is formulated by 
the National Development Planning Body (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, 
BAPPENAS). The implementation of offset binds two stakeholders: national defence 
industry and foreign OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) as the offset 
provider.  
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The second sampling level was aimed at targeting people in the strategic industries. 
The sampling must be treated differently in accordance with each offset development 
stage. While it was difficult to trace the heads of programmes in offset stage one, 
with some of these programmes having been conducted 30 years ago, sufficient 
amounts of information were generated by mixing interviews with people involved 
in the programme with secondary sources. Sampling for offset stage two and three 
were mostly aimed at the heads of the offset programmes (LPD, KT Wong Bee, 
Tarantula, N-295, PKR), and those with sufficient involvement in the programmes. 
‘Sufficient’ in this context means that the respondent was directly involved in the 
programme carrying considerable responsibility; for instance, in contracting, 
designing and supervising the offset programme.  
The way the researcher approached the sampling was through her role as a 
government consultant at BAPPENAS and KEMHAN. During her work as a 
consultant, the researcher was involved in a number of seminal researches, such as 
the profiling of the defence industry (2011-2012), an assessment of defence 
acquisition (2012), offset policy formulation (2013), as well as defence industry 
mapping and assessment (2014). Through these projects the researcher acquired 
access to the primary data sources and access to primary and secondary data (in the 
form of government reports).68 
Data Collection  
Triangulation was employed to overcome the potential of bias. For this purpose, the 
research used multiple sources of evidence - comprising primary (survey and 
interview) and secondary sources (unpublished government reports, company 
profiles, reputable databases of newspapers like factiva and lexisnexis) - and 
multiple types of data collecting methods. The survey and interviews were 
conducted over three time-periods. The first preliminary survey throughout 
December 2011- January 2012 yielded insignificant results, the fact that only one of 
the three firms surveyed understood the offset surveys and the other two could not 
answer the questions rendered the questionnaire invalid.69 Following a two-year 
stopgap70, the second and third surveys and interviews were conducted in mid-2014 
(April-June) and early to mid-2015 (January-August).  
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Table 1.3 Data Collection Activities 
 Objective Target Timeframe 
Preliminary 
survey 
To compile the population of the offset 
case study and industry’s perception 
on offset 
Sampling 2 (PT DI, 
PT Pal, PT Pindad) 
December 
2011-January 
2012 
Survey I To gain insight intothe 
understandingof leadership of the 
three companies on offset as a concept, 
government policy related to offset, 
offset life cycle, and the impact of 
offset to the companies in the past 
Sampling 2 (PT DI, 
PT Pal, PT Pindad)  
April-May 
2013 
Interviews  To generate data on offset policy and 
implementation through different 
stages of offset development 
Sampling 1 (BPIS, 
Bappenas, BPPT, 
MoD, KKIP, BPPT) 
April 2014–
June 2014 
Survey II To evaluate the impact of offset on 
aerospace, maritime, and ammunition 
and land systems  
Sampling 2 (PT DI, 
PT Pal, PT Pindad) 
April 2014- 
August 2015 
Source: Author 
While the first and the second data collections were targeted at the leadership level 
of companies, the interviews were targeted at project manager level and the staff 
directly involved in the offset programme. Respondents were selected through non 
purposive and snowball sampling, in which a ‘gatekeeper’ was identified and 
employed in each respective company. 71 The presence of the gatekeeper was crucial 
in identifying respondents with suitable experience of offset, some of which are 
former senior staff that have already left the company.  
1.9.9 Data Analysis 
There are two important considerations in data analysis: validity and reliability. 
Validity concerns whether the findings are really about what they appear to be 
about. According to Robson, there are factors that can undermine the validity of a 
research: history, testing, instrumentation, mortality, maturation and ambiguity 
about causal direction.72  Ensuring validity of research means that the data collection 
should be held at the most neutral time and condition to minimise bias. Reliability 
can be measured by testing whether the same result will be achieved if similar 
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research were to be undertaken by other researchers, on other occasions. The key to 
maintaining research reliability is minimising subject and observer error and bias.  
The use of triangulation in data collection is arguably among the most important 
steps taken to ensure validity and reliability of the research findings. Longitudinal 
approach also ensured that the conditions when data collections have been 
conducted are varied. Although the choice of sampling was initially supplied by the 
gatekeeper, it was not solely limited to the recommendations of gatekeeper. Some of 
the key respondents have been identified through literature review - specifically 
news on offset - and, in some cases, names were found coincidentally during the time 
the researcher worked with the government and defence industry.  
Data were gathered and stored using a word processor and excel, to be coded and 
analysed in two ways: cross cutting three periods within one case study and cross 
cutting three subcase studies. This ensured that the findings do not carry bias of one 
sector only, or one offset stage only. The research did not aim for generalisation only, 
but also identification of the variations across industry sectors and offset periods for 
the purpose of generating ‘lessons learned’. This was in line with the significance of 
the study, as discussed in the previous sections.   
1.9.10 Ethical Considerations 
Research ethics concerns the responsibility to carry out research in way that 
minimises potential harm to people who will be implicated by the research; this 
includes vulnerable research subjects (from violation that might cause harm both 
physically and psychologically), the researcher her/himself and the institution where 
she/he belongs (from law suit and tainted reputation). To ensure the highest 
standard of ethics will be upheld, the researcher and her/his principal investigator 
need to be aware of several issues, including competency, consent of the research 
subject, protection of a participant’s welfare, confidentiality and balancing 
obligation. Competence means the researcher must exhibit knowledge of research 
methods or have received proper research training. Protection means the researcher 
must acknowledge the interests and rights of the participant (voluntary 
participation). Confidentiality means the researcher keeps confidential any 
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information generated from professional interaction with the participant. Balancing 
obligations means the researcher must be aware of his/her obligation to society, 
funder/employers, colleagues and the subject of the research, and be able to manage 
conflicts of interest in a way that would not harm the research subject and 
institution/profession which he/she represents. 
To uphold the highest possible degree of research ethics, the study have taken 
several precautions, as follows: 
(1) In undertaking field research, the researcher has always introduced herself 
and institution she represented and explained the purpose of research 
without any deception whatsoever.  
(2) Considering defence procurement is a sensitive issue, there might be 
instances in which research subjects refuse to be interviewed, or withdraw 
participation after giving an interview. For this purpose, the researcher has 
briefed the subject on her/his right to terminate participation at any given 
time, that she/he will have to give consent prior to any participation, have 
the right for anonymity if necessary, and have the right to check the 
researcher’s notes after the interview has concluded. 
(3) The researcher ensured the safety and storage of interview records, to be used 
solely by the researcher and not to be disseminated without approval. 
1.10 Study Structure 
The structure of this study is organised around six chapters. Chapter one contains 
the nuts and bolts of the introduction into the what, why and how aspects of the 
study. Chapter two will scrutinise the literature on development, industrialisation 
and technology development though strategic industry and technology 
indigenisation through offsets. Chapter three will undertake a broad sweep across 
the conceptual and empirical aspects of offset. The why, what, and how aspects of 
offset will be discussed, with a focus on the discrepancy between strategic objectives 
and the complexity of implementation. The thrust of this chapter is to evaluate how 
offset is implemented, emphasising the shortcomings of methodology, and the 
limited number of proper case studies of offset evaluation to provide justification for 
the  ‘matrix’ of offset evaluation. Chapter four will explore the two opposite 
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mainstreams of the Indonesian economic schools of thought, which are Habibienomics 
and Wijojonomics that influence the development and technological planning in 
Indonesia. A major portion of this chapter will be dedicated to Habibienomics, which 
basically represents economic nationalism, a sentiment that has always been at the 
forefront of intellectual debate, due to insecurity fears brought about by foreign 
intervention. Habibie’s concept of catch-up industrialisation through ‘strategic 
industries’ and technology development through a ‘progressive manufacturing plan’ 
represent the encapsulation of Indonesia’s spirit of self-sufficiency in the globalised 
world. The chapter will also discuss the flexibility of Habibie’s strategy that became 
the pretext for defence offset. Chapter five will discuss the three different periods in 
which offset was implemented in Indonesia: the development of strategic industries 
(1988-1998), survival (1999-2009) and revitalisation of defence Industries (2010-2014). 
The imperative behind this stage approach is the ‘gap’ in offset implementation, 
created by the economic crisis of late 1990s. The crisis effectively halted the defence 
industrialisation process through termination of government subsidies and the 
introduction of a competitive procurement policy. Each of the periods will explore 
three subcase studies of offset programmes representing each defence industry - PT 
DI/IPTN, PT PAL, PT Pindad - and assess how offsets have been implemented. The 
contribution of offset will be evaluated through six variables: job creation; skill 
enhancement; transfer of technology; creation of supply chains; promotion of export; 
and R&D. Chapter six will offer conclusions, based on the key findings, and also 
recommendation for future policy and further research. 
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22. FROM DEVELOPMENT… TO DEFENCE ‘AND’ DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose and structure of this chapter is to locate offset within the academic 
literature on economic development. In order to do so, there is need to undertake a 
broad sweep across the interrelated literature from development, industrialisation, 
technology-development and transfer mechanisms, to ‘strategic industrialisation’. 
There is a risk of trading-off in-depth studies and brushing the surface of a handful 
of seminal works. Arguably, this trade off is necessary to provide an adequate 
background to argue that offset - a highly specialised topic located under the 
intellectual umbrella of defence economics - is actually related to the study of a 
developing economy. The challenge here is to draw a clear connection between the 
principal components of scholarship to put the debate in a logical sequence as the 
basis for launching the ultimate argument that defence offset should not be seen as 
irregular transaction in defence procurement, but rather as a strategy used by 
developing countries for development. 
The opening section of this chapter will evaluate various influential development 
strategies crafted over the last 50 years. Development is different from economic 
growth; the latter is defined as an increase in total output that occurs either because 
the inputs of the factors of production (land, labour, capital) increase or because 
equivalent quantities of the inputs are being used more efficiently.1  Development is 
rather the qualitative aspect of growth, examining the economic, industrial and 
technological nature of wealth-creation that takes countries to a higher stage of 
development.  Stage theory from Rostow is used to explain economic ‘take-off’, a 
condition that leads to self-sustained growth. The balanced vs unbalanced growth 
debate is used to explain two opposite strategies - ‘big push’ and ‘lead sector’ - in 
kick-starting industrialisation and escaping from the vicious cycle of poverty. 
Industrialisation is believed to be the key concept for growth; it is measured by the 
presence of plants involved in manufacturing capital goods as well as processing raw 
material into finished goods. Technology has been widely accepted as having an 
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imperative role in fostering industrialisation in developing countries, helping 
diversification of the economy to move-up the ladder of production.  
The second part of the study will critically review how technology is understood, 
through discussion of the process of technology invention, innovation, and diffusion. 
This part will start with discussion on the need for developing countries to catch-up 
and break free from dependency on advanced countries. Technology itself is a 
contextual concept; therefore, adopting foreign technology implies the need for 
adjusting the transferee’s local conditions with that of the transferor. Various transfer 
mechanisms will be discussed, such as Foreign Direct Investment and offset, to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of every conduit appropriate in the context 
of developing countries, in general, and Indonesia, in particular. As technology 
transfer is not free, the barriers to technology access and the costs of technology 
transfer will also be discussed to complete the mosaic.  
The third part of the study will discuss the various strategies to technology 
development, including the Western, Soviet, East Asian and Africa models. The 
importance of examining the major features of each model - comprising the 
transformation process, defining characteristics and development goals - is to obtain 
a grasp of ‘circumstantial technological sensitivity’. Technology diffusion, 
internationally as well as regionally, will be assessed to understand how technology 
transfer occurs across firms and across countries/regions. 
The last part of the chapter will discuss technology development in the context of 
latecomers, carrying two options: to make, or to buy. The imperfection of the 
technology market calls for government involvement, which is conducted through 
procurement policy of advanced technology - one of which is military technology. 
Developing countries with rudimentary defence industrial capability are torn 
between make and buy choices. Globalisation achieves cost efficiency but at the cost 
of greater dependency on foreign technology; while autarky implies independence, 
but at the cost of economic viability. Either way, arms procurement carries an 
opportunity cost.  
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2.2 The Purpose of Offset: Industrial and Technological Development 
Development has been the preoccupation of every country, yet it remains largely an 
unsolved puzzle. There have been many attempts to define and measure 
development. In a broader sense, development is a normative concept, which implies 
economic, social, political and cultural transformation that should not be seen as the 
end but a means to enhance social well-being and quality of human life.2 Since 
quality of life is inseparable from human needs and values - which could be 
perceived differently from one society to another - measuring development has been 
a challenge. At first, development was seen as synonymous with growth3; in practice, 
this would be GNP (Gross National Product) or GNI (Gross National Income). This 
approach was soon criticised because defining development as growth has its limits. 
First, an increase in GNP per capita does not necessarily mean that the quality of life 
of a country’s population is improving, unless there is equality in the distribution of 
wealth.4 Second, GNP growth can have either positive or negative benefits.5 
A more humanistic approach to measuring development was proposed by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the form of a Human 
Development Index (HDI) and Gender Sensitive Development Index (GSDI) (UNDP, 
no year).6 However, despite its limitations, growth is still seen as the main metric of 
development. The World Bank, for instance, categorises a country’s development 
based on economic growth measured in GNI per capita - previously referred to as 
GNP.7This results in the categorisation of low (USD1,005 or less), lower-middle 
(USD1,006-3,975), upper-middle (USD3,976-12,275) and high-income groups 
(USD12,276 or more). The low and middle-income groups are sometimes referred to 
as developing countries. Indonesia falls under the category of a lower-middle income 
economy together with India, Sudan, and Kosovo.  
It was, and still is, believed that development would address the backwardness 
problem of LDCs. The World Bank believed that the estimated growth (1965-1984) 
for low income countries was 2.8 percent, compared to 2.4 percent of the more 
developed Western countries; hence, if it can be sustained in the long term, growth 
would enable the LDCs to ‘close the gap’ with developed countries. However, after 
four decades of development, not only could the LDCs not catch-up with the DCs, 
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but they also fell into deeper problems associated with wealth distribution and 
inequality, landlessness, urban bias, unemployment, underemployment, natural 
disaster, health, hunger, population growth, deprivation, inequality, and so on.8 In 
2001, the UNDP found that while many countries in Latin America and East Asia 
have moved beyond the basic threshold of HDI and GSDI, South Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa are still trapped at low levels of development. 9 Some countries have 
made significant progress since kick-starting development, some have not. Questions 
remain: how to break free from the vicious cycle of poverty and how to achieve not 
only development but also sustainable development, enabling the LDCs to catch-up 
with the DCs? 
Numerous theories have tried to explain what generates growth and how. Brue 
(1999) examined six divergent analyses of economic growth and development.10 The 
first is the simple yet powerful Harrod-Domar equation (1948, 1957), which 
postulates that economies must save and invest a certain proportion of their GNP in 
order to grow: the more they save, the faster they grow.11 The second is Solow’s 
growth theory (1956), which found that increases in labour and capital inputs only 
explain less than half of economic growth; the ‘residual’ being technological 
progress.12 The third is Schumpeter (1911, 1954) who argues that the key process in 
economic change is the introduction of innovations and the central innovator is the 
entrepreneur.13 He further argues that innovations do not occur continuously, but 
rather occur via industrial clusters. The fourth growth theory is postulated by 
Nurkse (1952, 1959) who argues for balanced development for poor countries to 
break away from the vicious cycle of poverty and advance.  The fifth is Lewis’ theory 
on economic growth which explains the dual-economy phenomenon in developing 
countries; a division of the economy into two sectors, traditional rural subsistence 
sector and modern urban industrial sector. Lewis devises the labour supply theory of 
rural-urban migration theory (1955) rationalising the importance of a dual economy 
because the agricultural sector serves as a labour reserve for the industrial sector, 
whereas the industrial sector is capable of expanding due to the hidden-capital 
reserve until the labour surplus in the agricultural sector is used up. This helps to 
explain how expansion of national output and income happens in developing 
countries and creates ‘self-sustained’ growth and development. The last theory came 
from Schultz (1961) who emphasises the importance of human capital.  
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According to Todaro (1989), labour and capital accumulations are both important 
inputs for development growth, but focusing on them would not be sufficient. He 
defers to Solow, Schumpeter and Schultz who emphasise the importance of a third 
input: technological progress. He concludes that investment improves the quality of 
existing physical and human resources, increases the quantity of these same 
productive resources, and raises the productivity of all resources. Invention, 
innovation and technological progress have been, and will continue to be, primary 
factors in stimulating economic growth in any society.14 
2.2.1 Adam Smith - The Liberalisation Guru 
The father of the modern economy, Adam Smith, published his famous treatise (An 
Inquiry to the Nature and Causes of the) Wealth of Nations in 1776, the same year that 
America proclaimed Independence, but before the industrial revolution occurred in 
Great Britain. Smith’s book can be seen as a testament of freedom in the economic 
realm. Smith promotes the idea of laissez-faire, free trade, and minimal government 
intervention, all of which have become the tenets of economic liberalism. He also 
introduces the concept of specialisation and competitiveness that he believed to be 
the main features of the (international) division of labour. 
To promote economic growth, Smith (1776) believes in economic freedom rather than 
systematic intervention. The role of government/sovereign is only required for 
eliminating monopolies and preserving competition.15 He emphasises rationality of 
humanand a self-regulatory market, which through the presence of ‘invisible hand’ 
economics will work automatically to correct market distortions. He encourages free 
trade and elimination of trade barriers, based on the theory of division of labour 
(which later was extended into an international division of labour)16. Smith sees trade 
as a positive sum game: every state will take profits from international trade because 
each has a distinctive competitiveness – dubbed as ‘absolute advantage’. It is derived 
from natural endowments that others would find difficult to challenge. Competition 
will force each player to focus on activities (s)he each do best.  In reality, the market 
is not perfect primarily because not all players can access information needed to ‘fix’ 
distortions and humans are not always rational.  
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2.2.2 Rostow’s “Take-off” Strategy 
In 1960, W.W. Rostow, an American economic historian, published The Stages of 
Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto that celebrated the idea of linear 
development stages. The fact that his book title openly opposed the Communist 
Manifesto proposed by Marx is perhaps linked to the geopolitics setting of the Cold 
War. In similarity to Marx, Rostow (1960) believes that development is a linear 
historical process. Rostow’s development stages are different from those his 
predecessors offered; they consist of five stages: traditional society, pre-condition, take-
off, drive to maturity, and age of high mass consumption.17 According to Rostow, take-off 
is the most important stage because it enables society to progress from a traditional 
stage to a modern stage with high mass consumption. 
The pre-condition stage is characterised by increased transport investment to enlarge 
the market and production specialisation, the revolution in agriculture, and the 
expansion of imports. The take-off stage is characterised by a decisive expansion 
occurring over 20-30 years, which radically transforms a country’s economy because 
barriers to steady growth are finally overcome, forces for making widespread 
economic progress dominate the society, and growth becomes a normal condition. 
The drive to maturity is characterised by a period of growth that is regular, expected, 
and self-sustained. Furthermore, Rostowargues that to enable take-off, it is necessary 
to get three conditions in place: (1) an increase in productive investment of more 
than 10% of national income; (2) development of one or more manufacturing sectors 
with a high rate of growth; (3) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social 
and institutional framework that will reinforce the moves towards expansion in the 
modern sector.18 If Marx emphasises the labour factor in the mobility of development 
stage, Rostow gives emphasis to capital accumulation, investment and 
manufacturing through a ‘leading sector’ approach. 
Rostow’s precondition to take-off stage, despite being widely acclaimed, suffers from 
a lack of supporting historical fact. Nevertheless, the term is widely used to describe 
the necessary conditions for initiating self-sustained growth. Rostow’s prerequisite 
for upward mobility in development stages, which give emphasis to capital 
accumulation and investment, echoes the Harrod Domar equation, and convinced 
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governments of the importance of capital. In the context of LDCs, this had been 
translated into massive doses of aid and foreign capital. Rostow’s concept of a 
leading sector also echoes that of his predecessor Hirschmann (1958), who argues the 
need for a ‘leading sector’ to set off development.  
2.2.3 Balanced v Unbalanced Growth Models 
Balanced versus unbalanced growth has been for a long time the most prominent 
contemporary debate in development strategies. The debate is essentially about how 
best to initiate a development process. The core of this debate is the ‘big push’ versus 
‘lead sector’ conundrum. It revolves around the question as to whether investment 
should be focused on one leading industrial sector or should be spread across all 
industrial sectors in the economy.  
Although the term ‘balanced growth’ was first advocated by Nurske (1953), the 
original formula can be traced back to the ‘big push theory’ advocated by Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943). Big push theory is about the simultaneous establishment of some 
complementary industries (coordinated investment programme), to secure positive 
externalities, and to allow the creation of a domestic market big enough for creating 
its own, self-propelled effective demand. 19  Externalities are impacts created by 
individual producers or consumers, whose effects are felt elsewhere in the 
economy.20 The argument for a ‘big push’ rests upon the effort to break the ‘vicious 
circle of poverty’, a theorythat argues low productivity, low incomes, and low levels 
of living are mutually reinforcing phenomena.21 Nurkse  (1953) sees balanced growth 
as a necessity to create market inducements to invest and achieve greater 
diversification.22 In the context of LDCs, diversification is essential to overcome trade 
barriers to their export in international trade. Scitovsky (1959) highlights the 
importance of complementarity and the related external economy; that it is 
imperative to have central co-ordination of investment decisions. Balanced theory 
implies the need for centrally planned industrialisation with the same rate of growth 
across all sectors.   
Hirschman (1958) criticises balanced growth theory for its unrealistic view. It is 
lacking in elaboration on how underdeveloped countries can obtain the required 
62 
administrative capacity to carry out a balanced growth programme and how to get 
the necessary resources for investment. He argues that LDCs do not have abundant 
sources of sound government decision making and entrepreneurship, and therefore 
it is better to concentrate these scarce resources on a few sectors rather than 
stretching them thinly. In reality, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the 
same rate of output from every sector as postulated by balanced growth theory, 
because some sectors could grow faster than others. Thus, Hirschman proposes an 
alternative ‘unbalanced growth theory’. He suggests that investment be poured into 
key industries with forward and backward linkages. Backward linkages refer to 
linkage from a particular industry to its suppliers. This can be measured through an 
interdependence ratio, the ratio of total purchases value from other branches sales 
value to total demand value. Forward linkages refer to linkages between industry 
and its users. Linkages are important because they relate to positive externalities, or 
benefits to the broader economy.  
Mathur (1966) argues that the two different theories are neither opposite nor 
contradictory; instead, they are mutually reinforcing23. He sees balanced-growth as 
the ultimate objective, whereas unbalanced-growth is the means of achieving it. 
When comparing the features of the two theories, he found similarities between 
balanced and unbalanced growth, such as the need for overhead investment, and 
when it comes to avoiding shortages, the two theories are actually mutually 
supportive.  
2.2.4 Development Through Trade 
The impact of trade on developing country’s development has been a subject of 
intense debate between the free trade advocates and the pragmatists. The central 
argument of trade as the engine of growth is based on the idea of comparative 
advantage and international division of labour. Neo-classical growth theory argues 
that foreign trade could be used as an effective ‘engine of growth’. History testifies 
that a large part of economic growth has actually been generated by exports. The 
core of the trade and development theory argument is comparative cost, which rests 
on the idea raised by classical economist David Ricardo. His argument about the 
principle of comparative advantage revolves around the idea of relative cost and 
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price differences: a country will specialise in the export of products that can be 
produced at the lowest relative cost. This way, even the most imbalanced trade will 
still be able to generate profit to all participants.  
Prebisch (1950, 1959) witnesses the failure of Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
theory when Argentina lost its comparative advantage in the beef and wheat markets 
due to the Great Depression and growing US economic domination. The prolonged 
crisis in the Western hemisphere made it difficult for LDCs to import manufactured 
goods. The fact that the price of primary goods also fell reinforced Prebisch’s doubts 
on comparative advantage theory. Prebisch and Singer (1950) observe that there is an 
international division of labour between periphery states that produce and export 
raw materials, and centre states that specialise in the production of manufactured 
goods. The division puts periphery states at a disadvantage because raw materials 
are subject to deteriorating terms of trade vis-a-vis industrialised countries, and the 
gains from trade are accumulated in the centre states.24 Therefore, Singer suggests 
that instead of specialising in the export of commodities, the periphery should 
attempt to change the whole structure of comparative advantage by promoting 
industrialisation. The Singer-Prebisch thesis was supported by scholars and staffs of 
the Economic Mission for Latin America (ECLA) - a UN development programme in 
Latin America that later established what came to be known as dependency 
theory/structuralism.  
Singer and Myrdal question the developmental effect of international trade. Myrdal 
(1957) agrees that free trade might have a ‘spread effect’ in the short term, but in the 
long term he warns of the ‘backwash’ effect that might lead to underdevelopment. 
He criticises free trade for the tendency to aggravate the existing gap between DCs 
and LDCs, because the expansion of market would favour those with developed 
industries. The Dependency school’s conception of industrialisation is commonly 
represented in the industrialisation strategy of import substituting industrialisation 
(ISI). Its aim is to achieving independence in manufactured goods by replacing 
previously imported manufactured goods with local goods.25Arguably, because it is 
almost impossible for newly built local industry to compete with more established 
industry from core countries, support for local industry is required.  
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Wallerstein (1979) argues that upward and downward mobility in the international 
division of labour is made possible. He uses the experience of NICs to propose the 
idea of a semi-periphery as intermediate countries that shift upwards from the 
periphery and act as a buffer between the core and the periphery, buying high-tech 
products from the former and exporting semi-manufactures to them while importing 
raw material from the periphery.  
Contrary to dependency theory, neo-classical growth theory argues that whether a 
country is weak or strong in international trade is not an imperative, as long as it can 
optimise its power by concentrating on activities in which it is relatively more 
powerful. Ultimately, trade will contribute to the diffusion of technology, expanding 
market opportunities, and encourage upward mobility.26 The key to benefitting from 
international trade is minimal government intervention and barriers. Neo-liberalists 
argue that many problems of development can actually be traced back to misguided 
government intervention. They also argue that openness did not preclude LDC 
industrialisation but rather encouraged technological adaptation, learning and 
entrepreneurial maturation.   
2.2.5 ‘Catch Up’ Industrialisation Strategy: The Critical Role of Government 
Planning 
Industrialisation has been seen as the principal hope for LDCs to improve levels of 
income. Chenery (1960) points out that increases in per capita income are 
accompanied by industrialisation or increases of industrial output.27 Industrialisation 
can be defined as the change in an economy from one that depends primarily on 
agriculture to one that eventually relies on manufacturing activity. The first 
industrialisation occurred in eighteenth century Great Britain. Although not 
immediately ignited, industrialisation was closely related to the invention and 
application of technology.28 A decade after the British embarked on industrialisation, 
other countries followed by adopting and indigenising the technological innovations 
of British industry. Industrialisation that soon followed in Western Europe and 
America was termed ‘catch-up industrialisation’. 
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There is neither a common definition for industrialisation nor agreed basic 
characteristics of the manner in which it manifests itself.29 Industrialisation is pretty 
much a regional phenomenon that takes place within Western countries; the 
characteristics – despite close resemblance – are not materialising at the same pace 
and level in all industrialising regions. Industrialisation has been measured by the 
presence of plants involved in manufacturing ‘capital’ goods as well as the 
processing of raw material into finished goods. Kuznets sees the expansion of 
manufacturing’s contribution to increasing per capita income as one of the most 
important indicators of industrialisation.30 When Sutcliffeintroduces a three-in-one 
test to measure industrialised country status in the 1960s31, he finds that only a small 
number of developing countries could pass this test, aside from their developed 
counterparts; these included Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, 
Japan, Australasia, Argentina, Hongkong, Malta and Singapore; whereas Israel, 
Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Portugal were on the borderline.  
Manufacturing is seen as the engine for growth in the promotion of industrialisation. 
Compared to agriculture and the services industry, manufacturing is believed to be 
more productive and has proven empirical correlation to increases in GNP. 
Manufacturing also offers special opportunities compared to agriculture, such as 
capital accumulation, economies of scale, embodied and disembodied technological 
process, as well as stronger linkage and spill over effects.32 
According to Chenery and Srinivasan (1989), every developing country attempting 
industrialisation will face three strategic options: export primary products and 
import manufactured goods; launch domestic production of manufactured goods 
that were initially imported (import-substitution industrialisation); and export 
manufactured goods (export-oriented industrialisation). The choice between Import 
Substituting Industrialisation and Export Oriented Industrialisation is often 
contradictory, but in a sense it is analogous to the stages of industrialisation in which 
the latter cannot occur if the first had not taken place. ISI was famous in the early 
independence (post World War II) period, whereas EOI began to a rise in the early 
1960s notably in East Asia.  
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ISI became the principal industrialisation strategy of LDCs in the early 1950s. The 
key concept for ISI is the infant industry argument, dating back to the idea advocated 
by Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List in the nineteenth century, and the 
international trade/division of labour as advocated by the dependency theorists 
mentioned earlier. According to Prebisch, ISI was meant to halt transfer of the 
surplus from the periphery to the core country.33 The main device used for this 
purpose was restricting importation of manufactured goods in the form of tariffs, 
quotas and multiple exchange rates to offset the difficulty in the balance of 
payments.34 
ISI was adopted predominantly in Latin American and Asian countries, but the latter 
abandoned the strategy in 1960s. When Sutcliffe surveys industrialisation in LDCs, 
he finds that some Latin American countries like Argentine and Chile had actually 
regressed; even though they kick-started industrialisation earlier than other 
developing countries, they were slow in generating new jobs.35   ISI is criticised 
because too much government intervention can create an inefficient allocation of 
resources. Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) list several basic weaknesses as shown in 
Table 2.1 below.  
Table 2.1 Critique of Import Substituting Industrialisation 
Intrinsic 
problems of 
government 
interference 
Excessive administrative regulations gave rise to bureaucratisation, 
corruption, uncertainty and delays and thus discouraged productive 
private initiative 
Bias against 
export 
The existence of import restriction led to a higher exchange rate than 
would have prevailed under a free-trade regime, reducing the relative 
gains obtained from exporting. 
Bias against 
agriculture 
The protection of local industry raised the price of manufactured goods 
relative to the agricultural product in the home market and the 
overvalued exchange rate reduced the domestic currency receipts for 
agricultural export. 
Under utilisation 
of installed 
capacity 
Since import controls did not equally apply to capital goods and since 
credit for installing machinery was relatively cheap, factories were over 
equipped. Moreover protection in product markets made it possible to 
earn good profits even at low capacity utilisation 
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Under utilisation 
of labour 
Capital goods could be obtained relatively cheaply due to the combined 
of over-valued exchange rates, low import restrictions for such goods 
and subsidised financing conditions, resulting in a bias against 
employment of labour. 
Import intensity 
of ISI 
While the importation of consumer goods was reduced substantially, this 
was achieved at the expense of increased imports of equipment and 
materials, resulting-contrary to expectations- in an even more rigid 
dependence on foreign supplies and renewed foreign exchange crisis. 
The slowing 
down of ISI 
Although initially industry can grow faster than domestic demand for 
manufactures, LDCs soon run out of import substitution possibilities. 
After than growth rates can only be maintained by a growth in domestic 
demand or in export, but by then the structure and inefficiency of 
industry stand in the way of conquering export market 
Source: Little, S. and Scott (1970). Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries. Oxford University 
Press and the OECD Development Center.  
The other side of industrialisation strategy, EOI (Export-Oriented Industrialisation) 
has been associated with the emergence of NICs in Asia. Weiss studies the extent to 
which industrialisation of developing countries has changed the economic structure 
of these economies, and how uneven industrial development has occurred within 
groups of developing countries. 36  He measures structural change caused by 
industrialisation through manufacturing growth, change in the proportion of workforce 
engaged in manufacturing or industry, in general, composition of 
manufacturingoutput, and composition of export. According to Weiss, since the 1960s the 
inequality between countries has increased rather than diminished. As a result of this 
inequality, a new classification had to be introduced to address a new group of rapid 
industrialising countries, becoming known as the NICs.37 The different between NICs 
and LDCs is described in Table 2.2. 
The emergence of the NICs in Asia helped to propel a new discourse on alternative 
development paths for LDCs. Economists, however, did not see the ‘Asian miracle’ 
in the same light. The prominent factor responsible for this phenomenon remained in 
dispute, but the role of EOI was acknowledged, alongside capital accumulation, and 
technological progress.38 
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Table 2.2 Differing Characteristics between NICs and LDCs 
NICs LDCs 
The role of manufacture varies markedly, but 
the average share of GDP is around 15 percent 
Small manufacturing role in the 
economy 
Diversification as well as expansion in 
manufacturing 
Economic growth since 1960s has been 
below the average for developing 
countries 
Trade pattern: increasing domestic production 
to substitute import; become main exporters of 
manufactures from LDC 
Manufacturing value-added per capita 
increase slightly at below 2 percent or 
under the average growth for 
developing countries at below 5 
percent 
Product exported: move to higher value 
commodities involving great processing of raw 
materials and more use of capital 
 
Source: Weiss, J. (1988). Industry in Developing Countries. Croom Helm.  
Debates on the essential features behind the success of NICs revolved around 
political, cultural and development strategy. Gereffi proposes three characteristics 
responsible for the success of NICs: the presence of the developmental state; cultural 
factors; and an outward-looking development strategy. 39  Quibria (2002) divides 
explanations behind the Asian miracle into primary and secondary factors. Primary 
factors exist in all NICs countries whereas secondary factors vary from one country 
to another. The primary factors are openness, macroeconomic stability, labour 
market flexibility, and education policy.40 
The success of NICs reignites discourse on the role of the 
government/developmental state in development. Previously the dependency 
theorists advocated strong governmental intervention in ISI strategy, but the 
approach was heavily criticised by neo-classical theorists that see markets as efficient 
(free-market analysis) and government cannot do anything right (public-choice 
theory). The need for selective governmental intervention had been acknowledged 
by Gerschenkron, who believes that in the context of catch-up industrialisation 
government intervention – primarily through planning – is essential to ensure that 
the initial development push occurs.41  According to Todaro (1989), since market 
failures are more widespread in LDCs, i.e. investment coordination, incomplete 
information, externalities in skill creation and learning, and economics of scale, 
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governments have a key role in facilitating the operation of the market through 
selective interventions, such as investing in physical and social infrastructure, health 
care facilities, educational institutions as well as providing a suitable climate for 
private enterprise.42 
2.3 Technological Development and Transfer Framework 
The correlation between technological innovation and the long-term dynamics of 
national economies was first suggested in the 1930s by Schumpeter, subsequent to 
Kondratieff who advocates the important role of technological change in shaping 
long-term cyclical trends in economic development. Historians Cameron and Neal 
suggest that history is replete with evidence on the major role played by technology 
in instigating the industrial revolution. The first industrial revolution saw the 
development of production (the factory), the mass production of textiles, the use of 
waterpower and access to cheap cotton (from the colonies); the second industrial 
revolution saw steam power; and the beginning of early 20th century saw electricity 
and mass production technologies.43 This century, it is impossible to dispute the 
tremendous impact of information and communication technology (ICT) on human 
life: it changes the way people communicate, study, shop, conduct business, and 
even conduct war.  
Technology is simply understood as goods, processes, methods of production, all of 
which adds value. Understanding of technology can be generated from different 
contexts, i.e. economic, engineering, social, as well as philosophical. Accordingly, 
Pelc concludes that technology could have a specifically tailored definition according 
to the context of disciplines that are neither synonymous nor convergent. 44 
Abramovich, Lall (1992), and Nelson and Sampat (2001) emphasise the importance of 
understanding technology not only in physical but also in social terms. Social 
technologies are embodied in organisational forms, bodies of law, public policies, 
codes of good business and administrative practice, customs, expectations and 
norms.45 These are preconditions for the effectiveness of operations as well as the 
transfer of physical technologies.  
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How technology relates to economic growth has been the focal point of the new 
growth theory. 46  The theory evolved from criticism on the Solow-Swan growth 
model: that in the absence of technical progress as a result of diminishing returns, a 
slowdown in growth will prevail.47  The model attempts to endogenise technical 
change through the use of external economies and spill over, and points to human 
capital (in addition to physical capital) as the determinant factor in economic 
growth. 48  The theory also examines the mechanism by which technology is 
transferred from one firm to another, within an industry in a single country and then 
across national borders. Innovation not only serves the country’s technical advances, 
but also could drive other countries’ growth through diffusion.  
2.3.1 Autarky and State’s Quest for Technology Change and Transfer 
The essence of technological change is the upgrading of technology: it means moving 
from a low-skill task to the production of complex components, making new 
products of higher value, moving-up the value chain, and eventually producing 
innovation. Technological change can be generated from indigenous learning or 
imitation/technology transfer. According to Schumpeter, new technology is first 
introduced by innovators and eventually imitated by competitors. The function of 
imitators is to restore perfect competition that had been distorted when the 
innovators gained excess profits due to their technological advantage. Therefore, 
technological change is not something static. Gershenkron (1951, 1962), Eaton and 
Kortum (1999) argue that possession of technology enables an innovative country to 
leave the others behind.49 
In the case of latecomers, the available technology stocks in an advanced country 
could mean the opportunity to kick-away the ladder and avoid recreating the wheels 
by imitating foreign technology. Geschenkron and Abramovic (1986) suggest that 
there is actually an advantage associated with being technologically laggard. 
Abramovicexplained the central idea of catch-up linked to the level of technology 
embodied in a country’s capital stock.50 A country where technology is invented and 
applied to industrialisation will have a technological age similar to its chronological 
age, but a technology recipient country will have a technological age relatively 
shorter than its chronological age due to the elapse of time needed to enable the 
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transfer. The catch-up hypothesis postulates that the bigger the backlog, the bigger 
the leap a latecomer country must achieve. The possibility of making this leap will be 
reduced as follower countries close in on the leader.  
The basic problem in technology catch-up is that it is not free and is always a 
challenging venture. 51  If successful, the latecomers that catch-up with the 
industrialised developing countries would be able to master innovations that had 
evolved over more than a century in the West in a much shorter period. NICs serve 
as a testimony of this process (see Table 2.3. below). All NICs are major customers of 
technology transfer, channelled primarily through licensed production and FDI.Their 
catch-up success is proven by the spectacular rates of export growth, especially 
during the first two periods of development (1961-1970 and 1971-1980). The average 
economic growth of the NICs during these periods is significantly higher than that of 
Southeast Asian countries. Taiwan recorded the highest average economic growth in 
that period. The electronics sector was the driver behind Taiwan’s rapid economic 
growth, which led to a tenfold increase in GDP per capita over the last four 
decades.52 South Korea was transformed from a war-torn country to the 15th largest 
economy in the world. Singapore was ejected from its hinterland Malaysia in early 
1960s with no natural endowment but manpower and rules of law; it is now the 
trading and transportation hub of Southeast Asia.  
Another imperative of technology transfer for catch-up is autarky or technological 
independence to ensure economic growth. This fits with the argument of 
dependency/structuralism theory, which advocates that technology could help 
developing countries overcome dependency on manufactured goods from developed 
countries by producing goods locally (import substitution). One example of the 
importance of technological independence is China, which was dependent on the 
import of Soviet capital goods from 1949-1957. When in the late 1950s the two 
engaged in a war, China was punished by a Soviet embargo. China’s economy was 
seriously affected by the embargo and as consequence it resorted to autarky until 
1978.53 
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Table 2.3 Decade Growth Rates for Selected Asian Economies 
Economy 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 
China 3.7 5.4 9.3 10.2 
Hong Kong  9.9 9.2 6.6 4.4 
Korea 8.3 7.8 8.7 6.3 
Taiwan 11.3 9.0 8.0 6.4 
Indonesia 4.2 7.9 6.3 4.4 
Malaysia 6.5 7.9 6.1 7.2 
Philippines 4.9 6.0 1.8 2.9 
Singapore  10.0 9.1 7.4 7.8 
Thailand 8.2 6.9 7.9 4.6 
Bangladesh 4.1 1.6 3.9 4.8 
India 3.9 3.1 5.9 5.3 
Pakistan 7.3 4.6 6.2 4.0 
Sri Lanka 4.6 4.6 4.3 5.2 
Japan 10.5 4.5 4.0 1.4 
Source: Dawling, J. M. and Valenzuela, R. (2004). Economic Development in Asia. Cengage Learning Asia. 
Technology adoption can also help the periphery countries to migrate vertically to 
intermediate status as experienced by the NICs. Technology is therefore an 
imperative factor in upgrading a country’s competitiveness in the international trade 
arena. Take the example of Singapore, which owns substantial oil refinery industries. 
Singapore imports raw oil from its neighbours and sells refined oil back to them and 
to other countries. In this context, Singapore’s technological advantage allows it to 
act as intermediate actor between raw material exporter and the buyer.  
Supranational institutions like the United Nations have also been urging for more 
technology transfer to developing countries. For example, the organisation believed 
diffusion of clean and climate-friendly technology would be the critical factor in both 
mitigating climate change and embarking on sustainable development in the 
disaster-prone countries. Seen from this point of view, diffusion of certain 
technologies can be beneficial for both transferor and transferee countries. 
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Indeed, research conducted by Easton and Kortum shows that diffusion of 
technology is actually beneficial for the inventor countries. 54  The research was 
conducted to measure quantitatively the research effort, growth productivity and the 
spread of technology across the US, Japan, France, UK and Germany. The authors 
believe that by eliminating international barriers to technology diffusion would not 
only bring productivity levels very close together but also would raise productivity.  
2.3.2 Conduits of Technology Transfer 
In the early stages of development, the NICs like Japan and South Korea attracted 
and used foreign technology, mostly through license-production. In the case of 
leading-edge technology where the license was not available, a mission was sent 
overseas to obtain the technology and imitate it.55 The NICs invested much on R&D 
so as to adopt the foreign technology. Southeast Asian countries on the other hand, 
obtained foreign technology through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).   
Besides license-production and FDI, there are other channels of technology transfer 
listed in the literature, such as international trade in goods, outward and inward FDI, 
return migration of scientists and engineers, publication and patents, and so on. 
Transnational companies undoubtedly have been the prominent player in 
technology diffusion. They conduct technology transfer through internal and 
external vehicles. Internal transfer is conducted through FDI and external transfer is 
through licensing agreements. This paper discussed six conduits of technology 
transfer that occur with participation of foreign companies: licensed-production, 
turnkey project, FDI, joint venture, strategic alliances and offset. 
A. License-Production 
License-production is a commercial agreement to provide the rights of intangible 
property to the license buyers, enabling them to manufacture part or whole of the 
licensed technology. In the implementation period, the degree of technology transfer 
under licensing can vary, from merely assembling knockdown kits to access to 
patents, inventions, processes, designs, trademarks as well as critical material 
production. Licensing is expensive and only allowed for a certain period of time or 
for a number of goods. Some license-production does not allow the licensee to 
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market the product to third parties, without going through a certain level of 
indigenisation first. Some licensing allows the licensee to market the technology but 
the royalties will have to be paid back to the licensor. 
Licensing has some advantages for the licensor, especially those lacking capital for 
investing or prevented from investing in the licensee’s country.56  This will save the 
licensor expensive development and risk costs associated with opening a new 
market. Whereas the benefit for the licensee is that it allows rapid acquisition of 
product and process know-how, while preserving local control over adaptation and 
modification. Adaptation and modification of the technology will be influenced by 
demand and the market, rather than by the licensor. 
Chandra and Kolavalli (2006), through their research on ten cases of technology 
transfer across Malaysia, Taiwan, India, Chile, Kenya and Uganda, discovered 
several downsides of licensing.57 First, it does not encourage local firms to keep up 
with technological progress and requires a significant level of technological 
capability in the licensee country or firm to put the licensed technology to work. 
Usually, it is mature technology that firms seek to license. Due to the time elapse in 
the transfer, by the time the licensee is finally able to master the technology, it has 
already become obsolete. Second, it is also unlikely that the best manufacturing 
technology will be transferred because the licensor does not want to lose competitive 
advantage. The third limitation of licensing is that the buyer must develop its own 
marketing capabilities. For the licensor, licensing is risky because there is a 
possibility that the licensee will violate the licensing agreement. Cross licensing is 
introduced so that each licensor will also become the licensee, hence making both 
susceptible to violation of licensing terms and mitigating the risk at the same time. 
The United States and Japan are among those countries that used license-production 
to kick-start technological change. The United States imported the steam engine from 
the British in the 18th century, but strong local technical capability made it 
independent from imitating British models and techniques. Japan licensed a great 
number of foreign technologies in the post World War II era, and was able to 
assimilate the technology to its own advantage.58 
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B. Turnkey Projects 
A turnkey project concerns the export of technology by setting up the entire 
production system. This means a plant will be designed, constructed and installed by 
the transferor country or firm in the host country. The term turnkey refers to the fact 
that only after the plant is fully established, can the transferee firm turn the ‘key’to 
the project to make it operable. Turnkey projects were popular among American 
firms in the 1990s as their outsourcing increased the share of their manufacturing 
abroad.59 
According to Hill, a turnkey project is more common among companies that 
specialise in complex production technologies, such as petroleum, chemical, 
pharmaceutical and metal refining companies. 60  A turnkey project has some 
advantages, and there are also risks associated with it. Hill argued that in countries 
that restrict FDI, a turnkey project helps them access technology without allowing 
much FDI inflow. For the transferor, a turkey project allows it to earn greater 
economic return without having to invest in long-term investment. This is 
particularly helpful in a country with no stable political and economic environment. 
However, by selling complex technology, the transferor firm risks losing competitive 
advantage and creating a potential competitor in the future.  
C. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
FDI refers to activities carried out by firms seeking to invest directly in production or 
marketing of a product in a foreign country. According to Hill, there are two kinds of 
FDI: green-field investment that involves the establishment of a new operation in a 
foreign country and acquiring or merging with local firm in foreign country. FDI is 
driven by companies keen to go transnational, becoming part of the globalisation 
phenomenon.  
Developing countries see FDI as a source of external financing besides development 
aid. FDI also contributes to the transfer of technology, improved labour, and 
management skills. Most developing countries use FDI to acquire technologies, 
enabling them to achieve technology mastery but not necessarily deepening.61 The 
positive side of FDI is that MNCs may invest in upgrading of local capabilities 
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through R&D, but only for those with a good skills base and scientific and 
technological infrastructure. The less-endowed countries will be given the results of 
foreign R&D, not the process. This is reflected by the distribution pattern of FDI, the 
majority of which goes to advanced countries and not developing economies.62 
The negative side of FDI is that it can actually conflict with local capability 
development, if there is no strong government policy to develop local capabilities. 
FDI also implies technological stagnation at the level of assembly, 63 which can be 
overcome if a national technological learning system is present.  
D. Joint Ventures 
A joint venture is a long-term commitment by two or more parties to undertake joint 
economic activity through the creating of a new entity. These parties contribute 
funding, facilities, services and share revenues, expenses and the control of the 
enterprise. Companies have various motives to create joint ventures, such as getting 
access to new technologies and markets, strengthening a company’s market power, 
exploiting the larger economies of scale and size that joint ventures offer, getting 
access to new technology, financial resources, customers as well as good managerial 
practices. The length of joint ventures varies according to either a specific project or a 
perpetual business relationship. Joint ventures can be created in a specific project or a 
perpetual business relationship through a number of forms, including corporation 
and Limited Liability Company. 
Through joint venture a firm can benefit from a local partner’s knowledge of local 
conditions, such as culture, political system and competition, share the risk and 
development costs of opening new markets, as well as the political benefits of having 
influence over local government policy. The downsides are similar to other conduits 
of technology transfer: firms entering joint ventures are facing the risk of giving 
away control over their own technology to a partner firm. Sharing ownership also 
risks conflict.  
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E. Strategic Alliances 
A strategic alliance is a form of relationship between two or more independent firms 
to coordinate their resources for a specific business project, without having to merge 
into or create a new single entity. It is somewhere between conducting the 
companies’ own business and merging their operations. Different from a joint 
venture, the relationship among parties involved in strategic alliances is that it is 
non-equity, less formal, and formed through a written contract with a termination 
period. A strategic alliance can materialise in many forms, like a technology transfer 
agreement, joint development of product, marketing, and promotional collaboration. 
The alliance can be for a one-off activity, or to concentrate on one issue in business, 
or to develop a new product jointly. The basic reason for creating a strategic alliance 
is to acquire competitive advantage. Even competing firms would create a strategic 
alliance to gain the benefit it offers. One company can have several strategic alliances 
with different firms.  
In the defence sector, international strategic alliances can be defined as a loose 
industrial arrangement between defence firms in two or more countries to share 
information or to study future possible co-production or co-development. An 
example of a strategic alliance is that between Britain’s BAE Systems and France’s 
Dassault on a joint defence study for a future attack aircraft.  
F. Offset 
Offset is perhaps the most understudied conduit of technology transfer. Part of the 
reason is perhaps because it takes place mostly in the arms market, which is not as 
transparent as the commercial market. Offset is a form of compensation in 
international trade involving high technology, such as military product and 
aerospace. As the power of buyer countries is strengthened by the oversupply in the 
international arms market in the post Cold War era, offset transactions and values 
increased significantly.64 While offset is initially demanded by buyer country as part 
of procurement deal, it is now valued as a strategic marketing vehicle for achieving 
arms exports.65 License-production and co-production are the two most common 
technology transfer conduits under offset. 
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As with other conduits, offset has several strengths and weaknesses. Amongst the 
strengths are: firstly, securing both political support for military expenditure and 
economic gains from military procurement compensation; secondly, with the 
increasing emphasis of dual-use policy, offset may have the benefit of straddling the 
civil-military divide;66 thirdly, offset offers similar benefits as other conduits, such as 
skill enhancement, technology transfer, and economic diversification.  
The weaknesses of offset are no different from other conduits of technology transfer. 
Firstly, offset incurs the costs of technology adaptation. However, due to the high 
secrecy of defence procurement, the cost is difficult to clarify – and can thus create 
opportunities for corruption and collusion between the offset transferor and 
transferee. Secondly, if the recipient countries do not have technology absorptive 
capability, it is difficult to put technology gained from offset into use. The classic 
example is India, which has been locked into a succession of license-productions and 
continuing dependency on Soviet/Russian military technology since the 1960s. India 
has finally been able to launch a prototype of its indigenous Tejas intermediate 
fighter jet, but critical technologies like engines are still manufactured abroad.  
2.3.3 Challenges of Technological Catch-up 
Evenson and Wetsphal argue that ‘circumstantial sensitivity’ - or ‘technological 
congruence’ as Abramovitz puts it - is a major constraint on the application of 
foreign technology. Broadberry provides an example of the adoption of American 
methods of standardised production that led to the decline of British industry in the 
post World War II era until 1979,67 and the American effort to adopt the German 
professorial system of research management training that failed to take root on 
American soil68.  
Rosenberg (1970) argues that there is no such thing as a technological solution to the 
problem of LDCs. He criticises the fact that technology, especially Western, has been 
exaggerated as the panacea for LDCs. The dilemma of innovation versus adaptation 
is not without reason. Some technologies are created specifically to local conditions, 
especially in the agricultural and medical sectors. In addition, factor endowment can 
also vary from one country to another. In the nineteenth century, for example, Britain 
was bestowed with abundant human resources but scarcity in land. The US, on the 
other hand, had abundant land but minimal workers. The difference explains why 
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fertilizer technology is more widespread in Britain, while agricultural machine 
technology is more prevalent in the US.69 Making the right choice of technology is 
linked to the convergence of local conditions with technological development, vital 
in the adaption of foreign technology.  
Central to the dilemma of technology diffusion is the question as to how technology 
transfer can be undertaken in a context where the gap between the latecomer and the 
technology leader is immense. Schumpeter suggests that latecomers should seek 
‘intermediate technology’ first before aiming for more complicated technology, 
because it is simply impossible to adapt state-of-the-art technology if the capability 
gap between transferor and transferee is too wide. 
In addition to the difficulty of transferring technology from one setting to another, it 
is also costly. The cost of technology transfer comprises four categories: the cost of 
pre-engineering technological exchange; the engineering cost associated with 
transferring the process design and the associated process engineering in the case of 
process innovation, or the product design and production engineering in the case of 
product innovation; the cost of R&D personnel during all phases of transfer project; 
cost of pre-start-up training costs and the excess manufacturing.70 
Arguably, technology transfer has become both easier and yet more complicated. 
Chandra and Kolavalli argue that it is easier in terms of gaining access to technology, 
but more difficult because global competition is rising and taking new forms, driven 
by rapid technology change and the growth of global production networks.71 Nelson 
(2005,) lists elements that had existed in all successful catch-up cases, such as inflow 
of better skilled people, active government support through protection and subsidy, 
as well as weak Intellectual Property Rights regimes. 72  He warns that these 
conditions no longer exist in contemporary catch-up countries; for example, subsidy 
and protection will be met with punitive actions, and so will legal and IPR 
infringement. Nelson went further to argue that the research capabilities of public 
institutions will play a vital role in ‘catch-up’ in the 21st century, because of a 
combination of factors: the need to develop indigenous technology is increasing as 
imitating technology becomes more difficult, the need to supply trained engineers 
and applied scientists for catch-up manufacturing, and the need for strong R&D 
capabilities to keep-up with the technology frontier. 
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The role of the state is crucial in setting up technological capability, but it is not the 
only actor. A state’s duty is to lay down the foundation for basic research and 
provide the incentive for the commercial sector to participate as basic research is 
costly and does not have immediate commercial application big enough to attract 
private investors. On the other side, non-state actors have also been prominent 
players in initiating technological progress and diffusion of commercial technology. 
Rosenberg argues that the capital goods industries in the 19th century were centres 
for the creation and diffusion of new techniques; the rapid rate of technological 
change is inseparable from capital goods firms.73 The reason behind this is simple: to 
retain markets and expand them, firms need to be ahead of the competition. 
Technological progress and diffusion guarantee this, at least until the competition is 
restored.  
2.3.4 Determinants of Adaptation: Technological Absorptive Capability 
What makes a state an innovator is intriguing. Cameron and Neal study the factors 
that might responsible for the rise of Britain as the world’s first technology frontier 
during the industrial revolution. A combination of factors is believed to be behind 
British success as technology innovators: political creativity, economic freedom, 
consumer opulence and a superior cultural and scientific level.74  They emphasise 
reduced state interference in economic life, as initially argued by Adam Smith, as 
conducive for innovation. They also note that it was the role of practical scientists, 
not first-rate researchers who contributed significantly to innovation creation.   
Lall (1980) argues that the nature of technological change in developing countries is 
different from that in developed countries; it calls for skills and resources that are not 
normally attributed to developing countries.75 In order to succeed in the catch-up 
process, argues Gerschenkron, the latecomer countries have to develop ‘new 
institutional instruments’. This materialised as organisations capable of identifying 
the most promising options ahead and mustering the necessary resources for 
exploiting the opportunity.76 The preconditions needed to be present in order for 
latecomers to have the ability to develop and exploit knowledge commercially are 
also known by various names, such as social capability, technological capability, and 
national innovation systems.77 
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Following Gerschenkron, Abramovitz offered his own version of ‘absorptive social 
capability’ (see Figure 2.1 Absorptive Social Capability).78  Gerschenkron’s version of 
social capability focuses on the interplay of four factors: technical competence, trade-
off between specialisation and adaptability, the character of the economic system and 
interaction between social capability and technology opportunity. He details 
indicators for each factor. Both Gerschenkron and Abramovic’s concepts are derived 
from their studies of European countries and the US. The emergence of NICs brought 
about a different nuance to the concept. Obviously, Latin American and Asian 
countries did not face the same circumstances as Germany and other countries at the 
time of their industrial catch-up period with the Great Britain in the 19th century. 
Figure 2.1 Abramovic’s Tapestry of Absorptive Social Capability 
 
Source: Abramovic, M. (1986). ‘Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind’. The Journal of 
Economic History, 46 (2), pp. 385-406 
Lall argues that in the case of NICs, it was ‘technological learning’ that played a 
crucial role. Learning consists of technological mastery (learning to use simple 
production technologies) and technology deepening (adding value) which is needed 
to progress from adaptation to innovation. 79 Using a case study on South Korea, Kim 
raised the term ‘technological capability’, which he defines as the ability to make 
effective use of technological knowledge in an effort to assimilate, use, adapt and 
change existing literature. This is also known as ‘innovation capability’, referring to 
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the ability to create new and useful knowledge based on previous knowledge. In 
some cases, firms or countries receive transfer of technology but are not able to 
innovate. For example, Taiwan and Malaysia have mastered the technologies needed 
to produce electronic hardware and software, but only Taiwan is capable of making 
an innovation.  
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) believe the aforementioned terms are overlapping; 
hence they propose metrics to define innovation systems. The system comprises 25 
indicators, tested against a sample of 155 countries over a three-year period 1992-
1994 and 2002-2004 (See Table 2.4). However, not all indicators can be used in the 
actual research due to the unavailability of the data. 
Table 2.4 Measuring Technological Capabilities 
Aspect Measure Capability 
Science, research and 
innovation 
Scientific publications, patents, R&D 
(total/business), innovation counts 
Technological 
Openness Openness to trade, foreign direct 
investment, technology licensing, immigration 
Technological 
Production 
quality/standards 
International (ISO) standards Technological 
ICT infrastructure Telecommunication, internet, computers Technological 
Skills Primary, secondary and tertiary education, 
managerial and technical skills 
Technological and 
social 
Finance Access to bank credit, stock market, venture 
capital 
Technological and 
social 
Quality of governance Corruption, law and order, independence 
of courts, property rights, business friendly 
regulation 
Social 
Social values Civil activities, trust, tolerance Social 
Type of political 
system 
Civil (political) rights; checks and balances; 
democracy or autocracy 
? 
Source: Fagerberg, J. and Shrolec, M. (2008). ‘National Innovation Systems, capabilities and economic 
development’. Research Policy No 3, pp.1417-1435. 
Indicators in italics were not included in the final research due to unavailability of the data  
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2.4 Technological Development Models and the Globalisation of Technology 
Technology diffusion occurs across firms and countries in various patterns. Vernon’s 
international product life cycle and Akamatsu’s flying geese paradigm are two 
prominent theories with objectives to explain the pattern of technology diffusion in 
different contexts. Vernon sought to explain technology diffusion according to the 
life-cycle stage of a product, whereas Akamatsu sought to explain how technology 
diffusion could occur regionally using the case of Japan and Asia as a region. 
The consequence of technology diffusion is the creation of regional and global 
production networks, which open opportunities for small countries and small firms 
to compete with their bigger counterparts, and seize position in the network by 
honing their competitiveness. Porter (1990, 2000) argues that competitiveness might 
be explained through two concepts: the diamond model and value chain. Central to 
this concept is the role of clusters or industrial districts as the sources of innovation.  
2.4.1 Technology Development Model 
Literature on technology development identified different patterns emerging across 
different regions. The various patterns usually referred, though not rigidly, to the 
Western, Soviet, East Asian and African models. Although variations also exist in 
each of these models, the primary features are more or less the same. For example, 
the degree of state intervention in the East Asian model might be different from 
Japan to NICs, but there is a common consensus that one of the main features of 
NICs is the presence of the ‘developmental state’ - market economies in which the 
state performs a highly interventionist role - though the degree and the nature of its 
involvement may be different.80 Each of the technology development models and 
their characteristics are defined in Table 2.5 Technology Development Paradigms. 
Each of the models brings out their own highlights. The Western model, usually 
refers to the United States and Western Europe is characterised by a limited 
government role and market driven economy. As the first to industrialise, no doubt 
innovation and competition are among the hallmarks that differentiate the Western 
model from the ‘latecomer’ model. One characteristic stands out: the evolution of the 
western model through vertical and horizontal disintegration. The first was 
attributed to firms in the United States, while the latter was attributed to the 
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existence of forms within industrial districts in the United Kingdom. Disintegration 
refers to the degree of specialisation within the industry sector. Whereas vertical 
disintegration- as coined by Rosenberg (2003)- can be defined as the emergence of 
new intermediate markets that divide a previously integrated production process 
between two sets of specialised firms in the same industry.81 In other words, vertical 
disintegration occurs when a company sheds its value chain to outsource from new 
specialist firms. The result of vertical disintegration is the creation of different levels 
of industry activities from supply chain at the bottom of value chain to the prime 
contractor/integrator at the top of value chain. Horizontal disintegration will be 
discussed in the later part of this section (under section on industrial 
district/cluster). 
Table 2.5 Technology Development Paradigms 
MODEL Western Soviet East Asian African 
PARADIGM  Market 
driven/limited 
government role 
 Vertical 
disintegration 
 High innovation 
 Huge research 
and 
development 
budget 
 High 
competitiveness 
 Capital intensive 
 High 
productivity 
 Central 
planning 
 Labour intensive 
 Low cost 
production 
 Reverse 
engineering 
 Minimal 
innovation 
 Low 
competitiveness 
 ‘Hybrid’ model 
 Strong 
government 
support 
 Market-driven 
 Export-oriented 
 Reverse-
engineering 
leading to 
innovation 
 High quality, low 
cost 
 From assembly-
type 
manufacturing to 
high-technology 
and service 
industry  
 Moving from 
labour intensive 
to capital 
intensive 
 Evolutionary 
 Agricultural 
based 
 Labour- 
intensive  
Source: Matthews, R., lecture on Management of Defence Technology, Masters of Strategic Studies, RSIS 
Singapore, 2010. 
The Soviet model is the opposite of western model. It is strictly controlled by state 
through central planning, and thus gives no incentive to competition and innovation. 
The highlight of this model is the use of scale and capital goods production. Major 
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sources of Soviet growth are substantial increases in labour-participation rates (ratio 
of the labour force to population), rates of investment, and education enrolment 
rates. 82  Huge capital investment was made, and the result is huge scale of 
employment in manufacturing, mining and textile industries- the latter absorbed 
around 20 percent of total workers in large-scale industry.83 The state encourages the 
expansion of a capital goods sectors especially fuel, iron, steel and machine building 
rather than consumer goods. The Soviet model achieved its peak during the 1950s, 
and despite its inefficient allocation of resources it managed to achieve substantial 
rates of growth, then suffered from negative growth soon after. The Soviet model 
captivated many LDCs to emulate the centrally planned economy, but soon LDCs 
learned that the economic model could not sustain growth.  
The East Asian model is a hybrid of different development models. The highlight of 
this model is the emphasis on the technology absorption and deepening. East Asia is 
a combination of western preference for a market-driven economy and Soviet 
inclination towards a strong interventionist state. The result is rapid economic 
growth, which propelled the NICs into a new class of developing countries, striding 
close in on developed countries. The East Asian technology development model 
relied heavily on technology transfer from abroad and the astounding absorptive 
capability, which enabled them to adopt, indigenise, and improve the technology.  
2.4.2 International Product Life-cycle Theory 
Various theories have tried to explain factors that shape and change the international 
trade pattern. Ricardo’s comparative advantage and Heckler-Ohlin factor 
endowment, which argue that variations in national endowment, intimately linked 
to state preference for production of goods, cannot give satisfactory answers to this 
peculiarity in the international trade pattern. The peculiarity includes, among others, 
why Japan export automobiles and Switzerland export pharmaceutical product, and 
why most of new products in the twentieth century were made in the United States.84 
Vernon argues that the pattern of international trade is not only shaped by 
comparative advantage or a country’s factor endowment per se, and proposed that 
the product life cycle correlates to a diffusion of technology that determines a 
country’s place in the international trade pattern.  
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Vernon explains that US ability to link technology with commercial application to 
create a new product is the result of interplay between high unit labour cost, 
relatively unrationed capital compared with other markets and the awareness of US 
entrepreneurs to satisfy new wants associated with high income levels of high unit 
labour cost.85 He discovers that new products originated from the US are produced 
locally despite demand growth in overseas markets, and inquired when, where to 
and why US firms decide to relocate their operation abroad. He creates what later 
became known as the product life cycle (PLC), which basically explains three stages 
through which a product must evolve: the introduction stage (new product), the 
maturity stage and the standardised product.  
The first stage is characterised by the non-standardised nature of the design which 
indicates the degree of freedom they have in changing inputs, the price elasticity of 
demand for the output of individual firms is comparatively low, and the need 
forswift and effective communication on the part of the producer with customers, 
suppliers and competitors.86  In other words, there is only limited demand from 
abroad at this stage, which can be addressed through export but there is not enough 
reason for firms to relocate the manufacturing nearer to the market.  
The second stage is characterised by the maturing of product design and increasingly 
sustained demand from abroad. At this stage, production cost is determined by scale 
and different labour costs. If the latter is large enough to offset transport cost of 
exporting back to the United States, it becomes possible to relocate the firm’s 
production abroad. Also, the technology-importing countries’ concern with 
balancing trade and economic loss due to import, provide the pull factor for foreign 
investment. This investment is steered towards employment creation and import 
substitution. 
The third stage is characterised by a product that is well-articulated, easily accessible 
by the international market and sold on the basis of price. At this point, even low 
cost labour might be the first point of attraction in relocating; there are other 
considerations as well.  
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The paradigm postulated that innovator countries would evolve from being the 
producer of new technology to the importer of the same technology (though less 
valuable) as they move on with new higher value-added technology for export. The 
consumer of technology will evolve to become the producer, only after the 
technology reaches maturity. Relocation of production to LDCs is due to cheaper 
labour price. However, industries relocated to LDCs are not producers of 
standardised, high value-added products and do not require a sophisticated 
industrial environment. This is because the LDCs are lacking in vertically-integrated 
self-sustaining industries, i.e. manufacturing processes dependent on skilled labour, 
repairmen, reliable power, spare parts, standardised industrial material and so on.87 
Innovation, scale economies, and other factors in international trade work to affect 
the strength of import substitution strategy in LDCs.  
Vernon’s product life-cycle scholarship was criticised due to its ethnocentricity, if 
seen from a non-US perspective.88 Many products are now firstly introduced and 
produced in other countries, such as Japan and Europe. Deardoff questions the 
implication of Vernon’s theory: whether the developing countries can only grow by 
expanding in industries that developed countries must then leave behind, and 
whether the established producers would act to limit the opportunities of 
newcomer.89 Vernon’s product life cycle, if true, is a grim prophecy for LDCs.  
2.4.3 Flying Geese Technology Diffusion Model 
An oriental version of the technology diffusion model is perhaps best represented by 
the paradigm of (a flock of) flying geese, first coined by Kaname Akamatsu and used 
as Japanese propaganda during World War II. Akamatsu used the flying geese 
model to explain the phenomenon of industrial development in a catching-up 
economy, on the basis of Japan’s experiences in catching-up with the West.90 He 
projected this paradigm on to the East Asia region with Japan as the leader of the 
flock. Central to this paradigm is the import-production-export sequence of activities 
which occurs for each product in the industrialisation process: the first stage is 
characterised by the follower economy beginning to import foreign goods, which 
gradually kick-starts local industrial development; the second stage is marked by the 
start of import-substituting production with either local or foreign capital or a 
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combination of both; the third stage is signified by increasing local production that 
exceeds local consumption, and thus excess goods start to be exported.91 
The flying geese paradigm was criticised for various reasons.92 First, it shows an 
overly harmonious picture of multilateral relations by believing that the paradigm 
will create an interdependent economy in East Asia. Second, Akamatsu did not 
elaborate further on the mechanism of technology transfer through trade. Third, 
Akamatsu underlines the importance of TNCs and FDI while in reality FDI does not 
automatically lead to technology transfer. Fourth, it is not clear as to how and 
whether Japan will always be the leader of the flock. China with its rapid economic 
growth has the potential to overtake Japan’s leadership position. 
2.4.4 Value Chain and Industrial Clustering supporting Firm Competitiveness 
Vernon’s product life cycle and Akamatsu’s flying geese models convey a grim 
message regarding the fate of LDC’s technology development. Porter (1990, 2000) 
suggested that there are other factors to determine a country’s competitiveness in the 
international trade pattern. Porter argued that competitiveness is not given; it has to 
be created. To understand this, Porter proposed the ‘Diamond model’ which seeks to 
explain firms/countries’ performance in the international market, based on the 
interplay of four factors: factor endowment, domestic demand conditions, related 
and supporting industries, and domestic rivalry.  
According to Porter, country competitiveness depends on the functioning of the four 
factors at play. Factor conditions refer to the ability to turn basic advantage, i.e. 
natural and human resource, into specialised advantage. Firm rivalry refers to the 
rules and incentives by which the intensity and type of rivalry are shaped. The 
‘good’ rivalry is one that encourages innovation, as opposed to the ‘bad’ rivalry that 
only creates imitation and price war. Demand conditions can be divided into local 
and global demand. The presence of sophisticated customers will force firms to move 
from imitating to innovating and differentiating, while global demand provides scale 
and enforces higher standards. All four forces need to be present in order to create 
conditions for competition, which will lead to emergence of innovation. The result of 
Porter’s model is a prediction on international trade patterns, in which countries will 
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be exporting products from industries where all four components of the diamond 
model are favourable.93 
 Another attribute of national advantage is the presence of internationally 
competitive suppliers or related industries. When related and supporting industries 
make investment, the benefit could spill over to other industries that help the 
economy to achieve strong competitiveness. There are two concepts linked 
intimately with this factor. The first is the value chain and the second is industrial 
clusters.  
A value chain refers to a chain of activities for a firm operating in a specific industry, 
but it can also be applied to the industry level dubbed ‘supply chain’. It stipulates 
that different economic activities are necessary to deliver a products or services. Each 
of these activities contributes different values, which are mobilised into an integrated 
value-chain system. This system encompasses not only firms’ suppliers but also the 
firm itself, its distribution system, and buyers. Every company should seek to 
configure its own value chain with the aim of lowering production cost, while at the 
same time maintaining the value of those assets that lead to differentiation. A value 
chain can be created through vertical or horizontal integration. Horizontal 
integration refers to a consolidation of many firms that handle the same part of the 
production process, as opposed to vertical integration, which refers to the degree to 
which a firm connects to its downstream suppliers and its upstream buyers. 
Another concept linked to competitiveness is that of clusters, which have been 
acknowledged as an important part of modern industry. Clusters refer to a 
geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated 
institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities.94 
Porter mentioned the concept in his seminal book The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations (1990), which triggered the creation of clusters around the world. Clusters 
originated from the concept of ‘industrial districts’, discovered by Marshall back in 
the nineteenth century. It refers to an area where a concentration of firms has been 
established.95 Marshall was studying the reason why small British enterprises are 
able to compete against their larger integrated counterparts in the United States 
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when he stumbled upon the fact that most important industries in the England like 
cotton and wool industries were gathered in the same location. 
Marshall distinguished industrial districts from ‘localisation’, but acknowledged that 
the first can arise from the latter. Localisation refers to the existence of a 
concentration of industry in a certain location for various reasons, which may 
include the need to be close toresources, and the existence of demand for products 
with high quality. Localisation could transform into an industrial district when the 
following preconditions are met: first, it gathered skills; second, it grew into 
subsidiary trades; third, there was the widespread use of highly specialised 
machinery; fourth, it provided a local market for specialist skills. Belussi and Caldari 
added two more preconditions, which are the emergence of industrial leadership and 
the introduction of novelties into the production process.96 
The advantage of industrial districts is the closeness among small firms that 
encourages a division of labour to create horizontal integration, which is typified by 
one firm engaged in different parts of production (e.g. growing raw materials 
manufacturing, transporting, marketing, and/or retailing). Such integration was 
made possible because of the peculiar way the industrial district operates. First, 
competition and cooperation seemed to work side by side in an industrial district. 
Second, the collection of small and medium enterprises created external economies. 
Marshall argues that the external economy helps to strengthen small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) to compete with larger firm.  
Clusters, on the other hand, are not just about a single industry. They encompass an 
array of linked industries and other entities imperative to competition. Various 
actors exist in a cluster, to include suppliers of specialised inputs, government and 
non-government institutions - such as universities, trade associations as well as 
foreign firms. It is not easy to draw a cluster’s boundary. First, it takes a thorough 
understanding of the linkages and complementarities across industries and 
institutions that are most important to competition in a particular field; second, it is 
difficult to determine the strength of these spillovers and their importance to 
productivity and innovation.97 Spillovers can be understood in terms of technology, 
skills, information, marketing, and also demand that cuts across firms and industries. 
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Porter notes that different clusters in a region can overlap with one another, with 
different degrees of interdependence. For example, information technology, 
communications equipment, aerospace vehicles, and defence have a tendency to 
overlap, so do clusters in the fields of plastic, chemical products and oil and gas.98 
2.5 Latecomer Technology Development Through ‘Strategic’ Industrialisation and 
Procurement of Military Technology 
What choice do latecomers have when it comes to technological development? There 
are two alternatives by which a particular technology can be mastered: autarchic and 
foreign technology acquisition. The first refers to creation or re-creation of 
technology by locally providing all of the necessary elements through developing the 
related technology capabilities. While it guarantees the acquisition of at least 
rudimentary proficiency in related capabilities, it is usually very costly, time 
consuming, and would likely result in perpetuation of backwardness of the 
latecomer. The second choice involves opening the door for foreign technology, to be 
established and operated domestically. While this might provide more guarantees in 
generating employment and foreign exchange, without the appropriate policies this 
does not automatically means a strong contribution to development of local 
capability. Even worse, this could also undermine the existing domestic capability –
due to an inability to compete, or perpetuate dependency on foreign technology.  
Government has critical role in technology development through facilitating the 
process of acquiring technological competence.99 First, when the technology is highly 
sophisticated, it entails substantive set-up costs and scale economies, as well as 
strong backward and forward linkages (externalities). Second, due to a ‘gestation lag’ 
in technology absorption, industry needs state protection from competition with 
foreign firms. Third, the state needs to act as a catalyst for coordinating the 
investment behaviour of related sectors or enterprises to fix the problem of 
coordinated development between sectors with strong interlinkages. Counter-
arguments for state intervention include the resolution of ‘rent-seeking’ and 
informational problems that are likely to prevent the state from performing effective 
intervention.100 
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Public procurement has been used as one form of government intervention in both 
industrialised and industrialising countries. Industrialising countries in Asia, such as 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, since the 1980s have used defence procurement 
for both industry and technology policy objectives with mixed results.101 Why do 
these countries use government intervention in the form of public procurement and 
the targeting of arms producing industry? Understanding the context is important, as 
industrialising countries in this region are facing different dynamics compared to 
their counterparts in the west that affect the way countries procure and market 
weapons.  
The next subchapter will discuss the imperative role of public procurement in the 
development of industry and technological capability, specifically through 
procurement of arms as ‘public goods’. Military technology has potential 
externalities for both defence and development, which renders the technology-
absorbing industry as ‘strategic’. This provides the option for the use of offset as a 
conduit of technology transfer.  
2.5.1 Public Procurement as Industry and Technology Policy Tool 
Public procurement is seen as one of the most promising innovation and industrial 
policy tools of both developed and developing countries. While the conventional 
wisdom is to acquire a cost efficient solution achieving value for money through 
competition, some of the most industrialised countries have actually been using 
public procurement for secondary purposes. The US has a ‘Buy American policy’ 
which basically aims to lessen dependency on foreign technology, including license 
production of imported goods.102 The EU has initiatives and directives since 2005 to 
use public procurement as tool for achieving a range of goals, to include the 
promotion of innovation, sustainability, and regional economic growth.103 It is no 
wonder that developing countries also follow a similar path. For example, South 
Africa used public procurement for “wealth redistribution”. 104  Most developing 
countries also perceive public procurement as strategic; this is why only few 
subscribe to the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement (GPA). GPA mandates 
asigning party to apply the principle of openness, transparency, and non-
discriminationin national public procurement.  
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Public procurement holds significant value in real terms. The government spending 
in OECD countries has averaged almost 30 percent of their GDP. Public procurement 
is also the biggest domestic market in LDCs, and can account for up to 50-70 percent 
of imports.105 As consequence, it has the potential to influence markets in terms of 
production and consumption trends. A number of empirical researches have 
confirmed that public procurement has the potential to elicit stronger innovation 
impulses than subsidies for R&D. 106 
There are at least two strategies on how government uses procurement as an 
industrial policy. The first is industrial policy through procurement strategy of 
‘making’, where domestic firms conduct the R&D and manufacture, which is called 
Public Procurement for Innovation (PPfI). 107 Public agencies can support innovation 
through procurement: creating new market and demand pull pressures, providing a 
testing ground for innovative products, and potentially encouraging innovation 
through lead markets for new technology.108 
Using procurement as innovation policy is not without its problems. Kattel and 
Reiner point out that government has capacity problems, is infamously known for 
underperformance due to the lack of competitive pressure, lacks proper institutional 
settings in terms of over or under regulation and organisational set up, and 
lackspolicy and administrative capacity. Furthermore, public procurement tends to 
have many objectives, such as cost savings, value-for-money, transparency, which 
often contradict each other or conflict with wider policy objectives. Finally, the PPfI 
process is costly and time consuming, demands strong coordination between 
stakeholders, and constant evaluation and learning.  
The second strategy deals with procurement from abroad, which is also seen as a 
potential conduit for technology transfer. This is where offset comes on to the scene. 
The offset strategy is costly and often a knowledge-intensive process, which 
demands investment in worker training, new capital equipment and plants, 
information collection, and product and ‘process debugging’.109 Also, the technology 
adopted is not new because the technology has reached maturity or has been battle-
proven in the case of military technology. The benefit of technology adoption is that 
the receiver might get an improved version of the original technology at less risk.  
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2.5.2 Defence Industry as a Strategic industry: Leading Edge Technology and 
Spillovers 
One major question that needs to be asked for facilitating technology absorption is: 
who will be the target of such a policy? In other word, which sector and industry is 
deemed ‘strategic’. Krugman points out that in most cases of government targeting, 
it is not clear as to what criteria is used to justify the target.110 When List advocates 
‘infant industry’ policy he makes it clear that the intervention should not be random, 
but selective and discriminatory.111 According to Krugman, criteria for government 
targeting fall into two groups: popular criteria and the economists’ criteria.112 The 
first group includes high value-added per workers, linkage industries, future 
competitiveness, and responding to other governments. These criteria are popular, 
because they are subject to discussion in books and articles aimed at a wide audience, 
except, ironically, the economist. The second group, which Krugman says is more 
sophisticated than the first, includes economies of scale and imperfection 
competition as well as external economies.  
Why target the defence sector for technology development? Apart from the obvious 
motive of achieving military sovereignty, defence industry has been one of the most 
regulated sectors because it reflects both public goods – non-exclusive and non-rival 
- and advanced technology. Eliasson points out that defence as a public good 
contains an inherent dilemma; if the state cannot control supply, there will be no 
incentive to invest privately in production for a market. 113  In fact, the role of 
government is central to understanding defence industrialisation because it is a 
major buyer - sometimes the only buyer (monopsony) - hence its buying power 
affects or even determines the size and ownership of its national defence industry, its 
structure, entry and exit, prices, efficiency and profitability.114 Arms procurement has 
some distinct characteristics that make it suitable for an interventionist industrial 
policy, but at the same time the same characteristics could also be responsible for 
why it cannot be used as effective industrial policy. According to Ball, arms 
procurement has specific characters that include cost; national security; time periods; 
complexities; arms control regime; and national legislation.115 Arms procurement has 
its own standard, such as political and security considerations that go beyond value-
for-money arguments, secrecy that limits transparency, long acquisition cycles, 
complexity of process that require management teams with multi disciplinary 
competence.  
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The nature of military technology as advanced technology comes from the fact that 
military organisation has a tendency to demand the most sophisticated weapons. 
This is understandable, particularly in the era of military transformation, where 
technology has become a vital element of superiority. Furthermore, some military 
technologies are acknowledged to be ‘critical’ or ‘strategic’ due to their potential 
spill-overs, so great that they will lead to technological advancement in non-defence 
sectors. The linkages between civilian and military technologies are usually 
understood through the concept of ‘spin-off’ and ‘spin-on’ effects. Spin-off simply 
means that effects are directed from military R&D and production to the civilian 
industries, while spin-on are the effects from the reverse direction. While the effects 
can be tangible or intangible116, spin-off implies not only that a linear relationship 
exists between military innovation and civilian application but also carries the 
argument that the military can act as the primary agent of technology innovation. 
The peak periods of technology transfer frequently accompany or cluster around the 
event of warfare117, arguably because of colossal military demand during wartime. 
Nothing ensures replacement like organised destruction.118 
Armament production has also been viewed as a ‘technology locomotive’, which can 
incite the growth of new industries and other technologies such as aerospace, 
electronics, and information technology.119 In the case of Sweden, the Gripen fighter 
jet project is estimated to produce spill-overs equal to 300 percent of the procurement 
contract value.120 In Japan, aerospace, defence and commercial industries are sharing 
facilities and human resources- and represent lead industies due to high value-added 
production, rapid output growth, knowledge intensive innovations, and horizontal 
and vertical industrial linkages with the wider economy.121 
How exactly is defence industrialisation influencing the technical progress of a 
country? In the case of the US, military R&D has accounted for the majority of 
government spending; therefore it influences the direction of technical progress.122 
However, Shankerman and Pakes (1986) find that patents from military R&D are of 
weak economic value, while estimations by Lichtenberg show that the average 
returns from private and military R&D are 33.9 percent and 0.7 percent 
respectively.123 Cowan and Foray point out there are some technological fields where 
military R&D may still generate results useful in the civilian domain, while in others 
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it is no longer the case.124  Herring identifies specific product innovations that have 
flown from military laboratories to civilian production and vice versa as proof that 
military R&D and civilian R&D now have closer relationships through spin off and 
spin on (Table 2.6).  
Table 2.6 Impact of Spin-Off and Spin-On of Specific Product Innovation 
Period I (1946-mid 1960s) 
Military technology Civilian application 
Bombing radar system 
Tactical field radios 
Fire control computers 
Infrared sensors 
Radar magnetrons 
Satellite systems 
All-weather civil air transports 
Police, safety, rescue communications 
Industrial process control systems 
Geological mapping 
Microwave ovens 
Communication satellites 
Period II (1960s-) 
Civilian technology Military application 
Integrated circuits 
Space-based sensors 
LSI, VLSI 
Fiber optics 
Electro-optical devices 
Lasers 
Artificial Intelligence 
Command control systems 
Military intelligence 
Cruise missile guidance 
Missile guidance 
Intelligence sensors 
Target designation, range measurement 
Smart weapons  
Source: Samuels, R. (1996). Rich Nation Strong Army: National Security and Technological Transformation of 
Japan. Cornel University Press.   
The relationship between military and commercial technology has become more 
dynamic. Military R&D budgets in United States dropped from 80 percent of federal 
R&D spending in the 1950s, to below 50 percent during the 1949-2005 periods.125 
Longer development time, increasing cost and risk of leading edge technology as 
well as limited production scale have stripped away the competitiveness of military 
technology. Civilian technology now leads in some sectors, particularly Information 
Technology, to the advantage of bigger scale and a shorter technology life cycle. The 
best economic alternative is the path of dual use policy to enforce ‘de-
compartmentalisation’ of the civil and military spheres, systematically guaranteeing 
diffusion of technological innovations to and from the military.126 
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2.5.3 Defence Industrialisation and Global Hierarchy 
Defence industry can be defined as a 
“Combination of people, institutions, technological know-how, and production capacity used 
to develop and manufacture the weapons and supporting defense equipment needed to 
achieve our [US] national security objectives. “ (Office of Technology Assessment)127 
This definition contains three vital elements: technology base, production base, and 
maintenance base. The technology base includes laboratories and research facilities 
of private industry, government, and university, testing centres, as well as trained 
scientists and technical personal to operate the facilities. The production base 
encompasses both government and private owned facilities, whether or not operated 
directly under government officials. The maintenance base includes government and 
private facilities and technical personal that maintain and repair equipment.  
What are the necessary elements to establish and sustain arms production? Evans 
compiles five essential capabilities: financial resources, level of industrial 
development, science and education facilities, political structure and organisation, 
and access to export markets.128 Financial resources refer to available capital that can 
be allocated for investment in the defence sector. In developing countries, this is 
often a dilemma due to limited resources that need to be spread across the economy - 
like health and education. The second capability is the level of industrial 
development, which is derived from the observation of Gavin Kennedy’s seminal 
research.129 Sophisticated weapon systems are produced from variants of metal and 
material that require standardisation and uniformity in specifications, hence 
requiring the pre-existence of technological expertise in a very broad range of 
disciplines and industries – such as metal and steel, metallurgy, electronics, 
transportation, machinery. Due to rigorous operational requirements, the production 
of military technology involves further specialisation beyond similar civilian 
applications. For example, it would be difficult to produce armoured vehicles in the 
absence of a transportation industry. Because the investment cost to create domestic 
capability will be too expensive, developing countries will tend to acquire embodied 
technology transferred in form of imported equipment.  
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The next element is scientific and education facilities to adopt technology and 
develop innovation. Developing countries often do not have sophisticated research 
programmes and facilities as well as adequate trained scientists and researchers, 
hence they will be dependent on foreign technology and assistance in the early 
development periods. An imperative in early defence industrialisation is the ability 
to choose which technology to adopt and the means of accessing the technology, for 
example through license production, offset, or reverse engineering. In the later 
development phases the ability to conduct massive R&D is an absolute necessity in 
order to initiate innovation. It is this innovation capability that separates a successful 
country from the laggard. The fourth element has a more political nuance, which is 
political structure and organisation. This refers to a government’s ability to control 
and direct resources from the civilian economy to the defence sector. The last 
element is access to export markets, which reflects the competitiveness and relative 
progress of developing countries. Export extends an economy’s scale to achieve a 
more economic production level, as well as resolve the classic problem faced by 
developing countries: bottlenecks created by high unit production cost and low 
domestic demand in peace time.130 
The progress of defence industrialisation in developing countries is encapsulated in 
the Ladder of Production (LoP), coined by Keith Krausse131, which starts with simple 
maintenance capability and gradually builds up to the highest capability to conduct 
independent R&D and the production of advanced weapons. The higher a state 
climbs, the more independent it is in arms production (autarky).  
The LoP concept has been criticised for not differentiating platforms from control 
units and subsystems. According to Brauer, in many cases industry in developing 
countries only has production capability of platforms while the value-added 
components - engine, radar, optronics - are still imported. 132  Therefore, Brauer 
suggests that the ladder of production between platform and control unit and 
subsystem is separated.  
Differences in technological capability determine the nature of arms production in a 
country and its relationship with the global defence business, thus shaping the 
hierarchy in the structure of the global defence industry. Krause, Ross, and Bitzinger 
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each propose a categorisation of arms producing countries into three or four tiers. 
The first tier refers to critical innovators at the technological frontier of arms 
production, with the US as the main source of arms supply as well as innovation. 
The second tier refers to adapters and modifiers of advanced military technology. 
Here Krause, Ross, and Bitzinger disagree. Krause limits the second tier to mostly 
west European countries, Ross includes China and Japan, whereas Bitzinger divides 
the group into three subgroups to cover industrial countries with small but 
sophisticated defence industrial bases (Japan, Sweden), developing countries with a 
rudimentary defence industrial base (South Korea, Indonesia), and developing 
countries with wide range of defence industrial base but lack an independent R&D 
and capacity to produce sophisticated technology (China, India). The third tier is 
defined as those countries possessing very limited and generally low-tech arms 
production capabilities. Bitzinger describes the structure of global defence industry 
as ‘hub-and-spoke’, signified by dependency to the first tier as the technology 
innovator.  
Table 2.7 Ladder of Production 
1 Capability of performing simple maintenance 
2 Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capabilities 
3 Assembly of imported components, simple licensed production 
4 Local production of components or raw materials 
5 Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local component production 
6 Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons 
7 Limited R&D improvements to local license-produced arms 
8 Limited independent production of less sophisticated weapons; limited production 
of more advanced weapons 
9 Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons 
10 Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign components 
11 Completely independent R&D and production 
Source: Krause, K. (1992). Arms and the State: Pattern of Military Production and Trade. Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
100 
2.5.4 The Widening Gap: Globalisation and Unipolar Defence Industry 
The trend in world military expenditure (MILEX) shapes the global defence industry 
structure, because MILEX represents access to R&D and procurement spending that 
is essential for the development of new products and large production runs that 
provide economies of scale. Figure 2.2 shows the world military expenditure 
throughout 1988-2013 in 2013 current prices has been more or less a rollercoaster 
ride. The figure demonstrates a bounce back by the late 1990s, following a major 
reduction of military expenditure after the Cold War ends. This reduction occurred 
in parallel with a rapid increase of unit production cost of weapons triggered by the 
RMA. 133  The massive scale of restructuring, mergers and acquisition took place 
across North America and Europe to cope with declining demand for arms 
production and a new approach was introduced to arms acquisition and arms 
export.134 
Figure 2.2 World’s Military Expenditure, 1988-2013 (in US$ bn) 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Available at https://www.sipri.org.arms(Accessed 29 
January 2015)  
A further breakdown of global MILEX demonstrates the US monopoly in spending - 
that until 2006 the US spent more than the rest of the world combined, and also arms 
production and export – the US also monopolised the global top 100 defence 
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number of prime contractors with far-reaching technological capabilities that allow 
them to focus on design and final assembly and testing of weapon systems.135 Prime 
contractors rely on subcontractors to supply various electronic sensors, engines, and 
weapons. Driven by the need for cost reduction and export, prime contractors will 
frequently take on subcontractors from other countries - particularly from 
developing countries to meet requirements for local content.  
Globalisation of defence industry is further endorsed by European countries, which 
have been struggling with reduced MILEX and procurement demand. Concerns have 
grown over the impact of the widening gap between US’ MILEX and those of 
Europe. Cost reduction becomes a priority, for that purpose commercialisation, 
contractorisation, as well as inter-Europe and transatlantic collaboration are 
employed as procurement strategies. The latter is a major shift away from traditional, 
single country patterns of weapon production towards the more transnational 
development and manufacture of arms. There is also growing criticality of the global 
arms market: as domestic markets shrink, overseas business has correspondingly 
grown in importance with an impact on the health and survival of defence industrial 
base. Industry’s perception of future markets and the desire for sales have globalised 
as well. 136  Globalisation that further ensues is characterised by a new kinds of 
industrial linkages, such as international subcontracting, joint ventures, cross border 
mergers and acquisition.137 
Figure 2.3 below shows that the end of Cold War had created a smaller market in 
Europe, but Asia and other parts of the world are getting more significant portions of 
arms imports. SIPRI recorded a 16 percent rise in the volume of international arms 
transfers across 2010-2014 in comparison to that in 2005-2009. Europe recorded 
notable decreases while Africa, America, Asia and Oceania, and the Middle East 
posted increases. The share of Asia and Oceania’s arms imports throughout 2010-
2014 accounted for 48 percent, followed by Middle East with 22 percent.138 
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Figure 2.3 The importers of major weapons, by region,  
2005-2009 and 2010-2014, percent of global share 
 
Source: SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015 
2.5.5 Catching up: Offset in Arms Procurement for Industrial and Technology 
Purposes 
Globalisation of arms production and arms export has provided greater access for 
developing countries to participate in the global supply chain and the development 
of sophisticated technology, but it also poses other challenges. Industrialised 
countries tighten aid for military procurement and push for commercialisation of 
payment.139 While developing countries do not have the same resources in terms of 
capital, skilled labour and technology as developed countries to tackle the defence 
burden, dropping out of defence business is not a choice and neither is self-
sufficiency.  
Defence industrialisation still matters for developing countries, especially in Asia. 
The strategic environment in Asia is not known to be benign; military sovereignty- 
defined as the capacity of the state to procure arms and maintain security of supply 
in defence acquisition is vital for assurance.Even in Southeast Asia, the presence of 
ASEAN and other security architecture does not change the fact that the region 
remains laden with flashpoints. For Indonesia, which has no strategic assurance, 
procurement of arms has been an imperative in safeguarding strategic sovereignty. 
But how do the developing countries secure defence industrialisation? 
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Figure 2.4 describes top defence importer worldwide in 2014 according to a report by 
Jane IHS. It puts six Asian-Australasian countries in the world’s top ten of arms 
importers; they are India (2nd), China (3rd), Taiwan (5th), Australia (6th), South Korea 
(7th), Indonesia (8th), and Pakistan (10th).140  With recent strong economic growth, 
Asian countries are able to spend more on defence and support the continuation of 
defence industrialisation. Frost & Sullivan note that with massive procurement 
programmes in Asia Pacific and the Middle East, offset deals are anticipated.141 While 
the bargaining power of a country varies in correspondence to its buying power, 
offset has been accepted as a norm in the arms trade in Asia and the Middle East. 
While arms exporting countries in Europe are now looking for growing markets in 
developing countries to compensate for reduction of demand at home, growth in 
military expenditure in Asia provides the opportunity to do so. What it creates is 
more or less a situation of ‘quid pro quo’ in which the bargaining power shifts to the 
Asian country, as the buyer, when negotiating offsets.  
Figure 2.4 Top Defence Importers Worldwide in 2014 (in US$ bn) 
 
Source: IHS Global Defence Trade Report 2015. 
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2.6 Summary 
The chapter has evaluated various influential development strategies crafted over the 
last 50 years, critically reviewed the role of technology in fostering industrialisation 
in developing countries, and various strategies of technology development across 
different economic systems. While technology can be transferred and diffused, it is 
not free, and comes with barriers and costs. The imperfection of the technology 
market calls for government involvement, which can span from subsidy to public 
procurement. Two points need to be highlighted: first, procurement of military 
equipment - which inherently contains high technology - has been used as a 
technology and industrial policy tool by developing countries. Second, offset 
through arms procurement has become a conduit for technology transfer that brings 
the promise of positive impacts to both defence and development in developing 
countries. Arms trade offset as a public procurement policy tool is arguably befitting 
developing economies like Indonesia through the establishment of rudimentary 
defence industrial capability. Globalisation provides cost efficiency but more 
dependency on foreign technology; while autarky secures independence but not 
economic viability. Offset perhaps emerges as a third choice, aiming to use foreign 
arms procurement for the benefit of national security, both military and economic.  
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33. DEFENCE OFFSET AS A VEHICLE FOR INDUSTRIAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
At the intersection of the scholarship on the international arms trade, technology 
transfer and countertrade lies offset. As a concept it is fetching, as a practice it is 
proliferating, and as a policy it is frustrating. Industry sees offset as a complication 
that threatens to shrink profit margins and potentially cultivates future competitors, 
but it is also aware of its importance in securing arms exports. The World Trade 
Organisation, the regime promoting liberal trade and free markets, explicitly 
prohibits the use of offsets as one of the criteria for awarding contracts due to the 
market distortion it potentially causes.1 The US, the world’s biggest arms exporting 
country, finds offset to be ‘economically inefficient and trade distorting’ 2 . The 
European Defence Agency (EDA), while acknowledging the potential benefits of 
offsets, has recently encouraged member states to limit offsets and practice 
abatements.3 
Offset has been dubbed “a necessary evil that would never exist in a perfect world”.4 
Demonstrating that the world is imperfect, offset practice has been proliferating to an 
alarming level, so much so that it is feared it might become a market inhibitor in the 
future. 5  The use of mandatory offset means countries tend towards excessive 
demand of offset requirements and stringent implementation rules. 6  A study 
undertaken by Avascent and Fleishman Hillard warns that global offset obligations 
in the aerospace and defence industry are expected to grow by US$ 50 bn per annum 
going forward to 2017.7 This number is remarkable considering the 2014 value of 
global arms stands at US$ 64.4 billion, which means the value of offset is nearly the 
same as that of global arms sales.8 Countries in the list of top ten defence importers in 
2014 are offset practitioners, eight of which have mandatory offset policies (see table 
3.1.).  
There is concern that policy shift towards stringent offset has taken place in the 
absence of an ample understanding of the real costs and benefits of offset. When 
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offset is used in the arms trade, conducting offset evaluation becomes problematic. In 
2010, Transparency International strongly asserted that offsets should be banned for 
a number of reasons, alleging that offsets are prone to corruption.9 So far, only few 
countries have embarked on a serious effort to evaluate offset, such as the US, 
Sweden, Finland, Australia, and the UK. 10  Demand for offset audit and 
accountability have been articulated11, which meet traditional concern that by doing 
so will endanger national security and reveal trade secret.  
Table 3.1 Top Defence Arms Importers, 2014 
No Country Offset policy Offset practice 
1 Saudi Arabia Yes Yes 
2 India Yes Yes 
3 China No Yes 
4 UAE Yes Yes 
5 Taiwan Yes Yes 
6 Australia No Yes 
7 South Korea Yes Yes 
8 Indonesia Yes Yes 
9 Turkey Yes Yes 
10 Pakistan Yes Yes 
Source: Author, compiled from online resources 
https://www.ihs.com/info/0214/balance-of-trade.html. (Accessed 10 April 2015) 
Part of the problem in understanding offset is the absence of a methodology for 
evaluation. Despite tens of case studies on offset practice, academics still scramble 
with explanations on how to define and measure offset success. In many cases, 
economists actually cite each other to highlight the negative impacts of offset, but 
seldom conduct real research with credible research methodology.12 The absence of 
this is allegedly responsible for the perpetuation of misunderstandings on offset. 
There is a danger that the problems with offset have been air-brushed out for a 
number of political reasons that justify more spending on arms procurement.13 
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The aim of this chapter is to remove confusion surrounding offset, by way of 
examining its conceptual, policy, and empirical elements. In order to do this, the 
chapter, firstly, attempts to construct a definition of offset and to locate its origins in 
the economic literature. Secondly, it seeks to scrutinise the practical side of offset that 
moulds its operational definition by way of identifying offset’s strategic objectives, 
classifying offset strategies, and describing the implementation of offsets. Thirdly, the 
chapter will discuss the most controversial aspects of offset: whether it works and at 
what cost, by taking stock of the methods of offset evaluation and the success 
discriminators. All of this will be based on the existing literature and the researcher’s 
observation of offset policy debates, particularly in Indonesia.  
3.2 Definition of Offset 
Around 130 countries practise offset today14, yet as a theoretical construct it is far 
from being solid. A variety of arguments have been offered as to why offset, as a 
form of compensatory trade mechanism, exists rather than adherence to classical 
economic principles. Among the proposed economic theories are second best theory, 
information asymmetry, rent seeking in public procurement, and strategic trade 
policy.15 Most literature begin the discussion on the origins of offset by describing 
offset as part of countertrade, quite the opposite of the definition of offset offered by 
WTO GPA that includes countertrade practice. The first part of the subchapter will 
screen the debate and what transpires in the practice, with emphasis on flexibility of 
the offset concept as interpreted by the stakeholders.  
3.2.1 Offset and Countertrade 
Discussion on offset usually begins with its relation to countertrade, a more 
established concept in the area of trade. Martin suggests that the reciprocity trade 
framework reflecting offset has been known in the civil sector as ‘countertrade’, 
which consists of arrangements like barter (simultaneous exchange of one product 
for another), clearing agreements (government-to-government transactions through a 
series of barter exchanges that are consolidated), counter purchase, as well as buy 
back.16 He categorises countertrade as part of offset activity and suggests that those 
who seek to understand offset should also look at the literature on countertrade. 
Contrary to Martin, Udis argues that it is misleading to liken the reciprocity of offset 
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transaction to barter.17  Indeed the concept of ‘added reciprocity’ is central in offset 
practice, but the objective is not to avoid the use of cash as in barter, but to create 
added impact or effect beyond the exchange of goods per se. Although cash 
substitution is not central in offset, it is admittedly being used for foreign exchange-
related motives. Defence purchase, especially pertaining to big-ticket items purchase, 
is considered as a disruption to a government’s balance-of-payment. Offset serves to 
improve this condition. Figure 3.1. below describes typology of countertrade 
according to Matthews, who differentiate offset from other forms of countertrade, 
namely barter and counterpurchase, and divide it into defence and civil contract. 
Figure 3.1 Typology of Countertrade 
 
Source: Matthews, R (2002) ‘Saudi Arabia: Defence Offset and Development’, in: Arming the South. 
Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (eds.) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms 
Trade Offsets. Routledge, pp. 92-104. 
In the context of defence procurement, offsets can be defined as  
“Compensatory procurement arrangements designed to offsets the cost of purchasing defence 
equipment from overseas by means of a reciprocal (countertrade) commitment by suppliers in 
support of a purchaser’s domestic economy”18 
What prompted offset in defence procurement? The notion of ‘added reciprocity’ and 
‘added value’ in offset signifies several issues specifically related to the arms market. 
Information asymmetry in the arms market creates the feeling that the vendor could 
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enjoy abnormal profit, which can be remedied by demanding compensation. 
Furthermore, reciprocity serves as a mechanism to guarantee the quality of goods 
and service in oligopolistic markets.  
Martin lists some theoretical justification for offset, such as it being a policy to 
achieve second best outcomes. The technology market is characterised by 
oligopolistic distortions, which could be cited as a justification to use industrial 
policy. Second, offset as a technology policy, that is government intervention to 
ensure technology transfer, can be justified on the basis that it promotes economic 
growth. Third, offset as an industrial tool, supporting infant industry with learning 
and scale economies through displacement of work from foreign vendors is 
necessary to achieve competitiveness.  
3.2.2 Offset: A Government Policy Instrument and an Industry Marketing Tool 
An official definition is provided by the US BIS, which represents the point of view 
of the US government:  
“ Offset is…a range of industrial and commercial compensation practices required as a 
condition of the purchase of US defence articles and/or defence services”.19 
Martin cites this definition in his book, arguing the validity of the definition comes 
from the fact that the US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has conducted 
more work on offset than any other organisation, exclusively due to the high number 
of US arms exports. Whereas Hall and Markowski offer another definition that is 
more or less similar to US BIS, that is: 
 “…A compensatory procurement arrangements designed to offset the cause of purchasing 
defence equipment from overseas by means of reciprocal (countertrade) commitment by 
suppliers in support of purchaser’s domestic economy.”(Markowski and hall, 2005)20 
Both definitions underline the fact that offset is a compensatory and reciprocal 
arrangement linked to a defence purchase. Another definition offered by Udis and 
Markus (1991) strengthen this argument:  
“… A contract imposing performance conditions on the seller of a good service so that the 
purchasing government can recoup, or offset, some of its investment. In some way, reciprocity 
beyond that associated with normal market exchange of goods and services is involved.”21 
This definition clearly illuminates the fact that offset is beyond normal market 
exchange, serving as a compensatory arrangement to force reciprocity in trade. 
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One aspect that stands out about the offset debate is whether it is, or rather should 
be, mandatory or voluntary. Hall and Markowski (1994) explained that offset is 
different from normal transactional reciprocity in commercial deals because 
 “It may be mandated by governments who apply to either all government imports or, most 
commonly, to imports of defence equipment above certain value (main capital acquisition) 
contracted by the DPA.” 22 
Therefore offset is indeed mandatory, as and when regulated by the government. It 
is clearly intended as a form of government intervention. However, to define offset 
as mandatory has its disadvantages. Hall and Markowski notethat mandatory offset 
policies are inefficient due to their restrictions on the buyer’s flexibility in negotiating 
the most advantageous price-content-quality deals. However, there is more than just 
a mandatory notion in offset definition. An interesting definition was offered by 
Eriksson, et.al (2007), which is quite contradictory tothe previously-mentioned 
definitions that emphasise the mandatory nature of offset: 
“Offset is…Compensations offered by a seller to a buyer. It is applied for so-called off-the-
shelf procurement, i.e. for already developed systems.”23 
Such a definition represents an argument that despite the mandatory nature of offset, 
it is actually accepted as part of ‘rules of the game’ and therefore the purchaser no 
longer has to demand it, instead, it can be proposed actively by the seller. Indeed, in 
some cases the seller seizes the upper hand by being allowed to negotiate directly 
with firms in the buyer country and not with its government, or the seller is given 
flexibility to discharge offset obligations by choosing the type of activities and 
suitable local partners. For example, India allows foreign suppliers to propose the 
kind of offset to discharge, subject to governmental approval. 
The definition offered by Eriksson also illuminates the fact that offset can only be 
given in an off-the-shelf purchase; in other words, mature technology. Looking at 
offset in this way gives the idea that anything related to the ‘transfer of technology’ 
in offset must only be dealing with mature technology. In reality, such an 
interpretation can be misleading because offset can also comprise activities that reach 
out beyond the purchase, which includes joint research and development of new 
technology. The research and development of new technology, however, may not be 
connected to the technology purchased.  
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The other element of offset is that it does not take place in any defence equipment 
purchase; it could takes place in international export transactions. Mower defined 
offset as  
“A provision in an international export transaction that commits the seller firm to provide 
technology, to procure locally produces components, or to provide other forms of technical 
and other assistance to firms in the purchaser nation that go beyond those deemed 
economically necessary to support the sale.”24 
Taylor argued that the fact that offset is attached to an international procurement is 
what makes it different from other government policies.25 Because it is attached to 
government procurement policies, offset binds at least two actors: at one point is a 
‘seller firm’ and at another there is a ‘purchaser nation’. While the supply side could 
be represented by a mere firm, a government must represent the receiving end. 
Martin and Hartley offered another offset definition, which also acknowledges the 
role of firms in the buyer countries in offset negotiation: 
“An offset occurs when the supplier places work to an agreed value with firms in the buying 
country, over and above what it would have bought in the absence of the offset… usually 
designed to achieve a relocation of economic activity from the country of the equipment 
supplier to the purchasing nation” 26 
The abovementioned definitions strengthen the idea of offset as a ‘burden’ on the 
side of the seller that has to be borne as consequence of an arms sale. Offset puts the 
seller into a marginal position because it has to deal with a government at the other 
side of the table. The definition also emphasises the bitter fact that the value of offset 
is beyond what is economically acceptable to support a sale, thus putting the seller 
into a disadvantaged position even though it managed to secure the arms 
sale.Furthermore, Nackmanoffered a definition of offset from the point of view of 
industry:  
“Defence countertrade is a label for a variety of industrial compensation arrangements 
utilised by some governments as requirement for foreign defence firms in large procurements. 
They function as a condition of the sale of defence articles to the purchasing foreign 
government, whereby that foreign government or its economy recoups some portion of the 
acquisition’s value.”27 
By defining offset as ‘condition of sale’, Nackman acknowledged the importance of 
offset for the industry to secure a procurement contract. However, by mentioning 
‘large procurements’, he hinted that offset could only be welcomed by industry if the 
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scaleof procurement is large. This of course a relative concept, and in the 
international arms market laden with competitors competing for small numbers of 
potential buyers, how big should the procurement be in order to justify the demand 
for offset? Countries apparently understand the significant of this relativity; hence, 
most have set a threshold on a minimal procurement value before they demand 
offset.  
3.2.3 Direct and Indirect Offset 
Defining offset gets problematic when it comes to the range of activities that can be 
put under the offset label (Figure 3.2 and table 3.2). The US government’s definition 
of offset explains that activities required under the offset clause could be related or 
unrelated to the defence article purchases in the contract: 
“Offsets are industrial compensation practices required as a condition of purchase in either 
government-to-government or commercial sales of defence articles and/or defense services as 
specified in the International Traffic Arms Regulations. In defence trade, offset include 
mandatory co-production, licensed production, subcontractor production, technology 
transfer, countertrade, and foreign investment. Offsets may be direct, indirect, or a 
combination of both. Direct offsets refer to compensation such as co-production or 
subcontracting, directly’ related to the system being exported. Indirect offsets apply to 
compensation unrelated to the export item, such as foreign investment or countertrade.” 
Figure 3.2 Classifications of Offset Transaction Categories 
 
Source: BIS Offset Database. In: Nackman, M.J. (2011) ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in 
International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for the United States’,Public Contract 
Law Journal, 40(2), p. 519 
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Table 3.2 Direct and Indirect Offset 
Direct offset Indirect offset 
 Subcontractor production: 
overseas production of a 
part or component of a US 
origin defense article. The 
subcontract does not 
necessarily involve license 
of technical information 
and is usually a direct 
commercial arrangement 
between the defense prime 
contractor and a foreign 
producer.  
 Co-production: overseas 
production based upon 
government-to-
government agreement 
that permits a foreign 
government of producer(s) 
to acquire the technical 
information to 
manufacture all or part of a 
US-origin defense article. 
Co-production includes 
government-to-
government licensed-
production, but excludes 
license-production based 
upon direct commercial 
arrangements by US 
manufactures. 
 
 Purchases: procurement of off-the-shelf items from the 
offset recipient. Often, but not always, purchases are 
indirect by nature. Indirect purchases are similar in 
definition to countertrade, while direct purchases are 
analogous to buy-backs. 
 Technology Transfer: transfer of technology that occurs 
as a result of an offset agreement and that may take the 
form of research and development conducted abroad, 
technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint 
venture of overseas investment, or other activities under 
direct commercial arrangement between the defense 
prime contractor and a foreign entity. 
 Training: generally includes training related to the 
production or maintenance of the exported defense item. 
Training may be required in unrelated areas, such as 
computer training, foreign language skills, or 
engineering capabilities. 
 License-production: overseas production of a US-origin 
defense article based upon transfer of technical 
information under direct commercial arrangements 
between a US manufacturer and a foreign government or 
producer. 
 Overseas investment: investment arising from the offset 
agreement, taking form of capital invested to establish or 
expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the foreign 
country. 
 Credit assistance: includes direct loans, brokered loans, 
loan guarantees, assistance in achieving favourable 
payment terms, credit extension, and lower interest 
rates. 
 Purchases: procurement of off-the-shelf items from the 
offset recipient. Often, but not always, purchases are 
indirect by nature. Indirect purchases are similar in 
definition to countertrade, while direct purchases are 
analogous to buy-backs. 
Source: nn. (2007). ’Offsets in Defence Trade’.Eleventh Report to Congress, US Department of Commerce 
Bureau of Industry and Security, January 2007. 
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BIS classifies offset into direct and indirect offset depending on whether the activities 
are related to the purchased goods or services. The activities are then classified into 
various categories that describe the nature of the arrangement or exchange. 
To explain the extent of variety in offset activities, Markowski and Hallsaid that 
offset is:  
“….Simply goods and services which form elements of complex voluntary transactions 
negotiated between governments as purchasers and foreign suppliers… They are those goods 
and services on which a government chooses to place the label ‘offsets’28 
Indeed some of the activities demanded by the buyer country to be put under offset 
could bear no relation whatsoever with the purchase. Markowski and Hallilluminate 
the dark side of offset: a government can actually put in just about anything as and 
when they label it as offset.29 To avoid counterproductive results, some governments 
have come with a clear idea on what activities could be labelled as offset. Matthews 
provides an example of offset practicethat the British and Australian government 
used to do in the past. They demand that a programme has to meet some criteria in 
order to be labelled offset, primarily these are value adding activities like bringing in 
new technology and skills, and creating new employment.30 These conditionality and 
additionality aspects of offset will be discussed further in a later subchapter. 
Understanding the expanding definition of offset is also required at the multilateral 
level. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) uses offset as an umbrella term that 
encompasses, among others, countertrade. Article XVI of the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) refers to offsets as:  
“… Measures used to encourage local development or improve the balance of payments 
accounts by using means of domestic content, licensing of technology, technology 
requirement, and countertrade or similar requirement.”31 
The WTO definition reflects that offset has become a bigger concept than 
countertrade as it could mean any benefit that countries choose to attach to a 
procurement contract.  
To sum up, the operational definition of offset should contain the following key 
elements: government policy, reciprocity, mandatory, compensation, international 
trade, mature technology, foreign seller, and domestic industry. Offset is a form of 
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government policy that mandates reciprocity in international trade in arms 
technology in the form of a compensation from the foreign seller to the domestic 
industry. In this case, offset is not perceived as a subset of countertrade, but the other 
way around. The emphasis given in such a definition is that offset is a very flexible 
concept, determined by both government and the foreign vendor, in order to 
generate value added on top of what each other will receive and pay in the 
procurement contract.  
3.3 Offset Strategic Objectives 
Offset has been acknowledged as a policy tool that can cater for many objectives. 
Many analysts have attempted to identify the objectives and the motives. Martin 
explains that offset objectives could link to defence, development, as well as 
politics.32 Markowski finds that offset objectives actually correlate with a country’s 
development status.33 Yang and Wangcategorise an offset objectives typology based 
on regions.34 The lists could go on and on, but the basic idea is that offset has become 
a convenient way to extract rent and achieve multiple objectives.35 Because offset 
involves two parties, buyer and seller (in some cases a third party like subcontractor 
if the prime contractor and offset consultant might also be involved), each party has 
interests that are not necessarily compatible with the other. Therefore, the strategic 
objectives of each side will be explored, how incompatible they are, and how offset 
could and should be used for the benefit of all parties. A mutual understanding that 
offset can benefit both arms sellers and buyers is believed to be an important 
precondition for successful implementation.  
3.3.1 Objectives of Buyer Countries 
The offset objectives in arms procurement have become more diversified in terms of 
politics and economy. While early offset practice was primary used to countering 
balance of payments problems between the US and its allies, offset in post Cold War 
era was used to provide political justification for defence imports and efforts to 
protect the national defence industrial base, jobs, and technology.36 Europe used 
offset throughout 1960s-1970s for, among other aims, of economising scarce foreign 
exchange to protect a nation’s balance-of-payments37. Furthermore, such methods are 
also expected to promote non-traditional goods and to penetrate non-traditional 
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markets. The considerations for a trade surplus in offset are twofold: first, the 
purchasing country does not have significant defence industry hence considers direct 
offset as unfit; second, the purchasing country is in the middle of economic issues, 
such as a slowdown in growth, and therefore seeks a quick recovery through 
commodity trading and export diversification.38 Later on, countries identifyoffset as a 
mechanism for technology transfer. Udis and Markussuggest that offset might be a 
more efficient way of acquiring technology than a straightforward purchase, because 
the risk of the technology failure is shifted to the vendor who will have a greater 
incentive to transfer successfully the technology for fear that failure will tarnish his 
reputation in the provision of the entire system.39 Matthews suggests that offset has 
been conceptualised as a catalyst for deeper industrialisation, a tool to avoid 
‘reinventing the wheel’ of the R&D cycle, and as a partnering mechanism for 
engaging in collaborative development of frontier technological systems.40 
A number of studies have tried to reveal patterns behind offset objectives. For 
example, Markowski argues that offsets are tiered according to the level of a 
country’s development status.41 While developed countries (such as Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, UK and Germany) were able to demand and link offsets to their own 
military industries (direct offsets), the so-called NICs tend to integrate offset more 
into non-military industries which explain the preference for a combination of direct 
and indirect offsets. Lastly, LDCs aim at indirect offset in line with their focus on 
development. Yang and Wanguse the BIS database to create a typology of offset 
objectives based on region, namely Europe, Asia, Middle East, and North and South 
America.42 Countries that came from the same region were claimed to have similar 
objectives, such as Pacific Rim countries who sought to use offset for aerospace 
technology transfer while country from North and South America focused on 
economy, technology, and jobs. This argument seems to be in correspondence with 
Markowski’s. In this context, a region as a category could actually represent a group 
of countries with similar endowments and stage of economic development. For 
example countries from the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates are similar in their reliance on oil production, hence they share similar 
offset objective to diversify their economy portfolio. Apart from these presumed 
trends, offset objectives indeed encompass broad objectives with economic, political, 
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and strategic/defence considerations. With careful planning these objectives can be 
synchronised, but they are in fact inherently different and entail clashes of interest.   
Defence offset can be used to develop indigenous capability to ‘produce’ a 
comprehensive range of weapon systems in a country; in other words, defence 
industrialisation. Development of a defence industry is characterised by costly entry, 
rapid technical progress, and small demand, hence firms often survive by relying on 
government orders, and subsidies.43 Subsequent to government support to overcome 
the high cost of entry, offset is used to help provide learning and scale economies by 
forcing the foreign firms to transfer work to domestic manufacture. 44 As Martin 
suggests, the volume of work relocated might be such that domestic industry 
becomes internationally competitive, moves up the learning curve and, once, 
established, has no need for further protection.45 Other related motives are wide-
ranging, such as regional ambitions (India, Brazil, Indonesia), creating maintenance 
capacity, repair and overhaul (MRO) as well as upgrading capability (Singapore), 
reviving collapsed industry (Poland), and leveraging positions to fit into global 
supply chains (Australia, Canada).46  Offset for defence industrialisation develops 
over time, to help countries climb the ladder of production. For example, during 
1960s-1970s Singapore’s procurement of M16 rifles helped develop domestic 
capability to produce the indigenous SAE 80 weapon. Also, Malaysia’s procurement 
of Russian MiG fighters in the 1990s helped to establish domestic capability in the 
aerospace maintenance and repair service.   
Those states with no interest in promoting a defence industrial base per se could put 
defence offset to better use, such as to promote development objectives. According to 
Hammond, there are 13 economic objectives, among which are increasing local 
employment, enhancing market penetration, transfer of technology and increased 
diversification.47 Markusen suggests that countries foresee relative stagnation in the 
international military market and choose to use their offset credits to construct new 
comparative advantages in sectors with greater income elasticity and growth 
potential.48 
Saudi Arabia uses offset to reduce dependency on oil exports through development 
of a downstream petro-chemical industry.49 The reason behind such a policy seems to 
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be self-assurance that off-the-shelf weapons are readily available anytime.50Also, the 
country acknowledges that having a small and unskilled population does not fit with 
defence industrialisation ambitions; hence it should focus on production of non-
military items that can serve both a civil and military purpose. Offset, in this regard, 
is used as an extension of long-term civil programmes of technology transfer under 
contracts in the military sector.51 In the case of the Al Yamamah programme in which 
Saudi Arabia purchased fighter jets, training jet, naval ships and other equipment 
from the United Kingdom, the Saudi British Economic Offset Programme was 
formed in 1989 to manage offset programmes to reach a value of more than 1 billion 
pounds sterling. Offset has proven to be instrumental in establishing joint ventures 
in the chemicals, polypropylene, sugar, logistics and other sectors. For example, one 
of the established programmes was the joint venture between Tate & lyle, Savola 
Group and other Saudi Partners in constructing a sugar refinery worth 100 mn 
pounds sterling.  It is held that the refinery will fulfil nearly 100 percent of domestic 
demand, with possible export potential.52 
Other examples of the use of offset for development purposes arethe United Arab 
Emirates, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland. In United Arab Emirates, 
offset objectives included the aim to diversify the economy through the transfer of 
technology, gaining overseas market access, and creating job opportunities for its 
nationals. In Canada, offset has been used as regional development policy by 
spreading offset work.53 Whereas in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland, offset is 
used to enhance the development of strong domestic small medium enterprises 
(SMEs).54 
Employment generation is an offset objectives in many countries, such as Israel, 
Czech, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, as well as the United Arab Emirates.55 The driver 
behind this is both political and development related. First, offset serves as a 
compensation for the loss of manufacturing opportunities and jobs incurred by the 
purchasing country’s economy when big value procurement is given to foreign 
suppliers. In countries where government procurement becomes a politically 
sensitive issue, employment serves as a substantial justification for a foreign 
purchase. Second, offset becomes a government intervention policy tool in the labour 
market, creating demand for specialised employment in leading edge technology 
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sectors that otherwise would have been absent. This can be done by, for instance, 
encouraging foreign firms to buy more from local industry and specific policies to 
promote regional distribution of offset work to encourage firms to locate economic 
activity in specific geographical areas.56 
Political economic motives for particular offset objectives exist in Israel, which faced 
an immediate challenge to providing jobs for immigrants flowing into its territory. 
For example, from late 1986 through 1996 the migrant inflow from Russia increased 
the total Israeli population by 11 percent and the labour force by 14 percent.57 For the 
Czech Republic, which has been using offset policy since 1998, employment 
generation is critical to address the dramatic decline in employment in the traditional 
industrial regions.58 Political and economic changes due to the separation from the 
former Czechoslovakia have caused transformation in the economy, leading to the 
disappearance of large heavy industries to be replaced by SMEs, and the balancing of 
development across regions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have faced similar 
challenges. In Saudi, the problem of unemployment is the utmost urgency due to 
high population growth and the majority of the population being under the age of 30 
years.59 The UAE is faced by the twin demographic challenges of a young population 
in need of meaningful employment and a strong reliance on foreign labour whereby 
20 percent of UAE nationals were under the age of 15 in 2008 and 73.9 percent of 
those of working age are non-nationals.60 South Africa determined job creation to be 
one of the offset success indicators when agreeing to the Strategic Defence Packages 
in 1999.61 
The Dual-use Objective 
Bitzinger argues that offset in earlier times was simply used to quicken the process of 
defence industrialisation, but along the way it has been transformed into a more 
complex set of objectives and partially moved away from defence per se.62 Offset 
objectives have broadened from defence to dual-use and non-defence purposes. 
South Africa, for example, used direct and indirect offset simultaneously to facilitate 
a set of objectives that included retaining a sustainable defence industrial capacity. 
Its government also attempted to use arms purchases to leverage substantial 
investment in non-defence sectors by directing it to particular sectors like minerals 
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and energy. 63  The Malaysia Vision 2020 policy published in 1991 implicitly 
recognises the potential for spin-off from defence offset to support the plan for 
economic take-off: shifting from labour-intensive industrial development to high 
technology sectors, particularly aerospace.64 It is worth pointing out that this mixed 
policy might have stemmed from the inability of defence industry to absorb overall 
offset programmes, hence the need for indirect offset. The challenge of this approach 
is the complexity of offset contracts and the loss of focus, because a variety of 
activities that have no connection with each other along the spectrum of direct-
indirect offset have to be managed within a limited period of time.   
The defence industrial base can also be used as a lever for broader economic 
development, using spin-off as one of the determinant success factors.65 Singapore, 
with MILEX per GDP as high as 6%, used offset pragmatically to develop the 
capability of maintaining and supplying, upgrading, and modifying imported 
weapon systems, particularly aircraft. Singapore leveraged its military purchases to 
gain the expertise it needed to become a major partner in international aircraft 
development and upgrade programmes.66 Later on, Singapore used its offset efforts 
to commercialise and globalise its arms industry with considerable success. 
3.3.2 Objectives of Seller Countries 
Industries have accepted the importance of offsets as a sine qua non for securing arms 
sales. When a buyer starts to demand compensation for securing an arms deal, 
suppliers would prefer to conform rather than losing what would be a high-value 
but scarce sales opportunity. In some cases, offsets values can reach extremely high 
figures that exceed the value of the arms deal contract, such as in 1999when the 
South African government received offset offer worth R104 billion under Strategic 
Defence Packages, more than three times the value of the arms deal.67 
However, while offset could be beneficial for the foreign vendor’s competitiveness, 
the impact could hurt domestic industry. An example of this is Martin Marietta’s 
agreement to buy optical gear abroad as condition forarms sales, leaving it to find 
new vendors for electronics and electro-optic displays in Germany and Israel. 68 
Martin Marietta was not aware of the negative impacts of its actions on the US optics 
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industry. Furthermore, offset - especially the indirect variant - is not exactly the area 
in which the supplier excels. To turnaround this marketing landmine, prime 
contractors often delegate the implementation of offset obligations to its 
subcontractors. When General Dynamics secured the sale of F-16s to European 
countries in 1977, it required Menasco – a supplier of its landing gears - to teach a 
Dutch company called DAF how to make the gears.69 As a consequence of this sale, 
General Dynamics secured significant income while Menasco had to deal with self-
made competitors in the international market.70 
According to Hammond,there are ways in which suppliers can benefit from offset.71 
First, offset is a tool to secure competitive advantage in the highly competitive 
international market. Sellers could also use offset to enhance market penetration, by 
allowing a company to establish a commercial position it would have been unable to 
obtain in any other way. Offset provides an opportunity to sharpen marketing 
capabilities and increase networking and contacts to handle a wide range of 
unrelated products. Offset also provides ways to avoid financial and legal 
complications, because tariffs and quotas are usually waived and exempted from 
offset agreements.72 In short, offset has been used as tool of trade by the supplier.  
Martin and Hartley suggest that another benefit offset may present to the industry is 
the discovery of new lower cost suppliers, with whom they can continue to do 
business after the offsets deal is completely discharged.73 
3.3.3 Compatible or Contrasting Objectives? 
It can be said that the objectives of supplier and buyer countries are compatible in the 
beginning of their offset relationship, when politics is more prominent than 
economic motives. It was security interests that prompted the US to enter into offset 
arrangements with its closest allies, NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.74 
When offset is taken beyond the initial objective, such as to help economic 
development of the buyer country, it presents ever-growing challenges to the 
supplier and buyer. Bear in mind that offset stakeholders are not limited to foreign 
vendors and national firms, but also the host government and armed forces that also 
need to be taken into consideration. Armed forces as  users has theirown interests, 
among which is to minimise life-cycle costs and delivery risks. Offset can be seen as a 
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threat to this interest; for example, direct offset could add the risk of cost-bloating 
under performance and late delivery. On the other hand, the government might have 
broader interests, such as to attract investment, create jobs, and minimise 
procurement costs.  This shows that not only competition of interests exists between 
foreign and domestic stakeholders, but also among the latter. 
The main philosophy of a firm is to sell as much of its product while keeping the cost 
of business low. To engage in offset incurs a cost premium, that depending on the 
arrangement could end up being borne by the supplier thus supressing marginal 
profit. While defence firms are eager to score rare and high value deals using offset 
as a deal sweetener, the effect of offsets on industry’s competitiveness and 
employment has been alarming.75 Furthermore, the fact that offset is widely practised 
means that suppliers will face offset demands from different countries that might 
share similar objectives. As offset providers tend to transfer business to another 
country where it has an outstanding or new commitment, sustaining offset benefits 
could be a challenge for the buyer country.  
3.4 Operationalisation of Offset 
3.4.1 Classification of Offset Strategies 
The national offset strategy policy varies, stretching from flexible to mandatory 
approaches, as shown by Figure 3.3.  
Matthews categorised offset policies based on their place in the mandatory case-by-
case pendulum. The first category is case-by-case, which aims to maximise mutual 
benefit through negotiation and compromise.76 This discretionary approach is used 
only when the buyer foresees the benefit of using an offset strategy. The strong point 
about this approach lies in its adaptability to the complexity of acquisition 
technology, contract negotiation and compromise (Khan, 2010).77 Having said that, 
the success of this approach relies on the people who determine and negotiate offset. 
Hence, this approach only fits with a country where a pool of experienced people 
exists to operate the offset already in place. The prominent examples of countries 
using this approach are Japan, Singapore and Italy.  
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Figure 3.3 Spectrum of offset policy possibilities 
 
Source: Matthews, R. (2005), ‘Defence Offsets: policy versus pragmatism’ in: Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. 
P. (eds.) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets. 
Routledge. Example of countries are added with author’s permission.  
The second approach is mandatory policy, which is opposite to the case-by-case 
policy. The mandatory approach relies on formal policy, which prescribes in detail 
the minimum value of the procurement contract in which offset becomes an 
obligation, the offset threshold as a percentage of the main contract value, 
multipliers, as well as penalties. This is the normal approach chosen by a country 
where the available staffs lacks experience and skills in dealing with offset 
agreements, but it comes with the disadvantage of inflexibility resulting from the 
imposition of a standard solution.78 Matthewsnotes that the prescribed policy has 
become more and more ambitious, which has led to policy stress and non-fulfilment 
of supplier’s offset commitments.79 The examples of countries using this approach 
are many; among them are South Korea, Norway and Saudi Arabia. The first and 
second approaches are not mutually exclusive. In the case of South Korea, a 
mandatory offset policy is accompanied by flexible articles that adopt the 
discretionary case-by-case approach.  
The third approach is best endeavours as was practised by the UK and Australia. 
This approach relies on partnership, trust, and supplier commitment; hence apply no 
penalty in a general sense. However, the offset discharge performance of a supplier 
will be factored into future procurement bids in the form of disbarment. The fact that 
the UK came out as the biggest offset receiver throughout 1993-2006, in the absence 
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of a written policy, indicates the success of its non-mandatory approach to offset.80 
However, a best endeavours approach is also tricky and may not work in some 
countries. Australia, for example, once discarded this approach for mandatory 
approach in 1986. Australian offset policy initially relied on a best endeavours 
strategy (1970-1986) but then changed to a mandatory approach (1986-1992), before 
returning again to a best endeavours strategy (1992-).81 The mandatory offset was 
replaced in 1992 by more focused provisions within the contract, which put defence 
offset only as a ‘last resort’. A new offset policy in 2008 strengthened the non-
mandatory approach of Australian offset implementation, which was then followed 
by the 2009 policy innovation emphasising access to global supply chains. Under this 
policy, industrial participation in foreign arms procurement is directed at meeting 
the objective of creating opportunities for capable local firms to compete for work in 
the global supply chains of multinational primes and their major suppliers. The 
Australian case shows the possibility of an offset policy approach to evolve as 
countries learn more about what does not work in offset.   
3.4.2 Offset Policy Features 
Features that are normally included in offset policy - whether it is mandatory, case 
by case, or best endeavours - are a minimum value of procurement contract where 
offset becomes applicable, an offset threshold, eligible transaction to be recognised as 
offset, multipliers, discharge time frames, performance bonds and penalties, offset 
banking credits and offset swaps. All the main features of offset policy are captured 
in figure 3.4. below. These are policy tools to ensure that the purchasing country can 
gain optimal benefits from offsets, by allowing the foreign companies to discharge 
their offset obligation within a predetermined time frame and, if possible, at no cost 
to the offset receiver. 
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Figure 3.4 The main features of offset policy 
 
Source: Author 
Threshold 
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procurement value of USD 1 million and Slovenia at a procurement value of EUR 
400,000. Taiwan, Denmark, Israel, Malaysia determine offset minimum thresholds at 
a procurement value of USD 5 million, while Italy, Norway, Netherland, Poland set 
the bar at EURO 5 million. Norway approaches thresholds by targeting not only a 
single procurement contract but also aggregate contracts won by a single supplier. 
Suppliers to the Norwegian Armed Forces which during a five year period may be 
awarded multiple contracts, separately not exceeding the threshold value, areobliged 
to sign a conditional framework Industrial Co-operation Agreement if the aggregate 
contract value exceeds the threshold value. 84  Once the aggregate value of 
procurement hits the threshold, the Agreement becomes effective: all subsequent 
contracts concerning the same supplier are subject to offset regardless of its value.   
The highest offset thresholds are applied by India and Canada, which determine 
offset minimum thresholds at procurement values of USD 64.9 million and CAD 100 
millionrespectively. Minimum thresholds are not permanent and are subject to 
revision. Turkey used to apply offset at a minimum threshold of USD 5million, then 
the 2007 industrial participation and offset directive revised the threshold and 
doubled the value to USD 10 million, lifting the threshold up to the level of the 
United Arab Emirates and South Korea.  
Relatively high thresholds could mean many things: first, only high value arms 
procurement requires offset. The logic behind this is that high value procurement is 
akin to high technology value as well as large production scale. Second, only the big 
defence companies are targeted for offset. On the other hand, low thresholds could 
also mean that small and medium enterprises along with not so high technology 
firms are also subjected to offset. Since it is not very clear as to why a country 
determines an offset threshold at certain contract values, the use of a threshold could 
also mean limiting the number of procurements to be subjected to offset for the 
purpose of practicality.  
Thresholds might just be used to constrain the number of offset programmes, 
because applying a blanket-offset policy across all procurement is impractical and 
requires massive resources. Those with a case-by-case or best endeavours approach 
to offset use thresholds. For example, Italy applied an offset threshold of 5 mn euro. 
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When offset is negotiated on a case-by-case basis, the threshold might or might not 
be used. If it were to be used, the application is based on a buyer country’s 
technological needs rather than the value of the procurement contract. For example, 
although the minimum threshold in South Korea is US$ 10 mn, offset can still be 
pursued on a case by case basis made by DAPA’s policy for contracts with a value 
less than US$10 mn. South Korea realises that although the threshold has been 
determined based on standard criteria, it does not always offer the country the 
optimal technology and industrial benefits.  
Offset as a Percentage of Procurement Value  
In the beginning of offset practices in the 1950s the purchasing country only sought 
offset up to 10-30 percent of the value of a procurement contract, but by 1982 the 
threshold had gone up to 100 percent - the first of which occurred in the F-18 
purchase by Canada.85 Offset is usually defined as a certain percentage of contract 
value. Halldivides the offset requirement into equal thirds: high, mid-range, and 
low.86 High offset requirements mean that the offset demanded is at least 100 percent 
of the procurement contract value. An example of this is Brazil, which applies a 100 
percent offset - occasionally rising to 120 percent. Mid-range offset equals 50–99 
percent of procurement contract value. Low threshold refers to offset demand at 
lower than 50 percent of procurement contract value, such as in the case of India.  
Why countries have different offset percentages of procurement contract is 
intriguing. India, for example, decides to keep its offset percentage at 30 percent in 
general, but in individual cases this can rise. Verma suggests that many factors affect 
the decision on increasing offset thresholds: strategic importance of the acquisition or 
technology, the enhanced ability of the national defence industry to absorb the offset, 
the export potential generated, the negotiating position of the buyer country in the 
world defence market, the perceived need for direct/indirect offsets, and the 
capabilities of domestic industry to absorb the technology and participate in the 
quantum mandated in the discharge of obligations .87 
Verma’s factors affecting offset threshold decisions explain the reasoning behind the 
buyer’s side, which can sometimes make no sense. For example, if the offset value 
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equals the value of the main procurement contract, how can the supplier make the 
sale profitable? The issue becomes more complicated when the offset demanded falls 
within production related direct offset. Considering the cost structure of defence 
industry, in which the prime supplier or lead integrator do not own the whole value 
chains for defence production, it would be impossible for the supplier to give offset 
value equal to the procurement value. In the case of direct offset, one hundred 
percent offset may mean the company has to give up all of its profit.  
As and when 100 percent offset is demanded in direct offset, there are two 
possibilities that follow. The first is, knowing beforehand the offset demand, the 
supplier might increase the price of defence equipment in order to maintain 
reasonable profit hence creating an ‘offset premium cost’. This will be elaborated 
further in the following subchapter on offset cost. The second is that the prime 
contractor will distribute the offset obligation across its value chain, which opens the 
involvement of third parties. An example of the latter is the involvement of 
Indonesian Aerospace as a subcontractor to the French company Thales in the offset 
programme linked to Turkey’s Meltem II acquisition project.  
What if the offset percentage goes beyond the value of work of the main supplier? In 
the case of Brazil, offset demand can reach up to 120 percent of the procurement 
contract value, which makes no sense at all. Such high offset values only become 
understandable when the concept of the multiplier is introduced into the calculation, 
which means the value of offset, as a percentage of procurement value is not the real 
value. The multiplier will be elaborated further in the next subchapter.  
Multiplier 
According to BIS, the multiplier is “a factor applied to the actual value of certain 
offset transactions to calculate the credit value earned”.88 The multiplier is used as an 
incentive for a supplier to direct offset activities to sectors that the buyer country 
feels most beneficial. There are two kinds of multiplier, which are positive and 
negative multipliers. Positive multipliers are the ones used to attract offset into a 
designated area, thus applied so that the supplier receives a higher credit value, 
higher than the offset actual value. For example, the United Arab Emirates gives a 
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multiplier from 2 to 5 based on a spectrum of variables, namely end market, 
product/services, function, infra-structure, others (skill development, education and 
knowledge, social benefits within UAE). 
Negative multipliers, on the other hand, are used to discourage a supplier to offer 
offset activity in sectors that are not among the buyer’s best interests.89 One example 
of negative multipliers is the Switzerland multiplier for offset that falls outside its 
pre-defined industrial sector, which is 0.5 or equal to half of the value of offset.  
Because of the multiplier, one needs to understand that there are two kinds of offsets 
values: ‘actual value’ and ‘credit value’ of the offset transaction. The first refers to the 
real value of the offset transaction while the latter refers to the value credited for the 
offset transaction by application of a multiplier, which may be greater than, equal to, 
or less than the actual value of the offset. 
The purpose of applying a multiplier is clear, that is to require suppliers to discharge 
offset obligations in certain sectors with criteria that depend on, among other things, 
pre-defined sectors, offset receiver (industry, research institute, and so on), and end-
market, product/services. South Korea uses multipliers to encourage offset in 
aerospace. Switzerland gives the highest multiplier, which is 3 (three), for offset 
transaction with high relevance to Swiss security and armament policy.90 India gives 
the highest multiplier, which is 3.0 (three) for technology that is offered without any 
restriction and with full and unfettered rights including rights to export.91 Malaysia, 
on the other hand, will only consider multipliers in exceptional circumstances, such 
as when the programme acquired lead to high-end acquisition or maximisation of 
FDI into Malaysia.92 
In some countries, private sector firms, especially small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are regarded highly as offset receivers. Canada has been known to use offset 
to support SMEs. The United Arab Emirates value offsets in the form of developing 
private infrastructure with multiplier values of 4 (four) while developing public 
infrastructure is only valued with a multiplier 2 (two), while social benefits for SMEs 
are valued with a multiplier 5 (five). India gives a multiplier of 1.50 if the offset is 
directed to SMEs. 
138 
Using multipliers has its benefits and disadvantages. On the positive side, a 
multiplier is useful for the foreign company to formulate an offset proposal based on 
the type of activities that earn the highest multiplier. This way, the foreign company 
can come up with an offset proposal that meets the offset value obligation at the 
smallest cost. The negative side of the multiplier is the complexity that it brings to 
the offset evaluation. Since the value of technology is subjective, the offset receiver 
and the provider could have different multiplier calculations due to different 
judgements.  
From the buyer country’s perspective, the multiplier is also used to ensure the 
absorption of offset opportunity by the local industry. This might help to explain the 
different range of multiplier values across countries. Countries with low technology 
absorption capability might use a high range of multipliers to claim high offset 
credit, concealing the reality of its actual value. Here, a multiplier might actually be 
used for political gain, creating the impression of high benefit and high local 
absorption, to justify the procurement programme and the accompanying offset.93 
Apparently, not all countries believe that applying multipliers will endorse the the 
attainment of offset objective. Not all countries that practice offset use multipliers. 
The UK, for instance, used to rely on a best endeavours strategy, and did not use 
multipliers. Instead it allowed the offset provider to propose the value of offset. 
Another example is Malaysia, which only uses multipliers selectively in special cases. 
Eligible Transactions 
Determining what can be credited as offset is more challenging in the 
implementation stage. While government can refer to defence, industry, and 
technology policy as guidance for determining offset in the policy formulation stage, 
it might need a set of new criteria to do similar task during the offset implementation 
period. To avoid confusion and also low-value offset, some countries come up with a 
set of well-defined criteria to differentiate offset from other trade. According to 
Taylor (2012), an offset contains elements of additionality and sustainability to set it 
apart from other trade that occurs naturally.94 Additionality refers to new economic 
activity that was transferred from the seller to the purchasing government’s 
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economy, above existing activity that may have occurred in the free market. 
Sustainability refers to the benefits that accrue over a long period. A related term to 
additionality is conditionality, which refers to reciprocal exchange among multiple 
firms. Basically conditionality means that a benefit can be considered as offset if it 
can only be produced by offset. Hence, offset has to provide both additionality and 
conditionality during offset valuation.  
The operationalisation of additionality/causality varies across countries. For 
example, in Canada the benefits must be brought about from industrial and regional 
benefit obligations. In Norway, the continuation of an existing business is usually 
ineligible, but increases in the size of business of product portfolio may be accepted 
provided that this results in increased business activity or the development of 
technology and/or production capacity.95 Another criteria for offset eligibility is high 
technology. High technology is sought after in offset, but the implementing 
definition can be tricky. Some countries like Canada and the Netherlands define their 
technology requirement as “equivalent technological level in relation to the purchase 
of the defence equipment”.96 In Switzerland, the value of technology transfer cannot 
be recognised as offset. Only added value for the Swiss economy actually generated 
by the technology transfer can be recognised; for example, export transactions of 
follow-up business with a Swiss enterprise with other foreign enterprises that can be 
proven to result from the previous technology transfer.97 
Performance Bond and Penalties 
With respect to the fulfilment of offset obligations, the offset provider is required to 
establish a performance bond. The buyer country withholds a performance bond as a 
guarantee against the offset obligation discharge, in which any shortfall in discharge 
will be absorbed by the performance bond. The common practice is that the amount 
of the guarantee refers to the procurement regulation in the buyer country, unless it 
is stated otherwise in the offset guidelines. In South Korea, the contractor/offset 
provider does not have to establish a performance bond for the offset programme 
separately when the parties agree to use the performance bond of the main 
contract/procurement contract.98 Similarly, Canada does not demand the supplier to 
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furnish a performance bond, but will retain at least 10 percent of the purchase 
payment if an offset obligation is not fulfilled.99 
The form of performance bond varies. South Korea requires an irrevocable stand-by 
Letter of Credit that shall be valid until 90 days after the expiration date of the offset 
performance period. Malaysia requires a performance bond in the form of a bank 
guarantee from an acceptable Malaysian bank to the value of five percent of the main 
procurement contract. An additional performance bond can also be requested in the 
event that the period of offset obligation discharge exceeds the period of the main 
procurement contract, as in the case of India.100 
Regardless of the nature of offset requirements, whether it be mandatory, case-by-
case, or best endeavours, penalties have been widely applied. The purpose of the 
penalty is clear: to prevent the supplier from non-performance, and in some cases, 
barring the non-performing supplier from participating again in future procurement 
bidding. The United Kingdom that used to implement offset on a best endeavours 
basis also applies a penalty in the form of debarment, while Singapore implements 
offsets on a case-by-case basis applying penalties equal to up to 10 percent of the 
unfulfilled obligation. 
Discharge Time Frame 
The offset discharge time is regulated in the offset guidelines, which comprise the 
length of offset discharge, the ‘grace period’, and the extension. The length of offset 
discharge is varied, from co-terminus (offset discharge time is similar and runs 
parallel with the main procurement contract) to non co-terminus. Some countries 
chose not to use a co-terminus approach and instead, for example, in Italy and 
Austria, determine a discharge period ranging from 5 to 15 years. The co-terminus 
offset discharge time has become the most common practice. An example of this is 
the Malaysian offset guideline, which mandates offset obligations to be fulfilled 
within the delivery dates of the main procurement contract. However, it does not 
negate re-negotiation for extensions. Other countries use co-terminus plus a 
guarantee period as the basis to determine offset discharge time; for example, Turkey 
applies a procurement contract delivery time plus a two-year guarantee period and 
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Belgium applies a contract period plus 1-2 years. The benefit of using co-terminus for 
offset discharge time is that it is difficult to separate offset success from the main 
procurement, because the main procurement contract cannot be closed if the offset 
discharge is not yet concluded. Usually this is linked to the penalty system, whereby 
part of main procurement contract payment will be withheld if the provider can not 
perform in discharging offset obligations. This way, the provider is forced to carry 
out its offset obligation more seriously. However, the co-terminus approach is 
criticised as being too restrictive; for instance, it restricts the sourcing of major 
assemblies/component in the case of India.101 
Other countries have different approaches to offset discharge time; for example, 
using a milestone system. In the case of the UAE, its offset programme is divided 
into seven milestones across seven years, which requires a certain part of offset work 
to be finished within each milestone from the smallest (5 percent) to the biggest (25 
percent): milestone 1 (5 percent); milestone 2 (10 percent); milestone 3 (10 percent); 
milestone 4 (15 percent), milestone 5 (15 percent); milestone 6 (20 percent); and 
milestone 7 (25 percent). The purpose of using milestones is to foresee potential 
problems at early stage, hence implementation failure resulting in a penalty can be 
avoided. Sweden and the Netherlands also use milestone systems for the offset 
implementation time frame. A grace period can also be considered, but excluded 
from the offset discharge time. In the case of the UAE, the offset authority could 
determine a grace period as a head-start for the offset provider to set up a project 
that has complex infrastructure, training or facility requirements, which need 
additional time for construction or assembly.102 
Offset Swaps 
Offset swap/abatement schemes represent bilateral agreements that involve the 
reciprocal waiver of all or part of an arms suppliers’ offset obligations by the 
purchasing government and other governments in which the first country has 
mutual offset obligations. The Netherlands, for example, accepts a swap mechanism 
that allows mutual abatements. This means that an outstanding offset obligation of 
the Netherland’s industry in a foreign country can be swapped with outstanding 
offset obligations of the same country in the Netherlands. Switzerland and Turkey 
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stated in their offset guidelines the acceptance of an offset swap practice. In some 
cases, third party outstanding offset obligations can also be considered.  
In addition to a bilateral mechanism, abatements have been encouraged through 
trilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Denmark, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands have concluded a trilateral memorandum of understanding on offset 
abatement. The European Defence Agency (EDA) pushed for an offset abatement 
among member countries through its Code of Conduct on Offset issued in 2009.  
3.4.3 Linkage to Defence Procurement: The Offset Life Cycle 
Offset is an integral part of the procurement process; it is conducted in parallel with 
the procurement life cycle. As a consequence, offset could affect the conduct of 
procurement. First, the offset requirement potentially slows down the procurement 
process. Second, as a policy, offset might have different objectives compared to 
procurement; this might add to complexity in negotiation because offset negotiation 
is also part of procurement contract negotiation. Third, because offset agreement is 
part of the main procurement contract, it could serve as an additional risk. 
Unsuccessful direct offset could affect the fulfilment of the procurement contract. 
In order to understand how offset operates within the procurement cycle and the 
risks it creates, this research borrows Yang and Wang’s offset life cycle model, which 
was basically an integration of the offset sequence in the acquisition life cycle.103 The 
offset life cycle is divided into four phases. Phase I is the preparation phase where 
offset players need to evaluate the seller’s and the buyer’s capabilities, and then 
develop a strategy. Phase II is the negotiation and decision process. Phase III is the 
execution and audit phase. Phase IV is termination and feedback. Phase I and II are 
part of the strategic level view of offset, whereas phase III and IV represent the 
execution level. There are two evaluations accompanying this cycle, which serves as 
a sort of milestone for the offset. The first evaluation is conducted after phase I, with 
the purpose being a device evaluation mechanism with a strategic level view to 
decide which factors can affect the outcome of offset. The second evaluation is in the 
middle of phase III, after the execution but before the audit begins, with the objective 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the offset programme.  
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Phase I (preparation) is about planning the priorities. It is almost impossible to be 
done without predetermination of policy guidance as reference for offset priorities. 
This policy guidance could take the form of a national science and technology policy 
and armed force R&D policy. The British and Australians have a different view on 
this. While the British view national S&T policy as a reference to industrial 
participation, the Australians believe that decisions on offset should follow the 
armed forces’ R&D policy.104 A full knowledge of technological capability of the 
national industry as a potential offset receiver is also vital for decision-making on 
this stage. For example, the government of Malaysia requires an industry database, 
market intelligence, and a technology database as the basis for decision-making in 
this phase.105 No less important is the procurement plan that reflects the potential 
economies of scale, which serves as an important incentive to the national industry. 
According to Verma, it is important that industry is involved in the early stage of 
offset planning and aware of the government procurement plan. This would provide 
assurance of future business with the government that acts as an incentive for the 
industry to invest in new capabilities required to absorb offset.106 
After the government of a buyer country concludes the offset prioritisation, it can 
issue offset demand around the same time as the Request for Proposal (RfP) as a 
requirement to participate in the procurement tender. Some countries provide 
written offset guidance, which includes offset objectives, offset value, as well as 
multipliers, providing a reference for potential bidders to formulate their best offset 
proposal. The buyer country could also provide access to a national industry 
database to assist potential bidders identify and connect with qualified local offset 
partners.  
Phase II (negotiation and decision process) begins with evaluating the proposal from 
the foreign vendor. Although offset is not meant to be ‘the’ determining factor in a 
bid, it could be when traditional indicators like performance and cost in the 
competing bids come out almost identical. While offset valuation is the imperative at 
this stage, countries employ different methods and include different variables to 
determine offset value. Negotiation can be conducted between the purchaser country 
and the foreign vendor, or between the vendor and its potential partner in the 
purchaser country. For example, in India, negotiation of the MoU between the bidder 
144 
and Indian partner is critical, since it is the only document signed by the offset 
partner before signing the offset programme contract. Foreign bidders will formulate 
a Technical Offset Offer for the technical bid that contains details of 
products/services to be contracted, the percentage of offset commitment and the 
MoU with the Indian offset partner.107 
Phase III (execution and audit) begins with the implementation of the offset and is 
accompanied by an evaluation of the efficiency of the offset programme. In order to 
review the efficiency of the offset project, Wang and Yang suggest using data 
envelopment analysis, a method to identify input and output data. Input factors refer 
to how many resources companies need to put into the offset project, which includes 
manpower, material, and budget. Output factors refer to breakthroughs in critical 
technology, improvements in quality, reductions in R&D costs and schedules, the 
development of new products, and improvements in existing products. 
Phase IV (termination and feedback) is the last stage in the offset life cycle, when 
offset evaluation from the previous stage is used as feedback for both the purchasing 
government and the foreign vendor to set new efficiency criteria for the next offset 
project. This evaluation can be used to determine whether a foreign vendor will be 
blacklisted from the next procurement bid if it is considered as failing in offset 
delivery (disbarment). 
3.4.4 Responsibilities of the Offset Authority 
The government needs to establish institutional and legislative frameworks for 
operating offset agreements for two reasons: first, to overcome economic 
disadvantages associated with offset and, second, to manage the complexity of a 
long-term commitment.108 The first reason implies that, as suggested by Brauer, each 
country needs an arms trade offset audit team to measure the full economic cost of 
each proposed deal.109 To determine whether offset choice is more expensive than 
off-the-shelf or other choices, though, is an uphill task, if not impossible, considering 
the absence of information to measure the real cost of offset. In India, an independent 
audit body was created to carry out offset evaluation in an independent manner, 
arguably eliminating the potential for collusion and corruption. The second reason 
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prompts an important question: does government need a dedicated offset agency to 
manage offset programmes? The issue was raised owing to the fact that offset 
implementation is complex and lengthy, akin to the procurement programme.  
Whether a dedicated agency is required depends on whether the functions of such a 
body and competencies are present. Platzgummer suggests there are three primary 
functions of an offset agency: first, it defines the offset contract with the foreign 
supplier; second, the agency is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 
offset agreement; third, the agency informs companies from the domestic defence 
industrial base about possible cooperation with the foreign vendor.110 He concludes 
that even though offset is rather exceptional, the functions of an offset agency are 
relatively similar to other government agencies. Therefore, the function of an offset 
managing body could be handled by an existing government body, such as the 
Treasury, Ministry of Defence, or a procurement body. In the absence of such 
institutions, government could decide to create a standalone offset body for the 
specific purpose of offset implementation. 
In practice, the level of institutional arrangement for offset implementation varies 
due to differences in legislative frameworks. Offset policies are issued as regulations 
at various levels, such as government regulation (Hungary), ministerial regulation 
(Malaysia, the Netherlands), procurement agency regulation (South Korea). As a 
consequence, the level of regulation determines the level and degree of officials in 
charge with offset policy and implementation. For example, the Malaysian offset 
policy is issued by the Ministry of Finance, because it covers public procurement 
across government ministries; hence implementation becomes the responsibility of 
related ministries, which puts the Ministry of Defence in charge with offset in arms 
procurement. In South Korea, the Defence Acquisition Program Administration 
(DAPA), a civilian-led organisation under the Ministry of Defence, issues defence 
offsets guideline and carries out offset implementation. In the Netherlands, offset 
policy becomes an integral part of the industrial policy of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs.  
Regarding the necessary competency to manage offset, Yang and Wang argue that 
this should include programme managers, government officers, negotiators, financial 
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experts, legal specialists, engineering personnel, users, and industry 
representatives.111 While these people could come from different places and represent 
different interests, which are not necessarily compatible, the key person is the 
programme manager who is responsible for the success or failure of the offset 
programme because of the need to coordinate and integrate the opinions of different 
organisations and players in this competition game. 
3.5 Evaluating Offset’s Impact on Defence Industrialisation 
3.5.1 Evaluating Offset: the Meeting Strategic Objectives 
Numerous efforts have been undertaken to verify the success of offsets, and the 
majority have taken the form of case studies of a single country by one analyst or a 
group of authors who are consistent in undertaking longitudinal studies.112 Such 
studies provide feedback for their respective governments, and as a result the offset 
policies and preferences of those countries have changed overtime. Some countries 
have now moved from using unfocused offsets activity to pursuing the kind of 
offsets that they believe to bring the most value-added in a sustainable way.113 
Evaluating the success of offset programmes is a challenging task because the 
definition of offset success can be challenging. How does one define success? First, 
offset success can be defined as the fulfilment of offset commitments based on the 
contract. Second, which is much harder to accomplish, the definition of offset success 
is linked with the fulfilment of offset objectives. Unfortunately, there is no single 
universally accepted method to evaluate offsets due to differences in offset objectives 
and the lack of quantitative data. A number of analysts have proposed to look at 
offsets’ economic contribution through several variables such as job creation and the 
promotion of skills, the fresh flow of investment capital, the transfer of technology, 
and forward and backward linkages, as encapsulated in Table 3.3 below.114 
This study lists seven methods of offset evaluation, which are conducted at different 
stages of the offset life cycle across four countries: Finland, the United Kingdom, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Both the offset receiver and provider conduct offset 
evaluation in Finland, which interestingly provides different results. A pre-
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evaluation of UK’s offset approach by Hartley was conducted during the planning 
stage of offset and aimed to value the best offset proposal, while Matthews 
conducted post implementation evaluation of a different case but still in the area of 
aerospace. Balakrishnan conducted offset evaluation in a most comprehensive way, 
using eight variables for assessment. Yuniorrita and Febrianti respectively conducted 
post-implementation offset evaluation in two different Indonesian companies.  
An interesting case of offset evaluation is the Finnish offset, in which offset impact 
was measured from both the perspective of a foreign vendor and the offset 
receiver.115 In 1999 the National Audit Organization of Finland carried out an audit of 
an offset agreement three years before the completion of the programme for three 
purposes: (1) to examine the fulfilment of the offset agreement and its impact; (2) to 
investigate the achievement of offset goals; and (3) to investigate the cost-benefit of 
the offsets. The fulfilment of offset is measured by whether the transaction would 
have occurred in the absence of offset. The audit acknowledges a number of issues, 
which include the over-pricing of the multiplier coefficient and advance crediting 
before the offset project concludes. The achievement of the offset goals are measured 
by the number of new job opportunities, the export share of SMEs and the durability 
of the business contract. The last purpose, the investigation of offset’s cost and 
benefit, proved to be the most difficult and the audit was unable to reach a 
judgement on this issue. In 2001, the Bureau of Export Administration of the US 
Department of Commerce conducted a statistical survey of income and employment 
data on the largest offset-receiving company in Finland, which forms 30 percent of 
total offset value. Surprisingly, the two studies produced different results. The first 
study found that no significant impact occurred as a result of offset, while the latter 
study concluded that offset was a factor in the increase of income and employment, 
though not the only one.  
Matthews (2014) assessed the impact of the UK requirement of Future Carrier Borne 
Aircraft on the UK Aerospace industry, which are also the case studies of the UK’s 
biggest offshore commitment holder. He employed six variables: employment, 
technology transfer, R&D, export, share of company’s output, and market access.  
Among his findings are the following: (1) offset had been useful to maintain jobs and 
defence industrial capacity; (2) offset subcontracts provide the basis for sustainable 
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development and production work as well as accommodating mutually beneficial 
partnerships.  
In 2000, Hartley and Martin conducted a pre-evaluation of the impact of offset 
associated with the requirement for Future Carrier Borne Aircraft to the UK 
aerospace industry and economy. 116  Three variables were employed, being 
employment, technology, and competitive impact in the form of exports, to create 
rankings based on quantitative and qualitative assessment. The study employs a 
number of data collection methods, such as a postal survey of UK equipment 
suppliers, open source data, and interviews with both offset providers and receivers 
to obtain data for estimating employment. Technology refers to the value of 
technology transfer and its possible involvement in life cycle support for the UK and 
abroad. The study found that by using economic and industrial criteria for ranking, 
Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter came top from six contenders for the 
procurement bid for 3000 jobs of high quality, potentially good on technology, and 
potential export.   
Balakrishnan (2007) conducted a post evaluation of the impact of offset on industrial 
transformation in Malaysia, using mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. She 
employed eight variables for evaluation: technology innovation and competitiveness, 
dual use technology, diversification, market penetration, defence export, job creation, 
skills enhancement, subcontracting and the promotion of industrial clusters.  She 
found that offset has been successful mainly in three areas: technology capability 
development, skill enhancement, and diversification. However, offset has been less 
successful in the area of R&D leading to indigenisation, dual-use technology, the 
subcontracting base, market penetration, defence exports, job creation, and 
sustainability.  
Yuniorrita (2009) conducted a post evaluation on the role of offset in the 
enhancement of Indonesian defence industrial capability, using a case study of PT 
Dirgantara Indonesia (PT DI) under the leadership of Habibie (1976-1998). She 
employed participatory observation, a literature review, and interviews as her data 
collection methods. Her findings reveal that offset has worked in PT DI, especially in 
the form of low added value projects involving manufacture capability and skill 
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enhancement through scholarships provided through offset. She noted that the 
downside of offset is dependency on foreign components in the supply chain and 
problems with technology absorption due to low R&D.  
Febrianti (2013) conducted a post evaluation on the impact of offset using a case 
study of PT Pindad (ammunition and landsystems) in Indonesia through 1980-2011. 
She employed triangulation methods of interview, questionnaire, and secondary 
data to measure the impact using three variables: employment, technology transfer, 
and arms import-exports. Her findings reveal that in two cases of offset – license 
production of the FNC assault rifle and assembly of the Scorpion tank, no significant 
employment was created, and skill enhancement occurred as there was practically no 
skills before the offset programme commenced. Also, offset helped to create new 
skills that reduced imports of components used in these two programmes. 
Table 3.3 Compilation of Selected Approaches to Offset Evaluation 
Evaluation Objective Variable of Assessment Indicator 
National Audit 
Organisation 
of Finland 
(1999) 
Measure impact of 
offset to Finland 
1. Income 
2. Employment 
 Value of offset project as 
percentage of company’s total 
income 
BEA of US 
Department of 
Commerce 
(2001) 
Measure (short 
term) impact of 
offset to Finland 
1. Employment 
2. Income to firms 
3. Transfer of 
Technology 
 
Matthews 
(2014) 
The impact of UK 
requirement of a 
Future Carrier 
Borne Aircraft on 
the UK aerospace 
industry 
1. Employment 
2. Technology Transfer 
3. R&D 
4. Export 
5. Share of company’s 
output 
6. Market access 
 
Hartley and 
Martin (2000) 
Impact of offset 
associated with 
UK defence 
exports 
1. Employment 
2. Technology 
3. Competitive impact 
 Number of jobs and quality of 
jobs 
 Benefit from technology transfer 
and possible involvement in life 
cycle support for UK and abroad 
 Export 
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Evaluation Objective Variable of Assessment Indicator 
Balakrishnan 
(2007) 
 
Evaluate 
industrial 
transformation 
through offset 
1. Technology 
innovation and 
competitiveness 
 
 
 Types of technology transferred 
 Benchmarking local defence 
technology capabilities 
 Basis of company’s 
competitiveness  
2. Dual use technology  Dual use applicability  
3. Diversification  Utilisation of technology obtained 
through offset to diversify into 
other project 
4. Market penetration  Benefit of offset with respect to 
capability for market penetration 
5. Defence export  Growth in export sales 
6. Job creation  Number of additional job and the 
types 
 Sustainability of the job 
7. Skills enhancement  Improvement in worker skills 
8. Subcontracting and 
promotion of 
industrial cluster 
 Contractorisation 
 Backward linkages 
Yuniorrita 
(2009) 
The impact of 
offset on 
Indonesian 
Aerospace 
1. Transfer of 
Technology 
2. Skills enhancement 
3. Supply chain 
 
Febrianti 
(2013) 
The impact of 
offset on PT 
Pindad Indonesia 
1. Employment 
 
2. Technology 
development  
3. Arms import and 
export (supply chain) 
 New employment, skills, working 
hour 
 Technology absorption, 
technology innovation, 
technology know how 
 Demand of arms and number of 
arms import 
Source: Matthews, R. (2014).’ The UK Offset Model: From Participation to Engagement’. Whitehall Report 1-14. Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Hartley, K. (2004). ‘Offset and the Joint Strike Fighter in the UK and the 
Netherlands’, in: Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (eds.).Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms 
Trade Offsets. Routledge, pp. 118-136; Skons, E. (2004) ‘Evaluating defense offsets: the experience in Finland and Sweden’, in: 
Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (eds.) Ibid, pp. 149-162; Balakrishnan, K. (2007).Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offsets as a Mechanism 
for Promoting Malaysian Defence Industrial and Technology Development. PhD Thesis. Cranfield University; Yuniorrita, S. 
(2009).Offset in Indonesian Aerospace. Masters Thesis. Institut Teknologi Bandung,; Febrianti, A.I. (2013).Dampak Offset 
Pertahanan Terhadap Industri Pertahanan Indonesia: Studi Kasus PT Pindad. Master Thesis, Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia. 
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Employment 
All but one evaluation listed above used employment as one of the variables to 
measure the impact of offset. Indicators used for this are the numbers of jobs created 
by offset (Hartley and Martin, Balakrishnan, Febrianti, Matthews), quality of jobs 
created by offset (Hartley and Martin, Balakrishnan, Matthews) numbers of jobs 
maintained by offset (Matthews), and numbers of jobs lost by offset on the side of the 
offset provider (BEA). Using employment as an offset objective and an indicator for 
offset success has its downsides. Most research suggests that there have been 
discrepancies between aspirations and reality, and its positive impact (or lack 
thereof) to the economy. Furthermore, jobs brought in through offset are often 
centralised in certain regions thus can prolong regional economic inequality. For 
example, Saudi Arabia initially envisaged about 75,000 jobs would be created 
through the country’s three major offset rogrammes worth US$3.8bn, but Jane’s 
research identified only 3,540 jobs created with the set up of four joint venture 
companies by 2009.117  Similarly, South Africa aimed for 65,000 jobs created from the 
Strategic Defence Procurement Package in 1999, but so far only 13,690 have been 
created.118 
Skills Enhancement 
Skills enhancement has also been used as one of the offset success indicators 
(Balakrishnan, Yuniorrita), which often are seen as part of technology transfer. It is 
indicated by improvement in worker skills (Balakrishnan), as a result of education 
and training received by the workers (Yuniorrita).  
Technology Transfer 
Technology transfer has been used as indicator in all evaluations of offset, but 
researchers approach this differently. Technology transfer can be indicated by the 
quality of technology (Martin and Hartley, Balakrishnan, Yuniorrita, Febrianti, 
Matthews), local supply chain creation (Balakrishnan, Febrianti, Matthews), the type 
of technology ranging from methods, jigs and tools, know how, know why, and so 
on (Balakrishnan, Febrianti, Yuniorrita). The downside of using technology transfer, 
as an indicator in offset evaluation is that the technology transferred is usually not 
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new. Depending on whether the offset provider sees the offset receiver as a potential 
competitor, the OEMs could withhold high value technology to maintain their 
competitiveness. For example, offsets in the Indian defence aerospace sector did little 
more than ‘reinvent the wheel’ as it is locked in an endless succession of license 
production of Russian fighter jets.  
Value Chain Creation 
Local supply chain or value chain creation is used as one indicator of offset success 
(Balakrishnan, Yuniorrita, Febriani, Matthews), but often is incorporated into a 
technology transfer measurement (Hartley and Martin). In reality, the local supply 
chain is actually an output from technology absorptive capability upon receiving 
technology transfer. It is indicated by contractorisation and backward linkages 
(Balakrishnan), the number of components imported (Febrianti), numbers of 
components produced domestically (Febrianti, Yuniorrita). The supply chain is also 
signified by the export of components to the OEMs through buy back or post offset 
extended contracts, as a signal of product quality.  
The downside of using the supply chain as an offset success indicator is that in most 
cases the offset receiver will be dependent on the OEMs, particularly in value added 
components or systems. Even though the offset supplier becomes adept in producing 
a number of components, dependency on OEMs will remain to a certain degree.  
Export 
Export is one indicator of offset success, when the objective is to improve 
competitiveness of the company (Hartley and Martin). Export can be made in the 
form of a complete system, or components/parts. It is indicated by the growth in 
export sales and participation in the global supply chain. The downside of using 
export as an indicator of offset success is that exporting arms is not always about 
competitiveness of the seller. The buyer country could define ‘value for money’ in 
accordance with its own rule. Politics, mode of payment - such as availability of 
export credits – as a deal sweeter like offset, could be a determining factor in 
procurement bid decisions. There is also the issue of license and arms control 
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agreements. Even though the offset receiver could adapt with the new production 
capability, its export potential remains uncertain. OEMs could prevent export by 
forbidding exports to a third country, whenever they see the offset receiver as a 
potential competitor.119 
R&D  
R&D is one of the advanced indicators of offset success. It is measured by the 
participation of offset providers in R&D activities in the buyer country (Matthews) 
and the R&D programme created as consequence of technology transfer from offset 
(Balakrishna). Study finding by Balakrishna concludes that R&D leading to 
indigenisation is one of less successful outcomes from offsets in Malaysia. This is due 
to lack of government support and restricted domestic industry commitment and 
investment to R&D, absence of specific requests for R&D project from offsets, and 
limited coordination between R&D stakeholders. Whereas study finding by 
Matthews suggests that, the UK has successfully harvested various R&D activities 
and commitment of financial support from foreign suppliers as part of offset 
programme. 
3.5.2 Offset Success Discriminators 
Discussion of offset seldom touches the issue of success discriminators, perhaps 
because it is difficult to pinpoint the primary factors for offset success across 
countries with different settings. Case studies, the most general form of offset 
literature, offer lessons learned from a specific country setting, and hardly address 
the existence of success discriminators. If there is analysis, it has been more on the 
failure discriminator of offset programme than on success. For example, when offsets 
in Saudi Arabia through the Al Yamamah Programme fell short in its contribution to 
job creation and skill enhancement, it was the bureaucratic and administrative 
systems of a country instead of technology and economic systems that took the 
blame for not able to optimise advantage from the transfer of technology.120 Other 
variables often linked to offset failure in small countries are the lack of economies of 
scale, weak procurement budgets, low local production and technology capability. 
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One of the most valuable debates on offset success discriminators is via a master’s 
thesis by Deborah Kremer and Bill Sain. 121 They consider two phases in the 
development of offset when addressing the issue of success: the first phase, 
development and implementation, and the second phase, execution. They identify 22 
factors that comprise six buyer-related factors, eight seller-related factors, five 
contract-related factors, and three product-related factors (Table 3.4). This is one of 
the most comprehensive accounts to address the issue of offset success 
discriminators; however, the authors’ research includes a literature review of 
countertrade, international joint ventures, international cooperative projects, and 
international contracts, in addition to offset programmes. 
Table 3.4 Factors Affecting the Success of Offset Agreements 
Buyer-related: 
 International Experience 
 Offset experience 
 Not viewed as competitor 
 Technical experience 
 Sufficient financial resources 
 Stable environment 
Seller-related: 
 Compatible Goals 
 Proactive Strategy 
 In-house Offset Group 
 International Experience 
 Offset Experience 
 Large Company 
 Commitment to Project 
 Top Management Support 
Contract-related: 
 Transferability of Obligations 
 Dual Contracts 
 Large Dollar Value 
 Long Payback Period 
 Low Penalties 
Product-related: 
 Mature Technology 
 Complex Product 
 High Visibility of Product 
Source: Kremer, D. and Sain, B. (1992). Offset in Weapon System Sales: A Case Study of the Korean Fighter 
Program. Master Thesis. Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of 
Technology Air University. 
Molas-Gallart notes that focused objectives and negotiation skills play an important 
role in the case of Spain. Its purchase of 84 F-18s ended up in a higher value of 
indirect offset despite the initial plan being only for direct offset. It turned out that 
indirect offset provides a better commercial value compared to direct offset, which 
gives more emphasis on technology capability. Spain did not succumb to indirect 
offset, however, but in the end renegotiated a more focused direct offset that gave it 
capability in maintenance and support of the purchased system.122 
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Matthewsemphasises the significance of mature defence economies in the success of 
offset, which is signified by procurement scale, engineering skills, industrial capacity, 
and technological infrastructure. He argues that technology absorptive capacity is 
the critical success factor in offset programmes, which he defines as the: 
“Possession of an educated and highly trained workforce; existence of a diversified and 
innovative subcontractor base, structured across clusters of horizontally and vertically 
integrated high technology companies; and the ability to dynamically involve local 
technologies where intellectual property rights can be conferred.”123 
Furthermore, he argues that if procurement scale, engineering skills, industrial 
capacity, as well as technological infrastructure are already in place, the obligor can 
be expected to exploit the commercial incentives arising from such mature defence 
economies. 
3.6 The Lingering Offset Challenge 
3.6.1 Notion of a Cost Premium 
Offset premium cost is an additional expense that occurs due to the implementation 
of offset. This has been a problem because of the expectation that offsets will reduce 
arms procurement costs to the importing country.124 Countries seem wedded to the 
idea that offsets are free goods and are reluctant to publicly admit that offset costs 
more than off the shelf purchase. 125  Taylor, for example, warned that the extra 
variable and fixed costs are usually passed on to the buyer - at least partially- in the 
form of a higher price of the base good, through a practice known as price 
padding.126 
Offset cost has become a sore point in offset transactions, both for the provider and 
receiver. In general, the offset receiving country refuses to accept the burden of offset 
premium cost. Malaysian offset policy, for example, refuses to credit the cost 
premium as an offset. However, the government of Malaysia does acknowledge that 
some costs are incurred because of offset, such as official travel claims and 
passports. 127  Similarly, the South Korean government allows some costs to be 
credited as offset. Meanwhile from the perspective of the offset provider, the US 
Government not only recognises this cost but also allows US contractors to recover 
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the full cost of offset implementation. This mechanism is only allowed in Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) purchases under condition that the Letter of Agreement (LOA) 
is financed wholly with customer cash or repayable foreign military finance credit.128 
In practice, many countries recognise and pay for the additional cost. When 
European nations bought the F-16 from America’s General Dynamics company in 
1975, they paid an extra 34 percent which excluded the costs of the extra time and 
delays involved in the co-production programme.129 Table 3.5 shows a compilation of 
offset premiums across five countries: the Netherlands, the UK, Malaysia, Finland, 
and Belgium. Offset cost premiums vary greatly from 2.9 percent to 30 percent of 
procurement contract value. Among the five, The Netherlands and Belgium 
respectively recorded the lowest and the highest offset premium cost of 2.9 percent 
and 20-30 percent. These numbers need to be deliberated with precaution, as it is 
likely that countries do not calculate offset premium in the same way.  
Table 3.5 Offset Premium Costs in Selected Countries 
Country 
Offset premium cost as percentage of 
procurement contract value 
The Netherlands 2.9 (in average) 
UK 3-5 
Malaysia 4-15 
Finland 10-15 
Belgium 20-30 
Source:  Hartley, K. (2005). ‘Offsets and the Joint Strike Fighter in the UK and the Netherlands’, in: 
Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (eds.) Op.Cit. ; Skons, E. (2004). ‘Evaluating defense offsets: the experience in 
Finland and Sweden’ in: Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (ed.). Loc.Cit.; Struys, Wally (2004). ‘Offsets in 
Belgium: between Scylla and Charybdis?’, in:  Brauer, J. and Dunne, J. P. (ed.). Loc.Cit.; Balakrishnan, K. 
(2007).Evaluating the Effectiveness of Offsets as a Mechanism for Promoting Malaysian Defence Industrial and 
Technology Development. PhD Thesis, Cranfield University.  
This fact begs three questions: first, how exactly does a country calculate offset cost 
premiums and who should bear them; second, why are offset cost premiums low for 
one country and higher in others; and third, does offset cost premiums render offset 
as a worse choice in terms of cost effectiveness when compared to other choices such 
as off the shelf or collaboration?   
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It is not easy to verify the existence of an offset premium cost and to pin down its 
exact value. Table 3.6 shows an example of an ‘offset administrative cost’ that the US 
government allows its defence companies to reimburse. The cost will subsequently 
be added into to the price of procurement for the buyer country. A number of 
methods have been suggested for this purpose. For example, Taylor suggests a 
complex approach which involves the purchasing government computing the 
economic cost of the offset arrangement that includes the opportunity cost of 
resources that are redirected toward the offset as well as the additional variable and 
fixed cost to fulfil the offset. However, this method requires that non-offset 
procurement strategies be calculated in terms of finance and that variable costs as 
well as fixed costs be identified before deciding to use offset.  
Table 3.6 Example of offset administrative costs 
1 In-house and/or purchased: organization, administrative and technical 
support, including offset staffing; quality assurance, manufacturing, 
purchasing support, data acquisition; proposal, transaction and report 
preparation; broker/trading services; legal support; and similar support 
activities 
2 Off-shore operations for technical representative and consultant activities, 
office operations, customer and industry interface, capability surveys; 
3 Marketing assistance and related technical assistance, transfer or technical 
information and related training 
4 Employee travel and subsistence costs 
5 Taxes and duties 
Source: Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Section 225.7303-2(a)(2)(iii)(C). In: 
O’Connor, L.L. (1992) ‘Contractor Recovery of Offset Administrative Costs’. The DISAM Journal, 
Summer.  
What makes offset premium cost arise? Balakrishnan (2007) believes that it is affected 
by: first, the tendency of foreign vendors to load transactional costs, including risk 
contingencies, into both the primary defence contract price and offset package value; 
second, amended or additional offsets demanded late in negotiation will force foreign 
vendors to raise the cost premium to mitigate the risk of non-fulfilment of 
obligations most prominently in direct offset. On the other hand, greater 
transparency of offsets requirements such as process, implementation, and 
monitoring, is believed to have a positive impact in reducing the offset cost 
premium, but interestingly, procurement strategy does not seem to have an impact 
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on offset cost. While it is assumed that the rise of offset premiums might be more 
evidentin sole-sourcing procurement since there is neither competition nor 
comparison, this is not necessarily true due to information asymmetry in the arms 
market.  
3.6.2 Spectre of Corruption 
In 2010, Transparency International issued a report on the risk of corruption in offset 
due to the lack of transparency, monitoring, and evaluation, incentivisation, and 
project completion (Transparency International, 2010).130 Here, corruption can take 
the form of improper influence on acquisition with the rewards coming through 
offset, improper influence on the award of the contract, theft of funds allocated to the 
offset, using offset as vehicle for payment of bribes, and mutual agreement between 
the offset provider and receiver on non-performance of the obligation. The report 
uses the case of corruption allegations linked to offset deals in arms procurement in 
South Africa, Portugal, and Greece. It concludes that the potential of offset-related 
corruption seems to be higher in an environment of overly prescriptive offset policy 
operated under closed regimes and, in contrast, marginalised in a more open and 
competitive environment. At the end, the report suggests that offset should be 
banned. 
Matthews (2014) criticises the report as flawed, due to the “superficial methodology 
employed and flimsy evidence offered”131. He argues that corruption allegations 
have more to do with the general procurement system, rather than the offset itself. 
However, he does not dismiss the possibility of corruption related to offset in 
developing countries with low levels of industrial capacity. If such a country 
demands direct offset, the offset obligor could be tempted to bribe to achieve 
agreement on fulfilment with the receiver, that otherwise be difficult to accomplish. 
A more elaborate study on offset related corruption can be found in Platzgummer’s 
study (2013) on the type of corruption related to offset in a time series analysis 
covering the period of 1980-2012.132 He concludes that only relatively small numbers 
of countries had engaged in seven different types of corruption. He emphasised that 
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while the tendering process is prone to manipulation, no evidence had been found so 
far for actual corruption.  
Another study by Lambrecht (2012) argues that offset is vulnerable to corruption due 
to a number of factors.133 First, offset distributes large sums of money as incentives in 
highly competitive negotiated government procurements. Since much offset work 
seems disconnected from the purchased items, this raises a suspicion of improper or 
corrupt inducement. Second, government often has murky or confused policy goals 
when demanding offset. Measuring the security gains from procurement is already 
difficult because of the cost-effectiveness v dependency dilemma, let alone adding 
the political and economic reasons that are often represented by offset. Third, offset 
combines a high value economic asset with a lack of transparency, due to national 
security concerns and complex transactions and accounting practices. Difficulty in 
monitoring offset makes it easier for corruption to occur. Fourth, the involvement of 
a third party, i.e. foreign consultant, offset broker, to develop and manage offset 
transactions adds to the risk of corruption in offset. Lambrecht believes that these 
problems can be managed using existing anti corruption tools. 
3.6.3 Sustainability 
Offset programmes have been criticised for their short-term character, hence the 
benefit often does not last long enough to sustain the accomplishment of the 
purchasing country’s strategic objective. Because the interest of the offset provider is 
merely to fulfil offset requirements, it will shift resources to other countries where it 
has outstanding offset commitments. This is understandable considering the growth 
in the numbers of countries that use offset in an obligatory way. As a consequence, 
many manufacturing facilities and skills created through offset are neglected once 
the offset programme concludes. Matthewspoints out that this problem signals a lack 
of strategic vision and planning by both the offshore vendor and the recipient 
country’s offset authority.134 
As a response to the short-term character of offset, the time horizon of those seeking 
offset seems to have lengthened. There is a move away from broadly defined short-
term offset work towards a more focused long-term investment strategy. For this 
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purpose, many countries allow a firm to bank offset credits in anticipation of a future 
obligation and this provides an incentive for the foreign defence contractor to 
continue placing work with domestic manufacturers. Offset credit banking is a 
unique mechanism that allows offset providers to accumulate credits, which can later 
be used to meet future offset agreements. This provides an opportunity for buyers to 
achieve sustainable benefits from offset agreements. From the perspective of the 
provider, banking credits serve as a kind of incentive to place work with domestic 
industry beyond the offset contract time horizon. Offset credits that can be banked 
are varied: it can be value-adding activities carried out by a prospective provider in 
pre offset discharge period or ‘pre-offset’ credit, or surplus in offset discharge. The 
downside of offset banking is its complexity, thus making it unsuitable for a country 
with only minor experience in offset.  
In addition to overcoming short-termism of offset through credit banking, Martin 
suggests that a number of countries now seek to draw foreign firms into the domestic 
economy through either equity investments in existing domestic firms with an 
incentive to continue to place work in the domestic economy, as well as to share 
other skills as this increases the profitability of their overseas investment. This can be 
interpreted as an emphasis on the success of offset strategy in laying the foundations 
on which future joint ventures could be built.135 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter has undertaken a broad sweep of the literature covering both the 
conceptual and empirical aspect of defence offset. As a concept, offset is full of 
controversy, but as a government policy toolit has gone far to pursue a number of 
strategic objectives related to defence, development, and dual-purpose. While offset 
policy and practices vary widely, from mandatory to case-by-case basis, there are 
elements of offset –such as threshold, multiplier, penalty, and so on- that should be 
clarified as reference for offset planning, negotiation, and evaluation. Offset 
implementation in arms procurement undoubtedly adds to the complexity, thus 
should be well prepared and run by a competent body or human resources. The 
effectiveness ofoffset differsacross countries, but there are at least six areas where 
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offset could be beneficial: employment, skill enhancement, technology transfer, value 
chain creation, export, and R&D. 
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44. INDONESIAN ECONOMIC TAKE OFF THROUGH THE FOSTERING 
OF STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL CHAMPIONS 
4.1 Introduction: Planning for Development Push 
This chapter aims to provide the context for offset policy making and 
implementation in Indonesia. For that purpose, factors that influence the course of 
Indonesian technology development and accelerated industrialisation, in which 
offset will serve as a technology transfer conduit, will be explained. Technological 
development and technology policy are vital to Indonesian development for a 
number of economic and political economy considerations.1 First, imperfections in 
certain segments of the international technology market should allow Indonesia to 
acquire some basic technological competence to assess, assimilate, and diffuse 
technology. Second, because Indonesia entered the phase of export-oriented 
industrialisation in the 1980s as a latecomer compared to its neighbours, it needs a 
niche to be competitive. Third, technological planning has to be done in advance due 
to the long lead times in the establishment of technological capacity.  
This chapter will be structured as follows: section 4.2 highlights the post-war 
industrial beginnings when early attempts at government intervention were taken to 
initiate rapid industrialisation and lessen dependency on natural resources. This 
period also witnessed the swings of the policy-making pendulum that had been 
influenced by economic nationalists and technocrats. As has been observed in a 
number of writings2, this pendulum reflects the competition of influence between 
advocates of comparative advantage and those of competitive advantage when it 
comes to determining industrialisation strategy.Section 4.3 explains technology 
planning and strategic industrialisation as the brainchild of Habibie - the Minister of 
Research and Technology - to realise the then President Soeharto’s vision for 
economic take off. Facing the impediments of financial and human resources, ten 
industries were selected and labelled as strategic. They were to be the vehicle of 
industrial transformation, through which technology progress was expected to 
accelerate in a relatively short period of time. Section 4.4 addresses the issue of dual 
use industrialisation and technology as a spearhead to ensure military expenditure 
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contributes to broader economic development through demand created from the 
military modernisation plan; it would support wider industry to gain technology 
transfer, broadening production scale.  
4.2 Indonesia’s Post-War Industrial Origins, and the Path to Economic 
Nationalism 
Since independence in 1945, development strategy in Indonesia has been subjected to 
competition, and such pressures continued throughout the New Order period (1968-
1998). Economic independence was a critical issue after the country survived the War 
of Independence (1945-1949). It inherited a staggering debt of USD 1.13 billion from 
the pre-war Dutch administration,3 damaged agriculture, weakened industrial and 
physical infrastructure and estates, and food crop production was a mere 70-75 
percent of pre-war output.4  Most of the country’s economic assets were owned and 
controlled by Dutch and foreign nations that also dominated trade, restricting the 
manoeuvrability of Indonesia’s policy makers.5 As consequence, the first debate on 
development strategy was between those who wished to nationalise all foreign assets 
versus the technocrats who advocated macroeconomic stability. The second faction 
saw the benefit of allowing a Dutch business presence, while at the same time 
cultivating strong domestic economic actors. Although the advocates of macro 
economy won, divisions over development strategy continued and nationalisation 
gradually took hold.  
The first industrialisation attempt was carried out under President Soekarno through 
Program Benteng6, Economic Urgency Plan/ Industrial Urgency Plan 1951 and First 
Five Year Development Plan 1956-19607. Government planning was formalised with 
the creation of the Agency for National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) in the 
1960s, which was in charge of macroeconomic planning. At the time, the economy 
was heavily engaged in agriculture (56 percent of net domestic product), with a small 
manufacturing sector that mainly served to process export crops worth around 8-10 
percent of net domestic product8. Due to Soekarno’s anti neo-colonialism politics, 
foreign investment was only open to the Soviet Union, China, and East European 
countries. The era witnessed the establishment of an industrial base for 
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manufacturing, including fertiliser, cement, automobiles, shipbuilding, and general 
engineering.  
The initial industrialisation effort was far from successful, because of political 
instability within the parliamentary system. Furthermore, Indonesia had to deal with 
a number of security threats from armed insurgencies, from the Trikora campaign 
against the Dutch stronghold in Western New Guinea (1961-1962), and konfrontasi 
against the Federation of Malaya (1963-1966). As a consequence, the local 
manufacturing industry recorded tortuous growth of 1 percent throughout 1960-
1967 9 . When Soekarno was removed from office following the violent political 
upheaval in 1966, the country faced economic bankruptcy: a massive debt of USD 2.5 
billion and industrial output below 20 percent of capacity10. Hill noted that by the 
mid 1960s Indonesia was a ‘chronic economic drop out’. This, however, would prove 
to be one of several economic and political downturns from which the country 
survived as a resilient nation.  
4.2.1 Open Door Policy and Import Oriented Industrialisation 
The second industrialisation began as Soeharto became the country’s second 
President, in an era that was later defined as the New Order (1966-2008).  By the time 
Indonesia kick-started industrialisation, it was already a latecomer compared to 
neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia that had embarked upon industrialisation 
one or two decades earlier. Hence, catching up became the preoccupation of the 
President. 
Soeharto began his economic policy by choosing a team of economists with a 
technocratic approach and a Western orientation to rehabilitate the economy11; these 
technocrats subsequently held strategic positions in BAPPENAS. The First Five Year 
Development Plan, Repelita I (1969/70-1973/74) was prepared with the assistance of 
the World Bank and IMF, aiming to consolidate the economy. The open door policy 
to foreign and domestic direct investment was introduced in 1967 and 1968, 
respectively, through the State Agency for Investment Coordination (BKPM). 
Throughout the latter 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, Indonesia pursued an 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy as a result of unfulfilled domestic 
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demand, rapid economic growth led by increased commodity prices, and strong 
government intervention.12 
The open door policy resulted in a balanced budget and restrained hyperinflation 
from 1,136 percent in 1966 to 17 percent by the 1970s13 as well as inflows of raw 
materials and intermediate goods for the manufacturing industry. However, 
dependency on foreign capital continued to increase; for instance, in 1972/1973 
foreign aid was equal to 21.1 percent of all government revenue.14 Entering the 1970s, 
high dependency on foreign capital, especially Japanese investment, led to a negative 
sentiment eventually culminating in the ‘Fifteen of January Tragedy ‘.15 
4.2.2 The Return of Economic Nationalism, Leading to ‘Take-off’ Ambitions 
The first oil bonanza of 1972-73 lessened the significance of foreign aid in Indonesia.16 
The following year saw a policy swing towards protectionism, such as more 
restrictions on FDI and support for native business players to thrive. The push for 
efficiency and the shift to export-oriented industrialisation was ignored and, instead, 
Soeharto no longer saw the technocrat approach as adequate. As a consequence, the 
influence of the technocrats gradually faded. 
At the same time, Indonesia was facing urgent development, issues such as rapid 
population growth, inadequate transportation infrastructure within the archipelago, 
and environmental problems pertaining to over exploitation of natural resources.17 
The economy was heavily unbalanced with an overly strong reliance on oil and 
natural resources, on the one hand, with oil forming three quarters of all exports in 
the 1970s, and slow manufacturing growth on the other.18 Pertamina, the state oil 
company, singlehandedly contributed to the state’s biggest income. The 
manufacturing industry -such as basic metals and plywood- grew significantly while 
agricultural industries declined. Nevertheless, agriculture remained the biggest 
employment provider whereas manufacturing industry provided 14 percent of total 
employment during the 1970s due to their capital-intensive nature19. In order to 
tackle the abovementioned problems, Repelita II (1974/75-1978/79) prioritised 
employment provision, the development of raw material processing industry, as well 
as agriculture and infrastructure. 
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Meanwhile, Soeharto had a clear vision about the future of Indonesia. As early as 
1971, Soeharto had talked about economic take-off20, sharing this passion with Vice 
President of Germany’s Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm B.J. Habibie on 
‘transformative industrialisation’ or development with a ‘value-added orientation’, 
where technology plays the central role. In 1974, Soeharto through the Director of 
Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, requested Habibie to return to Indonesia to accomplish 
three important tasks: first, to set up an agency for assessment and implementation 
of technology; second, to create an aerospace industry; and third, to establish a 
scientific centre. 21  Habibie came home to lead the Advanced Technology and 
Aerospace Industry (ATTP) division under Pertamina. One year later, a massive debt 
scandal brought down Pertamina, rendering the ATTP as short-lived. Within this 
short period, Habibie managed to use ATTP as a preparation ground for the required 
human resources and the funding for the establishment of BPPT and IPTN.  
4.2.3 Constructing the Technological Base for the ‘Catch-up’model 
During 1980-1982, the Indonesian economy experienced an alarming slowdown due 
to the world recession. Following a similar pattern years earlier, the technocrat’s 
influence returned whenever crisis struck the country. This time deregulation and 
Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) based on comparative advantage were 
adopted to compensate for falling oil incomes and the payment of foreign debt. 
Countertrade policy was also adopted in 1982 as a temporary measure to maintain 
economic growth through the export promotion of non-petroleum and mineral 
products; the policy included offset implementation linked to public procurement of 
high technology. 
The concern of government policy at this stage was how to accomplish the 
‘deepening’ and strengthening of industrial structures, expand the machinery and 
electronics industry, develop small and medium industry, export manufactured 
products, as well as develop technological capability in industrial planning and 
engineering. The manufacturing sector recorded dismal growth, contributing only 
12.7 percent to national income, much less than agriculture and mining, that 
contributed 23 and 20.8 percent, respectively.22 Repelita IV (1984/85-1988/89) set a 
long-term objective to expand the industrial sector to equal that of agriculture. 
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The initial attempt to promote technology development was recorded in 1960s, when 
the Minister of Higher Education and Science was created and then transformed into 
MENRISTEK in 1976. In the Soeharto era, the institutional framework for a 
technology base was laid down through the creation of BPPT in 1978. The National 
Research Council (Dewan Riset Nasional, DRN) was created in 1984 to assist 
MENRISTEKin formulating strategic plans, most importantly the Prioritised R&D 
sector (PUNASRISTEK). Research was directed towards supporting and accelerating 
national development, hence the emphasis on applied rather than basic research.   
The government had a vital role in technology development because it provided 
most of the R&D budget, which in 1979 amounted to 0.45 percent of GDP.23The role 
of the private sector was minimal, owing to the lack of a research culture, a 
preference for trading, the lack of incentives for foreign investors to invest in R&D 
activity, and limited cooperation between private and public R&D institutions.24 In 
the absence of strong local R&D activities, the external sources of technology 
transfer, such as FDI and imported technology became important. Unfortunately, the 
highly restrictive regime since 1970s rendered FDI as an insignificant channel of 
technology transfer. Furthermore, as noted by Wie, FDI projects in Indonesia in 
general did not have fully-fledged R&D units, only small laboratories for product 
testing and quality control only.25 
Industrial deepening and the transformation of the economy from agriculture to 
industry, as enunciated in Repelita, called for technological progress, but the private 
sector lacked any significant contribution, and thus was not expected to take the lead 
in the process. Habibie’s answer for this challenge was transformative 
industrialisation through a progressive manufacturing plan, human resource 
development, strategic industries, and protection of the domestic market through 
import substitution. The basic idea was to have developing countries like Indonesia 
conducting transformation through technology transfer via an accelerated process, 
taking into consideration socio-cultural challenges. The consequence of such an idea 
was government intervention at a much higher level than before. Although the 
technocrats recognised a disconnect between economic and fiscal reality, this 
transformational plan was passed due to support from the President, who held 
control over the budget.26 
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4.3 Mapping Out the ‘Strategic Industry’ Paradigm 
4.3.1 Technology Planning and Industrialisation a la Habibie 
Writings on Indonesia’s technology development in general have applauded the 
centrality of Habibie.27 He held position as State Minister of Science and Technology 
as well as head of BPPT for two decades, making him the longest serving minister 
before being elevated to the Vice Presidency in 1997, and then the Presidency in 
1998-2000. It might be argued that his closeness to Soeharto was responsible for the 
longevity of his career, but none can deny his own exceptional intelligence. He has 
been known as ‘Mr Crack’ after his ability to resolve problems of stress cracks in 
aircraft frames, a process that later was incorporated into the maintenance of NATO 
missile systems.28 An inspiring and larger-than-life Indonesian figure, it is not an 
overstatement to state that Habibie’s name is indistinguishable from technology 
progress in Indonesia. 
Although Habibie’s training was as an engineer, he was amazingly economic 
oriented.29 His creative thinking was clearly articulated and well documented in a 
two-volume book compilation of his speeches, spanning across two decades, 1980s-
1990s. The most comprehensive of Habibie’s thoughts on industrial transformation 
were in the paper he presented at Deutsche Fur Luft-und Raumfahrt in Bonn, 14 June 
1983, entitled ‘Some Thoughts on Industrial Transformation Strategy of Developing 
Country’.30 Here, Habibie argues that the industrial transformation process is part of 
‘nation building’, which he defined as independence in economy, society, cultural 
identity, and political integrity. He believes that technology development, instead of 
natural resources, is vital to the process. 
According Habibie, there are five basic principles in the implementation of science 
and technology as a basis for nation building. First, education and training in all 
sectors relevant to development. Second, a clear view of the required technology to 
address real world issues. Third, the transfer, implementation and development of 
technology must be done in accordance with contextual reality. Fourth, the 
determination of the state to solve its problem independently by reducing reliance on 
technology imports. Fifth, the need to protect national capability in the early stages 
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of transformation until the economy achieves competitiveness. Habibie emphasises 
that the state has to plan the achievement of international competitiveness in the 
shortest time possible.  
For the abovementioned purpose, Habibie offers the concept of a ‘vehicle for 
technology and industrial transformation’ (wahana tranformasi teknologi dan industri), 
based on two conditions: first, the value added processes associated with industrial 
deepening through a ‘progressive manufacturing process’ to achieve levels of 
competitiveness comparable to advanced countries.31 Second, the need for a huge 
potential market in both the domestic and international arenas to permit optimal 
economies of scale, high quality production and an after sales service. Habibie 
believes that a large domestic market would enable Indonesia to build its own planes 
and develop related strategic industries.32 
4.3.2 First Condition of the Transformation Vehicle: Progressive 
Manufacturing Plan (PMP) 
The idea of a ‘Progressive Manufacturing Plan’33 (PMP) was based on a version of 
reverse engineering or the Ladder of Production(see chapter 2p.43). The Plan is 
divided into four stages, starting from the mastering of existing technology and 
ending with basic research (see figure 4.1). Habibie believes that industry will be in 
charge of stages one and two, while the R&D institution should take the lead in 
stages three and four to support the industry.34 
The first stage focuses on building capability to master advanced design, technics, 
and production that were developed abroad. Habibie refuses investment in local 
R&D at this stage, believing that the effort will end up ‘reinventing the wheel’. 
Instead, he was convinced that technology transfer through license production 
makes the most sense, but this must be guaranteed through linking the level of 
technology transfer with the number of units of production (scale).  
The second stage focuses on technology integration into the new product. This stage 
would see the development of capability in design and blue print making, 
integration, optimisation of component, and above all, the ability to select the best 
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design. Habibie was convinced that many foreign providers would be eager to offer 
their leading-edge designs and products, hence domestic capability on testing, 
management, marketing and simulation would need to be developed further. As a 
consequence, the role of R&D facilities becomes important.   
Figure 4.1 Habibie’s Progressive Manufacturing Plan 
 
Source: Author 
The third stage focuses on technology development, enabling developed countries 
and NICs to maintain competitiveness. This stage requires innovation to develop 
components or parts of the best technology in each respective sector. Habibie 
assumed that companies and countries would face theoretical impediments in their 
research, which generate the need for basic research. This is when the fourth stage 
comes in; that is, conducting basic research on a massive scale. Habibie understood 
that financial resources, facilities, and human resources are scarce in a developing 
country; hence he put basic research as a last priority compared to the other stages. 
He argued that most basic R&D was conducted in advanced countries, which could 
be accessed by developing countries through R&D cooperation agreements. The 
progressive manufacturing plan relied on both industry and R&D institutions.  
4.3.3 Second Condition for the Transformation Vehicle: A Captive Market 
Habibie believes that domestic market protection is the second condition for the 
transformation vehicle. Developing countries with limited domestic markets need to 
plan a programme that will enable a selected industrial product to compete against 
rivals in the international market. As for developing countries with a high demand 
for selected industrial products, they need to have production technology advanced 
enough to compete in the domestic market. Habibie cautions that developing 
countries should not seek transfer of the most advanced technology as that is too 
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highly specialised - such as rotary blades and engines - because the domestic 
demand is low and barriers to enter the international market are high.   
An orientation to the domestic market is essential, because in order to be 
competitive, a product must fulfil a number of requirements: first, the economies of 
scale are close to optimal; second, the quality of the product and after sales service 
must be reliable. Habibie was convinced that without temporary protection, it would 
be impossible to achieve optimal production scale and sufficient quality of product 
and aftersales. This protection could be removed once the production scale reaches 
optimal scale and the capability has been properly institutionalised. It was obvious 
that Habibie’s train of thought followed the argument of infant industry protection. 
The idea that strategic industries must be sheltered from competition in the domestic 
market was implemented through a number of regulations on import restriction, a 
tax levy, and most importantly, public procurement. Import restriction, for example, 
was applied to aircraft products similar to those that national industry would be 
capable of producing. Public procurement undertaken by state-owned enterprises 
and government departments/institutions, including the Armed Forces, must lodge 
an application for technology import approval. Presidential Instruction No.1 Year 
1988 stated that no order could be made without approval of a coordinating 
committee that includes representatives of BPPT and the Ministry of Finance.35 For 
example, Garuda Indonesia Airways had to secure approval from BPPT before 
importing aircraft from Boeing. Another way to make domestic industry more 
competitive is to provide a tax levy on imported components of aircraft and other 
products, as determined by the President during the cabinet meeting in December 
1986.36 
4.3.4 Nine Industrial Transformation Vehicles 
Habibie determined that nine vehicles for industrial transformation were required, 
and he prioritised them accordingly, as: aerospace, maritime and shipbuilding, land 
transportation, telecommunication, energy, engineering, tools and agricultural 
machinery, defence industry, and related industry. 37  The first four vehicles, 
transportation (land, sea, air), and communication and electronics, are closely linked 
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to the political and economic integration of an archipelagic country, which he 
believed to be the most appropriate industries to channel and develop technology. A 
target was set for these industries to achieve stage three or even stage four of the 
progressive manufacturing plan within the course of 20 years.38 
As the abovementioned industries grow, they will provide more employment 
needed to boost income. Increases in income will raise energy demand, which 
justifies the strategic position of the energy sector, including the manufacture of 
turbines, generators, and energy transmission tools, as the fifth vehicle. The sixth 
vehicle refers to the engineering industry, required to process energy and mineral 
resources as well as agriculture outputs such as sugar, palm oil, petrochemicals, 
cement, paper, and many more products. The seventh vehicle is agricultural tools 
and machinery needed for ‘extensification’ and mechanisation of agriculture, to 
respond to the decreasing available land under population outside Java Island.  All 
of these investments in development would bear fruit and must be protected from 
internal and external threats, which call for the existence of eighth vehicle, which is 
the defence industry. This industry relates to both weapon systems and the platforms 
in which the weapons are embedded, such as aircraft, ships, and land vehicles.  
Interestingly, Habibie’s notion of the ninth industry did not refer to any specific 
sector of industry, unlike the others. He was convinced that the development of all 
eight vehicles would eventually stimulate supplier industries to grow through 
backward and forward linkages. 39  These industries, previously considered less 
strategic due to limited demand - such as aircraft rotary blades and hydraulic 
systems - will sprout due to the increasing demand for their products. All industries 
that grow due to the spill over effects of the other eight industries will be the 
embodiment of the ‘tangible ninth vehicle’.  
The idea of nine vehicles for industrial transformation was to be realised in stages. 
One by one, state owned enterprises were appointed as strategic industries through 
Presidential Decrees in 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, and 1989. Presidential Decree No.44 in 
the Year 1989 defined a strategic industry as an “industry being granted status as 
strategic by this decree”. This definition was simple but at the same time, final. The 
fact that the decree was issued by the President, who under an authoritarian system 
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held unchallenged authority, was very effective in putting down any opposition to 
the choice of industry. 40  In total there were ten State Own Enterprises (SOEs) 
designated as strategic industries as shown in Table 4.1 identifying the Ten Strategic 
Industries in Indonesia. 
Table 4.1 Ten Strategic Industries in Indonesia. 
No Industry Founded Product 
1 PERUM DAHANA 1966 Explosives 
2 PT Boma Bisma Indra (BBI) 1971 Machine tools, construction 
equipment 
3 PT Barata Indonesia 1971 Machinery and engineering service 
4 PT Industri Telekomunikasi 
(INTI) 
1974 Telecommunication  
5 PT IPTN 1976 Aircraft, weapon systems 
6 PT Krakatau Steel 1978 Integrated iron and steel product 
7 PT PAL Indonesia 1980 Shipbuilding, general engineering 
8 PT Industri Kereta Api 
(INKA) 
1981 Rolling stock 
9 PT PINDAD 1983 Small arms and heavy equipment 
10 LEN Production Unit 1965 Electronics and communication 
Source: Raillon, F. (1990) Indonesia 2000 the industrial and technological challenge. CNPF-TEC & Cipta 
Kreatif. Completed with information from each of industry’s official website. 
These industries were a mix of old and new industries, some like PT BBI, PT Bharata, 
PT INKA, PT INTI, had a long history back to the colonial era. Three industries 
previously were under a military charge, i.e. PT IPTN, PT PAL and PT Pindad. 
Perum Dahana was formed under an offsets agreement in 1957 when the Indonesian 
Air Force procured surface-to-air missile.41 PT Krakatau Steel was formed in 1967 
using the remnants of the Trikora Steel Project built in the Soekarno era, under Soviet 
aid. PT LEN was created from an R&D centre, which used to be known as 
TELKOMA under the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI).  
Aside from these industries, the state’s R&D institutions had also been established. 
Lall notes that public sector institutions were divided between those under the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) and those under the MENRISTEKinstitutes; 
the latter being far more significant in terms of funding and scope of work. Under 
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MENRISTEKwere six non-departmental government institutes, namely BPPT, 
Indonesian Science Body (LIPI), Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), National Mapping 
and Survey Coordinating Board (Bakorsurtanal), National Institute of Aeronautics 
and Space (LAPAN), and National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN). The Center for 
Research and Technology (PUSPITEK) in Serpong owns a number of labs and 
scientific research installations to support basic research and implementation 
through testing labs. Under MOIT there were 12 national level and several regional 
level R&D institutes, which managed a number of domestic and regional 
programme, such as providing technical service units focused on product design and 
engineering, process technology, management, and training.42 
4.3.5 Management of Strategic Industries 
The institutional arrangements for managing strategic industries were made to 
ensure that Habibie could exercise direct control over them and also the R&D 
institutions, answering directly to the President. The preparation for the strategic 
industries establishment was carried out through the Ministerial Council on Strategic 
Industries (DPIS) and the implementation of PMP was coordinated under the 
Agency for Strategic Industries Management (BPIS), both were sheltered under 
BPPT. Figure 4.2 shows the command line from the President through DPIS and 
BPIS, which ends at the strategic industries.  
DPIS was established in 1983, and consisted of ministers from the Departments of 
Industry, Defence and Security, Communications, Finance, Tourism, Post and 
Telecommunications, and also the State Secretary, the State Minister for National 
Planning and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.  This council was tasked 
with coordination, administrative and managerial functions of the first eight strategic 
industries. Following what Habibie admitted as “a lengthy plan of almost 11 years”, 
BPIS was established through Presidential Decree No. 44 in the Year 1989.43 The state 
minister for Research and Technology, none other than Habibie himself, chaired 
BPIS. The organisation structure comprised four deputies: planning, economic and 
financial affairs, technological affairs, and administrative affairs. For this purpose, 
BPIS expanded its human resources from 141 in 1993 to 300 people in 1999 - more 
than double in the course of six years. The majority of staff have more bachelor 
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degrees in social sciences (122) compared to that of science (9) and engineering (85); 
staffs with postgraduate degrees only amounted to 10 percent (34 out of 300) of the 
overall human resources in 1999. 44 
Figure 4.2 Institution Arrangements for Strategic Industry 
 
Source: altered version from Raillon, F. (1990). Indonesia 2000 The Industrial and Technological Challenge. 
CNPF-TEC & Cipta Kreatif. 
BPIS worked similarly under a holding company, mothering the then ten strategic 
industries by implementing integrated management, technical guidance and control. 
In detail, the Agency was authorised to manage, plan and oversee the 
implementation of programmes and production in the strategic industries; to 
manage, plan and oversee technology transfer and industrial transformation as well 
as to develop the strategic industries in integrative ways; to manage, plan and 
oversee efforts to develop wealth and the marketing of strategic industries. By the 
early 1990s, BPIS controlled ten SOEs strategic industries with around 43,000 
employees.45 
By the end of 1990s, BPIS had scored a number of successes.46 First, it introduced and 
provided guidance for technology transfer through the PMP, determining the centres 
of excellence and parameters of product variation in the strategic industries. Second, 
BPIS determined the direction of strategic industry through coordination meetings 
held on a frequent basis. Third, it equipped the strategic industries with the tools of 
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management. Fourth, it provided guidance and assistance in the formulation of long 
term planning of all strategic industries. Fifth, it formulated and conducted 
improvements in human resources in all the strategic industries. Sixth, it improved 
the professionalism of the strategic industries through discussion in the general 
meetings of shareholders (Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham, RUPS). Seventh, it was the 
command and control centre of every strategic industry and monitored their 
performance every month. 
No less significant than DPIS and BPIS was the role of BPPT itself in safeguarding 
the development of the strategic industries. As the agency was in charge of 
technology assessment and applications, it retained massive authority and resources 
at its disposal. In addition to Habibie’s centrality in BPIS as the head, BPPT as an 
institution delegated a number of its expert staff to strategic industries, some of who 
held strategic positions.47 
4.3.6 The Strategic Industry 
Among the unique features of accelerated industrialisation in Indonesia is the fact 
that the organisational framework chosen for the strategic industries was the SOEs. 
The Constitution 1945 Article 33(2) stipulates that the “Branches of production which 
are deemed vital for the state as well as affecting the interests of the nation will be 
managed by the state”. Due to their strategic role, SOEs are protected from 
competition and, unlike the private sector objective, their objective is not solely to 
generate profits. Under the authoritarian and cronyism system of the New Order, 
there was the mind-set that the top-level positions in the SOEs is a matter of 
politics48. Lack of competition and the absence of meritocracy explain the character of 
SOEs that lean more to political considerations than professional values.49 
There are three SOEs that focus on, but not exclusively limited to, the transportation 
sectors. These are PT IPTN (aerospace), PT PAL (shipbuilding), and PT INKA 
(rolling stock). The aerospace industry at the time was the most advanced in 
technological capability compared to the other two, having had the capability to 
design and produce aircraft since 1930s. In the post-independence era, President 
Soekarno endorsed the development of design and production capability with 
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assistance from Eastern Europe. The first aircraft prototype was designed and 
produced in 1953 and by 1957 a trainer aircraft dubbed ‘Belalang’ (grasshopper) was 
successfully built for Air force trainees. Following preparation to set up an aerospace 
industry, a department of aerospace engineering was established in 1963 in the 
Institut Teknologi Bandung, a prominent state university, and a number of 
university students were sent abroad to master aerospace technology. Unfortunately, 
the project was halted under the political turmoil that saw the fall of Soekarno. 
A fully-fledged aircraft industry was finally realised in 1976, when IPTN was formed 
through the merging of the inventory of aircraft division of Pertamina and LIPNUR 
(Lembaga Industri Penerbangan Nurtanio). Hailed as ‘the’ model of progressive 
manufacturing plan and the ‘technology spearhead’, PT IPTN was the jewel of all 
strategic industries as well as the hallmark of Habibie’s personal achievement. In 
addition to aircraft manufacture, the company also performed aircraft after sales 
service, maintenance, repair and overhaul as result of licensing and international 
cooperation.  
Starting with around 500 workers and 17 engineers, PT IPTN multiplied its 
workforce to around 16,000 people by the early 1990s. 50  This expansion was 
obviously linked to the needs of the PMP. In retrospect, the company was the only 
strategic industry that managed to conduct all four stages of the PMP, where stages 2 
and 3 were initiated only four years apart. The first stage was achieved through 
license production of the transport aircraft C-212 from Spain’s CASA. Helicopters 
were license produced from Germany’s MBB, France’s Aerospatiale, and the US’ Bell. 
In the defence sector, PT IPTN also license produced the SUT Torpedo from 
Germany’s AEG Telefunken. The second stage was carried out through a joint 
venture with CASA, called Airtech, which became the outlet to jointly design and 
produce the CN-235 aircraft. Before the second stage concluded, the third stage was 
already embarked upon through indigenous design and production of the N-250 in 
which the latest technology, particularly ‘fly-by-wire’, was incorporated.51 Again, the 
fourth stage was started before the previous stage concluded through indigenous 
design of the regional jet N-2130.   
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PT INKA initially started as a workshop for steam locomotive repair. It was 
established in 1981 over 20 hectares of land and supported by nearly 1,000 workers.52 
Stage one of the progressive manufacturing plan was achieved through assembly of 
bulk freight cars and passenger coaches licensed from, among others, Sumitomo 
Japan and Hawker Siddeley Canada. Stage two was kick-started with Holec/BN of 
the Netherlands/Belgium with electric trains. The company focused its business on 
the fabrication of railway cars, bogies, passenger coaches and the assembly of electric 
railcar, as well as the manufacture of forklift components and telephone 
exchangecontainers. In addition to manufacture, the company also had maintenance 
capability of rolling stock. In 1990, the company won a contract to manufacture 
container bogie cars to Malaysia valued at USD 3.8 million.53 
PT PAL started as a ship maintenance and repair facility in the colonial era, being 
incorporated under the Indonesian Navy in the 1960s and located side-by-side with 
the eastern fleet naval base in Surabaya.  PAL was made fully-fledged industry in 
1980, occupying over 150 hectares of land with modern docks and facilities. To 
accommodate the PMP, six divisions (warships, commercial ships, general 
engineering, maintenance and repair, electronics and weapons, material) were 
formed. The company grew its employees to around 6,000 in the 1990s.54 Until the 
end of the 1990s, PT PAL succeeded in progressing through three stages of the PMP. 
The first stage was carried out through license production of both commercial and 
defence products. License production of Fast Patrol Boat 28 and Fast Patrol Boat 57 
was acquired from the Belgian Ship Corp and Germany’s FR Lursen. The second 
stage of PMP was achieved through joint design with Mitsui Japan on 3,000 and 
3,500 DWT tankers dubbed ‘Caraka Jaya’, which were indigenously manufactured in 
cooperation with five other shipbuilders in Indonesia.55 The third stage of the PMP 
was secured through the indigenous design of a container ship, dubbed ‘Palwo 
Buwono’.  
Communication and electronics sectors, represented by PT INTI and PT LEN, were 
considered as producers of strategic transportation for the integration of an 
archipelagic country and for national resilience. PT INTI started as a post and 
telecommunication laboratory in 1926, became an R&D institute under the Ministry 
of P&T, and finally transformed into a telecommunications industry with support 
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from Siemens Germany. Starting with 500 employees, the company owned three 
support centres for training, computer activities and R&D.56 Similar to PT INTI, PT 
LEN was also created from an R&D centre, which used to be known as TELKOMA 
under LIPI. Located in Bandung, the company employed around 700 employees 
mostly with degrees from university.57 LEN became an SOE in 1991 and joined other 
strategic industries under BPIS.  
PT INTI and PT LEN were quick to expand technological capability, owing to their 
strong R&D culture and highly skilled workers. PT INTI started stage one through a 
license agreement with Siemens, Japan Radio Company and Nippon Electric 
Company, which also provided training and technical assistance. Stage two was 
conducted through cooperation with Siemens Germany.Entering 1990s, the company 
scored export of a small earth station to Malaysia.58 At the time the company’s annual 
production capacity included 55 Siemens’ digital telephone switching exchanges, 
166,000 units of standard desk telephones, 3,000 units of public payphones, marine 
radio equipment, small satellite earth stations, digital PABX, mobile telephone 
systems, and much more.59 Within 15 years, PT INTI managed to quadruple its 
workforce from around 500 to more than 2000 people.60 PT LEN recorded even more 
impressive progress. The company kick-started stage one through the development 
of hybrid and IC, moved up to stage two through the development of small earth 
stations, and achieved stage three through the production of relay TV.  
The fifth, sixth, and seventh vehicles of industrial transformation (energy, 
engineering, and agricultural machinery) were represented by PT BBI and PT 
Bharata. 61  PT BBI was started as the result of a merger between three Dutch 
companies, NV de Bromo in Pasuruan, NV de Industri and CV de Vulkaan in 
Surabaya, which were nationalised in 1958 and renamed as PT Boma, PT Bisma, and 
PT Indra. The three were merged in 1971 and retained their location in Surabaya. In 
1974, a license agreement was agreed with Netherlands’ Stork Werspoor Sugar to 
develop capability in designing, manufacturing, and completing the construction of a 
sugar factory, steam boiler and pressure vessel.62 
PT BBI joined the strategic industries rather late in 1998. Stage one of the PMP was 
started through a number of cooperation agreements, including KHD Germany in 
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diesel machines, Hamon Sobelco Belgium in industrial tools (energy, paper, cement, 
petro chemical), Pertamina in oil and gas, and PT KEC in cement. The company 
focused its business on heavy machinery, machines, metal casting, construction, 
machinery installation services, and maintenance of factories. By the early 1990s the 
company supported 2,000 employees in 14 branches across 10 cities in Indonesia 
(Java, Sumatra, and Borneo).63 Its annual production capacity amounted to 6,000 
diesel machines, 25,00 construction plates, engines and factory equipment, and 1 
million units of various agricultural equipment and fabricated tools.64 The company 
recorded exports to the US of 13,500 containers across 1989 and 1990.65 
PT Bharata, similar to PT BBI, also specialises in heavy equipment manufacturing, 
construction, and engineering. The company started as a merger between NV 
BRAAT Machinefabriek, a company manufacturing bridges and another steel 
construction firm, PN Sabang Merauke (previously Machinefabriek & Scheepswerf 
NV Molenvlict in 1920) engaged in the restoration of budidaya gunung dan 
perkalapan pantai, and PN Peprida (1962), a state owned company created to work 
on the development of basic industries (PT Barata, 2014).66 With its central office 
located in over 22 Ha in Gresik (previously in Surabaya), PT Bharata has 
infrastructure spread across 10 areas.67 PT Bharata started in stage one PMP through 
cooperation with Germany’s ABD&Werber producing pressing machines, with 
Yugoslavia’s Rudnap producing tractor dozers, and Japan’s Kobelco building 
excavators. By the early 1990s, the production capacity for heavy machineries as high 
as 810 units per year.68 The company employed around 3,000 workers in 1993.69 
The eighth vehicle, defence industry, was represented by PT Pindad. It started life as 
Artillerie Constructie Winkel in 1808. Pindad was incorporated under the armed 
forces in the 1960s to perform maintenance of artillery and produce small calibre 
ammunition. Pindad succeeded in the local production of assault rifles but never 
made it to mass production scale. By 1983 it was taken out of the Army’s control and 
became a fully-fledged industrial concern.70 Stage one of the PMP was carried out 
through a number of cooperation deals in both the defence and commercial sector. 
License production of the SS1 riffle was acquired from FN Herstall Belgium. License 
production of light and heavy ammunition was agreed with Germany’s Fritzwener 
and Salgaduk, respectively. In the commercial sector, Pindad agreed cooperation 
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with Siemens to produce generators, with Taiwan’s YAM and Yeong Chin to 
produce machine tools, and with Germany’s Thyssen RH to produce forging and 
casting products. Starting in the 1990s, PT Pindad exported to several countries in the 
region, such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei, which amounted US$ 5 
million, equal to two percent of its total production.71 
PT Krakatau Steel and PT Dahana are among the supporting industries. PT Krakatau 
Steel was formed in 1967 using the remnants of the Trikora Steel Project from the 
Soekarno era, which was part of the Soviet Union’s aid at the time. Stationed in 
Cilegon, West Java, PT Krakatau Steel employed more than 7,000 workers to produce 
sponge irons, steel slabs, billets and wires for shipbuilding;exports were made to 
Japan, including automotive parts.72 PT Krakatau Steel had moved from stage one 
(technology adoption), through cooperation with Hylsa Mexico on sponge iron, to 
stage two, through indigenous development of corten iron steel.  
PT Dahana, initially Perum Dahana, was created through an offset project called 
‘Project Menang’ (named after a village where the factory was built in East Java - in 
bahasa Indonesia this also means victory) to assembly missiles. Diversification into 
explosives manufacturing occurred, which later became the company’s business 
focus. In 1966 the factory was relocated to Tasikmalaya in West Java. The first stage 
of the PMP was conducted through Indigenous development of geodin and demotin 
dynamite and cooperation with ICI Australia on water based emulsion. Stage two 
was conducted through cooperation with Oil Tech Argentina on product shape 
charges.  
Table 4.2 below shows the stages of PMP achieved by each of the strategic industries 
by the mid of 1990s. PT IPTN was remarkably ahead of other industries, with PT 
PAL and PT LEN coming second at the third stage of PMP. PT Dahana, PT INKA, 
and PT INTI were at the second stage, whereas PT BBI, PT Bharata, and PT Pindad 
were still stuck in the first stage of PMP.  
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Table 4.2 Technological Progress in the Strategic Industries Based on Stages in 
Progressive Manufacturing (1983-1993) 
SOEs 
Stage in Progressive Manufacturing 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 4th stage 
PT IPTN  License production 
 CASA 212 with Spain 
 NBO 105 with MBB 
Germany 
 NAS 332 and NAS 330 
with Aerospatiale France 
 NBell 412 with Bell USA 
 SUT Torpedo with AEG 
Telefunken Germany  
CN 235 through Joint 
Venture with CASA 
N-250 N-2130 
PT PAL  License production FPB-
57 with FR Lursenw 
Germany 
 FPB-27 with Belgian Ship 
Corp 
 Boeing Jet Foil with 
Boeing USA 
Joint design, 
indigenous 
manufacture with 
Mitsui Japan on tanker 
3500 DWT and Caraka 
Jaya III 3000 DWT 
(merchant ship) 
Palwo 
Buwono  
NA 
PT 
Pindad 
 License production SS1 
with FN Herstall Belgium 
 Light ammunition with 
Fritzwerner Germany 
 Heavy ammunition with 
Salgaduk 
 Generator with Siemens 
Germany 
 Machine tools with YAM 
and Yeong Chin-Taiwan 
 Cast product with 
Thyssen RH-Germany 
Indigenous design of 
SS 1 assault rifle, 
Indigenous design of 
land system 
NA NA 
PT 
Dahana 
 Indigenous development 
of geodin and demotin 
 Cooperation with ICI 
Australia on waterbased 
emulsion 
Cooperation with Oil 
Tech Argentina on 
product shape charge  
NA NA 
PT 
Krakatau 
Steel 
 Cooperation with Hylsa 
Mexico on sponge iron 
Indigenous 
development of corten 
steel iron steel  
NA NA 
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SOEs 
Stage in Progressive Manufacturing 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 4th stage 
PT INKA  Cooperation with 
Sumitomo Japan on 
gerbong barang dan 
passenger train  
Coperation with 
Holec/BN-The 
Netherlands/Belgium 
on electric train  
NA NA 
PT INTI  Development of STDI, 
public phones, small 
earth stations  
Cooperation with 
Siemens Germany on 
STDI-K 
NA NA 
PT BBI  Cooperation with KHD 
Germany on diesel 
engine 
 Industrial tools (energy, 
paper, cement, petro 
chemical) with Hamon 
Sobelco Belgium on boiler 
 Pertamina on oil and gas 
 PT KEC on cement 
industry 
NA NA NA 
PT 
BARATA 
 Cooperation with 
ABG&Werber Germany 
on tandem roller, Rudnap 
Yugoslavia on tractor 
dozer, Kobelco Japan on 
excavators  
 Development of 
industrial tools such as 
steel structure, paper mill 
component, boiler and 
turbine for sugar mill and 
energy industry, high 
grade cast iron and steel 
NA NA Na 
PT LEN  Development of Hybrid 
& IC 
Development of SBK 
(small earth station) 
TV 
transmit
ter 
NA 
Source: Subekti et al (eds.) (1993) Teknologi di Indonesia. Teknologi Indonesia. Updated with additional 
data from fieldwork in PT DI, PT Pal, and PT Pindad April 2014- August 2015. 
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4.4 Development of Defence for Development 
4.4.1 Dual Use Industrialisation: The Technology Spearhead 
Habibie’s trail of thought on strategic industrialisation and the progressive 
manufacturing plan coincided with a number of other events, serving to support his 
case of a dual-use portfolio approach to the development of the strategic industries. 
The first event was military modernisation that was planned to kick-start in the early 
1990s, paving the way for major acquisitions on a big scale. Second, the shrinking 
access to western military technology was subsequently followed by a growing 
negative sentiment against dependency on foreign arms, which drove the need for 
self-sufficiency in arms provision.  
Defence procurement in Indonesia possessed distinctive politico-military 
conditions73, which reflected the unique features of its foreign policy and national 
interest, the absence of a professional military, and the lack of democratic control 
over its armed forces. Indonesia’s foreign policy was free and active, which 
eliminated the possibility of alliances and burden sharing in defence. 74 Threat 
perception, mission, influence of foreign policy on arms procurement, and 
dependency on foreign arms, all strengthened the inclination to secure strategic 
sovereignty. Following this logic, import substitution of arms should have become a 
mutual interest of the military and the engineers. However, the dual function of the 
military (socio-political role) also meant that the institution held privileges over some 
areas in which civilian oversight was absent, arms procurement being one example.75 
Arguably, this privilege was responsible for the ‘clash of interests’ between the 
military as the user and the engineers when it came to the imperative of offset in 
determining arms procurement contracts, whether it was due to arms import being a 
lucrative business for kickbacks, where the role of third parties or ‘brokers’ 
operated76 or other more strategic considerations. Hence, the defence procurement 
system at the time was not really enthused by the idea of participating in domestic 
arms provision. 
The above predicament became significant when the Indonesian armed forces 
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI), which at the time consisted of an 
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army, air force, navy, and the police, rose as a political actor with considerable 
influence. The unusual arrangement to unite the armed forces and police under one 
roof monopolised defence and security under one state agency. This explains why 
ABRI had the authority to respond to a vast spectrum of threats from the “low 
intensity threat, such as criminality, sabotage, terror and subversion”, to “high 
intensity threats, such as armed separatism, limited and open war by conventional 
and also weapons of mass destruction”77. ABRI’s dual use doctrine put emphasis on 
internal security and stability as the precondition for development, and was 
translated into a social political role, from representation in parliament to strategic 
positions in political and economic entities. The appointmentof ABRI’s personnel to 
positions disconnected from their core expertise is allegedly responsible forthe 
abandoning of ABRI. Regardless of ABRI’s considerable influence in Indonesian 
politics, the institution suffered from under-management and under-financing.  
As a consequence of the state’s prioritisation of economic recovery under Soeharto’s 
administration in 1966, defence development was not started in parallel with the first 
five-year development plan. Repelita I (1968-1973) focused on meeting the people’s 
basic needs, and therefore defence sector development took secondary priority and 
was pushed back to Repelita II. While ABRI had suffered from deterioration in 
equipment, logistics, and education as a consequence of constant deployment under 
the previous administration, the combination of benign external and internal 
conditions allowed ABRI to undertake consolidation and rehabilitation. 78  The 
Soviet’s decision to terminate arms and spare parts provision to the new 
administration in Jakarta created a significant gap in defence readiness, but this was 
soon remedied by grants from western countries. 
The first defence development policy mandated in RENSTRA HANKAM I (Strategic 
Plan on Defence and Security) under Repelita II (1974-1979)79, aimed to achieve a 
small but efficient ABRI that was able to expand rapidly under the emergency80. 
Small budget flexibility for development meant investment in material was 
constrained to extending the life cycle of weapon systems through renovation, 
rehabilitation and refit. Early defence procurement was undertaken through a 
combination of second-hand equipment purchases and grants, as well as limited 
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procurement of mostly western technology. This policy basically continued through 
RENSTRA HANKAM II (1979-1983).  
It was only under RENSTRA HANKAM III (1984-1988) that real defence 
modernisation finally began to receive serious attention. Additional maritime 
territory and air space as a result of UNCLOS81 and lengthy military campaigns in 
East Timor 82  were among the factors that shaped the requirement of defence 
missions and boosted the responsibility of the armed forces. There was also urgent 
development of capability that included national air defence, strategic transport, 
territorial control/surveillance, and security of the Exclusive Economic Zone. For the 
first time, self-sufficiency in weapons provision was deliberate, with the priority 
shifted to development of new air force and naval bases outside Java. The Plan also 
raised the need for industrial development to produce light weapons, explosives and 
ammunition, military optics, communication electronic devices and other simple 
technology that could be produced domestically.83 
4.4.2 Dual-use industrialisation: From Defence to Development 
Dual use production policy was made formal through the 1983 GBHN (State Policy 
Guidelines) chapter IV on Defence and Security, which mandated that modernisation 
of arms must uphold the utilisation of domestic production for dual purposes. 
Furthermore, RepelitaIV (1984-1989) stipulated that the mission of the Defence and 
Security Industry (DSI) must be expanded to include the economy, technology, and 
defence84 . In other words, strategic industries must be able to create multiplier 
effects, conduct progressive manufacturing plans, and fulfil both commercial and 
military demand (dual-use). It was not a coincidence that the obligations to fulfil 
these three roles fell to the strategic industries with dual use production - namely PT 
IPTN, PT PAL, and PT Pindad - the top three recipients of government investment,85 
led directly by Habibie. 
Initially dual-use production was applied toindustry that only produced arms, that is 
PT Pindad. According to Habibie, diversifying business to commercial activities 
would serve to reduce the cost of industrial development due to limited domestic 
demand, mostly came from government and the Armed Forces. For this purpose, a 
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formula was formalised for the appropriate ratio of production capacity in peace and 
war. It was expected that in peacetime, the ratio would be 80:20 for commercial: 
military, which would be reversed in war.86 For PT Pindad, this meant creating 
divisions of forging,  casting, industrial machinery and services. The same formula 
was then applied to PT IPTN and PT PAL; in the latter justifying the creation of a 
warship and weapons integration division.  
Other strategic industries played the role of supporting industries in dual-use 
industrialisation. As early as 1979, BPPT had conducted a study on how non-defence 
industries could support arms production, especially in the manufacture of light 
weapons.87 The study extended to other areas, such as engaging PT Bharata in the 
production of track shoe prototypes for PT-76 amphibious tanks in 1981. The push 
for supporting industries in the dual use industrialisation programme continued, 
among others, with PT Krakatau Steel supplying steel for shipbuilding in PT PAL as 
well as other shipbuilding activities in Indonesia, including PT Dahana supplying 
explosives for military purposes, and PT INTI developing capability for the 
installation of fire fighting systems on the navy’s ships.  
BPPT also played a vital role in the planning of dual use industrialisation. BPPT 
conducted a study in 1984/85 on defence and security issues at national, regional, 
and international levels that affected the country’s national interest in the short, 
medium, and long term. Based on this information calculation were made on the 
types and numbers of defence equipment required for each service in the Armed 
Forces until 2005. This list of requirements was used as a reference for strategic 
industry development planning.88 
Linked to the dual use model is the concept of a technology spearhead and industry 
hierarchy. Since the beginning, Habibie had stated that trickle down or multiplier 
effects were expected from the eight industries to create a ‘tangible nineth industry’. 
For this purpose, he focused on two industrial sectors, aerospace and shipbuilding, 
to be the technology spearheads to ensure the creation of multiplier effects. Figure 4.3 
below describes the hierarchy in strategic industries and how spill over effects could 
stimulate the development of supporting industries (industry pendukung) and the 
emergence of affected industries (industry terimbas).  
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This industrial hierarchy placed the most burden on aerospace and shipbuilding 
industry to create multiplier effects. PT IPTN as the only aerospace industry had to 
be able to compete in the global market through exports, and create enough demand 
for local supply chains to grow. According to Habibie (1978)89: 
“When the Nurtanio industry (later renamed IPTN) can hire 10,000 workers with 
international standard at one time, it will give benefits to others… by opening opportunity for 
subcontracting business in electronics, avionics,… which means the aerospace industry can 
provide multiplier effect.”  
PT PAL as the biggest shipbuilding industry must also be competitive globally, while 
at the same time encourage local supply of raw materials like steel and paints. The 
two industries were equipped with massive investments and top-notch facilities, 
such as computers and training, which could be accessed by other industries and 
higher education institutions.90 
Figure 4.3 Strategic Industry and Spill over Effects 
 
Source: BPIS (unpublished) 
The strategy of the progressive manufacturing plan through strategic industries 
therefore served a dual-purpose: for development, through the creation of value-
added, employment, and skill enhancement, and for defence, through the creation of 
defence value chains that consisted of spearhead industries and supporting 
industries. This dual-purpose industrialisation resonated with high ambition, but the 
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real purpose was actually to ensure the optimisation and dissemination of scarce 
resources through military expenditures could be enjoyed by other sectors as well.  
4.5 Summary: The Challenge of Technology Development 
This chapter has outlined the tapestry of Indonesia’s technology development and 
industrialisation from the independence era until the end of Soeharto’s New Order. 
While the first industrialisation effort under Soekarno laid the foundation for 
manufacturing, it was under Soeharto that the industrialisation aimed at ‘catching-
up’. This was done through a great experiment using strategic industries as vehicle 
for progressive manufacturing. The preconditions are captive market and 
technological capability to climb up ladder of production. In order to guarantee 
these, government used public procurement and transfer technology from abroad. 
Arms procurement provided the opportunity to enlarge the captive market for 
strategic industries, as well as to generate technology transfer from offset. This serves 
as the pretext for evaluating the role of offset in arms procurement that will be 
discussed in chapter five. 
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55. THE CONTRIBUTION OF OFFSET TO INDONESIAN DEFENCE 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
5.1 Introduction 
Indonesia presents a worthy case study of offset on several counts. First, the country 
is hailed as the pioneer of direct offset in the Southeast Asia region,1 and the first 
major country outside of Eastern Europe to adopt a countertrade policy2. Second, 
given its status as a latecomer, the country sought technological progress since the 
1970s to expedite the process of industrialisation. The government selected industrial 
champions and used offset as a means for technology transfer, as well as to gain 
international recognition essential to enter the global market. Third, offsets have been 
applied to both commercial and defence procurement and channelled to strategic 
industries, with a dual-use portfolio, particularly in the aerospace and shipbuilding 
sectors. This has enabled the strategic industries to climb up the ladder of 
production, as described in the previous chapter.  
Offset certainly has its appeal in Indonesia. The country has seen the emergence, 
disappearance, and reappearance of offset during the course of strategic 
industrialisation in the 1980s, the economic crisis in the late 1990s, and during the 
defence industrial revitalisation programme in the 21st Century. Offset keeps on 
returning, whether as an official policy or as an informal practice. The latest example 
is the adoption of the 2012 mandatory offset policy for the purpose of defence 
industrial revitalisation. However, the question remains as to what exactly has been 
the contribution of offset, and does it merit a special place in the country’s defence 
industrialisation efforts today?  
This chapter seeks to assess the role of offset in defence industrialisation policy in 
Indonesia. For that purpose, it is necessary to locate offset within the evolving 
practise of countertrade, and to gain an understanding how offset is perceived, 
regulated, and utilised. This chapter will be structured as follows: section 5.2. 
explains how offset has gradually taken centre stage in strategic industrialisation; 
section 5.3. provides an overview of offset programmes in Indonesia across three 
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different industrialisation periods: (1) during 1988 to the late 1998 when offset was 
used to support development of strategic industries; (2) during 1999-2009 when 
offset was used to help survival of the ailing strategic industries; and finally (3) 2010-
2014 when offset is used to support revitalisation of strategic industries; section 5.4 
analyses offset via the case studies of PT DI, PT Pal, and PT Pindad that represent 
defence industry in aerospace, shipbuilding, and land systems;section 5.5 moves on 
to establish whether offset has worked, looking at six variables in which offset has 
the potential to contribute to defence industrialisation: employment, skill-
enhancement, technology transfer, export, value chain creation and R&D; and, 
finallysection 5.6 examines the implications of offset on Indonesia’s defence 
industrialisation strategy.  
5.2 From Countertrade Roots to High Technology Offset 
The earliest record of countertrade regulation in Indonesia showed that offset is 
rooted in early post-war government policy. The first known countertrade policy 
was issued in 1952, entitled “Hong Kong Compensation Trade”, which allowed those 
who exported commodities to Hong Kong to accept imports of commodities from 
Hong Kong in return, at the same value.3 Barter was also conducted with socialist 
countries such as the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. The close 
bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s provided Indonesia with 
handsome compensation when purchasing military equipment, which included 
modern weapons, such as MiG-21 fighters and SA-76 rockets. As mentioned 
previously in chapter four (see p.20), the Indonesian explosive manufacturer PT 
Dahana was born out of an offset arrangement with the Soviet Union.4 
Countertrade practices were banned in 1971 by the then Minister of Trade, Sumitro, 
who believed that it actually did more harm than good to Indonesia.5  By the early 
1980s, countertrade had returned following the economic crisis that accompany 
falling oil prices. High reliance on petroleum exports inflicted a massive deficit on 
the government budget. The Indonesian government issued an emergency policy 
entitled the 1982 January Package6 to address the deficit as well as to boost the export 
of non-petroleum/gas products7 and non-traditional commodities to non-traditional 
markets. A subset of this regulation is the countertrade policy - encompassing offset, 
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compensation, and buy-backs 8 - which Parsons hailed as “perhaps the first 
comprehensive and legally codified countertrade policy ever instituted outside the 
socialist nations”9. The institutional framework was simple: the Ministry of Trade 
was in charge with counter purchase, while the arrangement of offset, compensation, 
and buy-back was assumed by the ministry in charge of procurement.10 Countertrade 
practices continued throughout 1982-1997, during which an average of 36 projects 
were conducted every year at a value of USD 478 million11. However, the absence of 
documentation made it impossible to determine the extent to which offset might 
have been implemented under the countertrade regulation.  
Offset gradually took centre stage, as Indonesia progressed industrialisation under 
President Soeharto. It was arguably driven by the increasing power of the engineers 
in directing the country’s microeconomic planning – specifically in technology 
adoption - and providing the stamp of approval for government procurement.12 The 
earliest mention of offset as a concept can be traced back to 1978, in Habibie’s speech 
at Sekolah Staf Komando Gabungan (Joint Command and Staff College) entitled 
“Technology in Development”.13 He suggested that procurement practices should 
not only focus on price or added cost but also on local participation in production, 
which can pave the way for technology transfer. Habibie explained to his audience 
that a common practice in aircraft sales is that part of the payment is made in man-
hours, not in cash per se. However, this is possible only when the buyer is recognised 
for its ability to produce parts at international standards. The benefit of this is to 
provide jobs and to save foreign currencies that otherwise would flow out.  
Again in 1982 Habibie mentioned offset in his speech entitled “Science and 
Technology and Nation Building” in front of the Keidanren, Tokyo. He said 
“… Captive market for vehicles, transportation and communications is huge. Import of these 
goods can be financed partly by export of energy, raw material, agriculture products and 
others… But at this level of development, part of the (procurement) cost can be financed, 
perhaps up to 50 percent, by local production through ‘offset arrangements’.”14 
He defined offset as an “agreement to import certain goods on condition that some of 
the components will be produced in the buyer country”. The objective is to reduce 
the cost of importing industrial goods. Already Habibie referred to offset as ‘a real 
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possibility’ because of the precondition he mentioned before in 1978 that a certain 
level of development of domestic industry must exist. PT IPTN, for example, had 
succeeded in license production of the C212 transport aircraft and was ready to climb 
to stage 2 of the PMP through a joint venture with Spain CASA to jointly design a 
medium transport aircraft for 35 passengers (see chapter four p.17). This means that 
the aerospace industry had the capability to produce components of aircraft to meet 
international standards.  
Among early implementation of offset under Habibie’s era was the government’s 
procurement of civilian technology. For example, technology transfer in the 
procurement of satellites from US Hughes and the production of engine access doors, 
pylons, and other relatively low technology through procurement of Boeing 
aircraft15, both were received by PT IPTN. While these examples refer to offset in civil 
contracts, the benefits hypothetically ‘spin on’ to the defence sector due to the dual-
use nature of strategic industries at that time.  
The opportunity to practice offset in defence procurement surfaced in 1986 as 
Indonesia began to adopt leading edge technology, predominantly aircraft 
technology both for commercial and military purposes. This was partly prompted by 
trends at the regional level, as Asia’s procurement accounted for about 40 percent of 
global firm orders for combat aircraft. Indonesia foresaw acquisition of 100 war 
planes over 25 years to replace its aging A4 and F-5 fighters.16 Considering the 
potential value of Indonesia’s arms procurement, Habibie was quick to exploit the 
prospective benefits by asserting that offset must be used as one of the procurement 
bid conditions. He argued  
“If we wanted to buy aircraft… we assess technical issues, whether they meet our conditions, 
use soft loans of export credit, delivery schedule… now we add one more criteria, that is the 
seller must provide offset… Whoever gives the biggest offset, we will buy the product.”17 
Habibie emphasised the change of mind-set from “preference to buy with soft loans” 
to “preference to buy with offset”, so that the state can provide more work and skill 
upgrades. Beyond the domestic economic motivation, Habibie ensured that offset 
would enable the compatibility needed for technology transfer. Furthermore, this 
compatibility will spare Indonesia from thinking about marketing. Habibie elevated 
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offset as one of the indicators of international trust in Indonesia’s capability in high 
technology production. 18  By securing offset, access to export markets through 
subcontracting work would be opened. This will guarantee the sustainability of local 
industry, as the domestic market was hardly enough to provide the necessary 
economies of scale. On the other hand, sustained production capacity is expected to 
justify the massive investment made into the strategic industries. 
5.3 Offset Development Stages 
While the first offset practice might have been started in the early post-Independence 
era, the absence of proper archival data makes it impossible to reveal the details of 
this practice. Therefore, analysis of the development stages of offset must start from 
the start of Soeharto’s administration. Across this long period, offset has manifested 
itself in different ways characterised by the differing strategies, regulatory 
frameworks, institutional arrangements, features, and its implementation across the 
life cycle from negotiation to the end of procurement contract. Arguably, offset has 
been developed from ‘best endeavours’ in Habibie’s era to an ‘ad hoc style’ in the 
post-reform era, to finally the ‘mandatory’ model, since the issuance of the Law on 
Defence Industry in 2012.  
It was not easy to verify the exact number of offset programme in commercial and 
defence procurement during the three periods, as the official data do not exist.19 A 
previous study by Palia20 suggests that data on countertrade could be compiled from 
Countertrade Outlook and Financial Times, but this is no longer valid today. 
Deriving arms trade offset data from SIPRI’s arms transfer database has its limits. 
While it helps to explain which arms procurements were accompanied by offset, the 
value of procurement as well as year of delivery, contains inherent weaknesses. First, 
SIPRI arms transfers serve as indicator values and not as the actual financial values. 
Second, as and when offset is listed, it lacks an explanation of the offset values and 
offset types associated with the procurement.  To fill in the lacuna in literature, 
findings from questionnaires and interviews were used to provide details on such 
offset programmes.  
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5.3.1 First Offset Stage 1988-1998: Offset for Development of Strategic 
Industries 
A study by Palia confirmed the vast use of offset in Indonesian procurement. He 
found that Indonesia had engaged in considerable offset activity with 25 countries 
and 19 organisations21; throughout 1987-1989 Indonesia had eight offset programmes 
equal to one fourth of total countertrade practice. The major offset partners at the 
time were West Germany, Japan, Canada, the US, Singapore and the UK. By 
reference to the 1982 countertrade regulation, Habibie included offset as part of the 
procurement conditions during this early period. This section limits the discussion of 
offset under President Soeharto’s administration to a period between 1982 and 
1998.22 
Table 5.1 shows that there are at least eight cases of offset attached to procurement of 
new military equipment throughout 1982-1998 that have been confirmed with 
industry. The majority of offsets to the strategic industries was direct, but some were 
indirect or hybrid. Six out of nine offset cases, were direct or related to the purchased 
equipment. At least two offset cases were indirect, Rapier and Hawk, both involving 
British vendors. The most common form of direct offset was license production and 
co-production, in which the local industry acted as subcontractors to foreign 
suppliers. This is understandable, considering Habibie’s local naming of offset as 
‘imbal produksi’ or counter-production with the aim of preparing the strategic 
industries to bid for subcontracting work of the foreign vendor.  
In addition to the abovementioned offsets, there are a number of offset cases that are 
difficult to confirm. For example in 1982-1983 and 1996-1997 Indonesia purchased 
unconfirmed numbers of Bell-412 helicopters from the US which were assembled 
from kits in Indonesia. The second deal, worth around USD 4.2mn, could either be 
offset or a pure business agreement that included local content.23 There is also an 
aborted offset case, in the procurement of Boeing’s patrol craft jetfoil in 1983. The 
plan for local production of 36 ships were not continued, due to the jetfoil’s 
inefficiency of fuel.24 
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Table 5.1 Offset in Indonesian Defence Procurement, 1980-1998 
No 
Procured 
Items 
Source of 
Technology 
Delivery 
Procurement 
Value 
(in US$ mn) 
Offset 
Value/ % 
from PV 
Offset 
Category 
PT IPTN/PT DI 
1 12 F-16  General 
Dynamics, USA 
1989-1990 337 US$ 52mn Direct 
2 N/A 
SUT AS/ASW 
Torpedo 
AEG 
Telefunken 
Germany 
1978-1985 N/A N/A Direct 
 SUT AS/ASW 
Torpedo 
AEG 
Telefunken 
Germany 
1988-1989 N/A N/A Direct 
3 N/A Rapier 
SAM System 
BAe Dynamics, 
UK 
1985-1986 100 N/A N/A 
 Rapier SAM 
System 
BAe Dynamics, 
UK 
1986-1987 60 N/A Hybrid 
4 8 Hawk 
100trainer/co
mbat aircraft 
BAe Systems, 
UK 
1996-1997 (Part of) 442 
 
Offset 35 % N/A 
 24 Hawk 200 
FGA aircraft  
BAe Systems, 
UK 
1997-1998 (Part of) 442  Offset 35% Indirect 
PT PAL 
1 12 FPB 57 Friedrich 
Luersen Werf, 
Germany 
1988-1995, 
2000-2004 
N/A N/A Direct 
2 N/A  
FPB 28 
Friedrich 
Luersen Werf, 
Germany 
N/A N/A N/A Direct 
PT PINDAD 
1 N/A 
FNC Assault 
Riffle 
Belgium N/A N/A N/A Direct 
2 35 Scorpion 90 
light tank  
Alvis, UK 1995-1999 N/A N/A Direct 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
 
Offset implementation during stage one was signified by two principal 
characteristics. First, there was neither a written offset policy nor a dedicated body to 
manage offset in Indonesia. 25  Despite offset being regulated under the 1982 
countertrade policy, fieldwork research found none of the respondents being aware 
of this policy. Instead, offset implementation was linked to the centrality of Habibie.26 
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The sentiment is plausible, considering that at the time Habibie held strategic 
positions in both government through BPPT, issuing permits for high technology 
imports, and as the Head of three strategic industries (PT IPTN, PT PAL, PT 
Pindad).27 This allowed him the authority to demand offset in procurement and 
channel the work to the strategic industries he preferred. The fact that Habibie was 
allowed to do this cannot be separated from his closeness to President Soeharto28, 
who had the final say on government procurement. Furthermore, Habibie was able 
to generate offset due to his networking and negotiation skills, as he was a respected 
figure internationally and well known among the elites of aerospace companies all 
over the world.  
Second, offset implementation had been characterised by a lack of consistency. Some 
offsets were requested before the procurement bid was finalised and some offsets 
were requested after the winner of the bid had been decided, which affected the 
bargaining position of industry vis a vis the foreign supplier in the offset 
negotiations. This inconsistency stemmed from the fact that Indonesia did not have 
dedicated human resources or a government offset body to maintain standard offset 
practice. Furthermore, there was difficulty in maintaining a standard practise due to 
the inability to predict and make sure which procurement offset could be applied.29 
Due to the absence of a written policy, it was unknown whether the implementation 
of offset was a blanket policy or done on a case-by-case basis, and on what threshold 
it was based.  
In the absence of an offset body, what is exactly the role of government? Offset 
negotiations were handled through business-to-business channels, directly involving 
the strategic industries in the negotiation process. The role of government was to 
pave the way for this negotiation to happen, most effectively by putting the 
obligations for offset before the procurement negotiation commenced, or after the 
procurement negotiations had been concluded. An interdepartmental team in charge 
of government procurement control, was created in 1980 through Presidential 
Decision Number 10 Year 1980. The team was led by Ministry/State Secretary and 
supported by five state ministries/non ministerial bodies, including Bappenas and 
Menristek, reporting directly to the President. This body was tasked to research and 
decide the type, amount, specification, price, and procedure for government 
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procurement. Each of government institution was allowed to conduct procurement 
bidding, but was not allowed to sign procurement contracts without permission 
granted by the interdepartmental team. It was during this short time that the 
interdepartmental team pushed for offset obligation.  
The extent to which the interdepartmental team could determine the optimisation of 
offset is uncertain, because the highest authority lay in the hands of the President. 
The team was not the only interest group in procurement. In the case of defence 
procurement, the user (military and ministry of defence, which were inseparable 
entities at the time) would also hold its own procurement criteria. The clashing of 
interests between prioritising offset and prioritising military objectives was apparent 
in the case of the F-16 procurement. In the bidding process, the engineers had a 
preference for the French Mirage that offered 30 percent offset and 80 percent 
countertrade.30 The offer also included subcontracting work forsome components to 
be produced in Indonesia, as well as French assistance on developing an indigenous 
fighter jet. Taking into consideration the strategic relationship between ABRI and the 
United States, President Soeharto chose to side with ABRI, despite the economic and 
technological benefits of the Mirage outweighing those of the F-16.  
A survey respondent described the process in which the strategic industries were 
directly involved in the offset negotiation process of the F-16 and the difficulty they 
faced, as follows:  
“We could start negotiation once there was estimation… PT IPTN directly demanded offset… 
The value was based on the foreign vendor’s standard practice.. before the procurement 
contract was signed, offset must be agreed first… Since the foreign vendor had determined 
the price, they could not increase it once offset was demanded.”31 
Another survey respondent explained that the offset negotiation process was 
initiated under the interdepartmental team, which then relayed the process to the 
strategic industries to negotiate the finer details.32 The content of offset could be 
demanded by government or industry to serve specific interests, and could also be 
proposed by the foreign vendor following a study of local industrial capability.  
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In the absence of a formal offset policy, there were informal procedures that guided 
offset implementation. Offset policy usually regulates features like offset thresholds, 
the multiplier, types of offset, penalties, and so on.  It was not clear whether an offset 
threshold; that is, the minimum offset percentage based on the total procurement 
cost, had been determined as a baseline for negotiation. Different results came from 
fieldwork research, proving that variations existed. While offset usually demanded 
at around 20 percent of procurement value that comes from subcontracted work33, in 
other cases no threshold was applied 34 . In the case of the F-16 and Hawk 
procurements, it was claimed that the offset equalled 35 percent of the procurement 
value35, but a fact check of the SIPRI arms transfer database confirms that offset in the 
F-16 procurement equalled only around 15 percent of the total procurement cost.36 
From these cases, the ‘actual’ threshold both turned out to be different from the 
expected norm, suggesting that the offset threshold depended on negotiation not 
policy direction.   
The multiplier was used as an incentive to push investment in certain sectors, aiming 
at the optimisation of offset impact. By referring to the 1982 countertrade policy, 
along with fieldwork interviews, no multiplier was used in the offset value 
calculation; in other words, offset was based on a “dollar by dollar“ approach.37 A 
statement by Habibie, however, suggested there was a multiplier, and that instead of 
the buyer country, it was the foreign vendor which set the multiplier. He claimed 
that the offset of the F-16, led to PT IPTN receiving a multiplier, or transfer 
technology factor of 2.5.38 
In the absence of an offset policy and a dedicated oversight body, there was always 
the centrality of Habibie and government control over public procurement and 
industrial production. However, the disadvantage of this centrality was the 
inconsistency of implementation and the lack of knowledge transfer to sustain the 
continuation of offset as proven in subsequent periods. 
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5.3.2 Second Offset Stage - 1999-2009: Offset for Strategic Industries Survival in 
the Aftermath of 1997 Crisis 
Offset practically ceased during the economic crisis in the late 1990s, when arms 
procurement programmes were mostly cancelled or rescheduled as result of the lack 
of state funding and an arms embargo. Following the downfall of Soeharto in 1997 
and pressures to reform, Habibie was forced to shelve the idea of infant industry 
protection and catch-up industrialisation. Habibie’s influence faded, as did the role 
of KEMRISTEK/BPPT in both procurement and offset. The institutional 
arrangements set up under Habibie’s era were shelved through the dismissal of BPIS 
in 2002, which left coordination issues between public procurement and the strategic 
industry’ production unresolved. At the same time, the armed forces undertook 
reform that prioritised the removal of socio-political roles, transferred military 
business back to the government, and improved the conditions of soldiers. With 
arms procurement pushed aside in the first years of Indonesian reform, offset was no 
longer an issue.  
Contrary to the disappearance of offset, countertrade practice continued despite the 
fact that its value was not as significant as in previous decades. During the years 
after the economic crisis, countertrade was valued at USD 150.21 million, USD 2.99 
million, and USD 22.77 million in 1998, 1999 and 2001-2002, respectively.39 In 2003, 
the Ministry of Trade went further by determining that countertrade was a priority 
programme, promoting the export of non-petroleum and mineral products as well as 
saving on foreign currency reserves. With the opening of alternative access to 
military technology from Russia in 2003, Indonesia started to procure new weapons 
and sought to utilise countertrade in arms procurement. Following the Indonesian 
Minister of Industry and Trade’s visit Russia in 2002, President Megawati signed an 
arms procurement contract for two Su-27, two Su-30MKK and two MI-35 helicopters, 
worth together, some USD 193 million- in which only 12.5 percent of the payment 
would be made in cash40 and the rest would be made through countertrade across an 
eighteen-month period.41 The practice was lambasted by Parliament allegedly for 
violation of procedures, thus damaging the view of countertrade.42 
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Other forms of offset, technology transfer and local content, were included in 
government procurement policy through Presidential Decree No.80 Year 2003 via 
Procurement and Defence Ministerial Decree Numbers 01/M/I/2005 and 
15/M/II/2005. While the two were often used interchangeably, which indicated a 
lack of clarity in their definition, no supporting regulation was issued to guide the 
implementation of these mechanisms. Therefore, the practical elements of offset are 
left to ad hoc negotiation. Correspondingly, in the absence of special laws that 
regulated arms procurement, it was left to the procurement task force whether offset 
should or should not be sought. As a result, while no implementation of offset is 
recorded on government procurements of commercial products43, it was applied on 
selected arms procurement.  
The first utilisation of technology transfers or local content in arms procurement was 
negotiated with South Korea in the purchase of seven KT-1B Wong Bee training 
aircraft and four landing platform docks from South Korea in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. The two countries signed an arrangement concerning mutual 
acceptance of government quality assurances of defence materiel and services in 
1999, followed by a letter of intent regarding specific defence industry cooperation in 
2000. Throughout 1999 to 2003 Indonesia received a substantial amount of loans from 
Korea to be used in the defence sector, which included a loan for submarine overhaul 
valued at USD 50,988,775.44 Bilateral relations with Korea also included utilisation of 
various types of offset mechanism, such as counter purchase and licensed 
production. Indonesia’s purchase of the KT-1 Wong Bee was subsequently followed 
by Korea’s purchase of 10 CN-235 transport aircraft manufactured by PT DI. The 
purchase of the LPD was tied to a licence production programme for PT PAL. No 
other offset programme was reported. Table 5.2. below lists all offset during the early 
reform period.  
The issuance of Presidential Decree No.54 Year 2010 was the first formal step to bring 
offset back as a procurement policy tool. Article 4 (2) mentioned that in the event that 
domestic industry cannot meet the requirements of the user, procurement could be 
sourced from abroad on condition that there is domestic industry participation 
through technology transfer, local content, offset, joint production or joint 
investment. Despite the regulation, the implementation of offset was characterised 
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by ad hoc flexibility. Two main factors were responsible for this condition: first, the 
absence of a supporting policy means there was no detailed guidance on offset 
implementation, which was resolved by the discretion of the procurement staff; 
second, the dismissal of BPIS meant there was no continuation of experience and 
transfer of knowledge pertaining to offset that would have been useful in the absence 
of guidance. Procurement staffs were disadvantaged by a shortage in guidance and 
experience. 
Table 5.2 Offset in Arms Procurement during the Second Offset Stage 
 (1999-2009) 
No 
Procured 
Items  
Source of 
Technology 
Delivery 
Procurement 
Value 
(in US$ mn) 
Offset 
Value/ % 
from PV 
Offset 
Category 
PT DI 
1 KT-1B KAI, South Korea 2003-2012 N/A USD2.1 mn Direct 
PT Pindad 
2 22 Tarantula 
IFV 
Doosan, South 
Korea 
2009-2013 70 N/A Direct 
PT Pal 
3 4 LPD  Dae Sun, South 
Korea 
2004-2007 150 N/A Direct 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
It was soon demonstrated that offset implementation was far from smooth. The first 
noticeable problem was the lack of a planning stage preceding negotiation. The sole 
purpose of offset in this period was to make use of idle capacity in industry, which, 
unfortunately, was carried out without reference to company business development 
plans.45 Furthermore, while it was clear that the offset programme derives from 
procurement contract negotiations, industry as the offset receiver was not included 
in the pre-offset implementation talks. Industry was often left in the dark until the 
last moment, and forced to engage with offset programmes in which they had no 
ownership. These problems contributed to the negative impact of offset on the 
procurement life cycle. For example, offset arguably contributed to the delayed 
delivery of domestically produced LPDs.  
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Offset under this period also failed in capitalising on arms procurement from Russia, 
Holland, and Poland. Russia - by far the largest arms supplier and provider of USD 1 
bn export credits – had, however, conveyed its willingness to provide assistance to 
develop weaponry system and defence industry in Indonesia.46  It was not clear 
whether the absence of offset from Russia was due to Russia’s rejection of 
Indonesia’s demands or because of the lack of confidence on the Indonesian side to 
pursue offset demands. 47  This period also recorded a number of failed offset 
attempts, such as the offset pertaining to the SIGMA corvette built by Damen Schelde 
of the Netherlands and the Skytruck aircraft from Poland. The first deal failed to 
secure Dutch parliamentry approval, therefore the overall production was executed 
in the Netherlands with minimum participation from Indonesia’s shipbuilder. The 
second deal was where the offset credits provided by the Polish government were 
halted when it became known that comparable technology was produced by 
domestic industry.48 
Perhaps the dominant factor responsible for the failure to capitalise on offset is the 
absence of proper defence management at the time. Apart from one defence White 
Paper issued in 2003, the government had no reference to defence-development 
policy. Arguably, without this knowledge, neither arms procurement nor arms 
production had any long-term guidance. This lack of high-level expertise was 
exploited by third parties to push for procurement of off-the-shelf technology from 
abroad. Coupled with the absence of a dedicated professional procurement 
organisation at KEMHAN49, the procurement process was chaotic, tainted with a 
number of spur-of-the-moment actions and alleged corruption - mostly with regard 
to procurements from Russia.50  Subsequent efforts to regulate procurement included 
streamlining the process through Defence Minister Decree/Regulation No 34 Year 
2011, applying a one-door procurement policy, and obligating stakeholders to sign 
an‘integration pact’ as initial attempt to dissuade corruption from procurement.51 
Entering the second Yudhoyono administration (2009-2014), the then Indonesian 
Minister of Defence Purnomo Yusgiantoro announced that the revitalisation of the 
strategic industries had been part of 15 programmes that President Yudhoyono had 
personally selected. Defence Minister Decree No 15 Year 2009 mandates the 
responsibility for the development of defence industry lay with KEMHAN. Its 
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responsibility covered the formulation of the following activities: defence industry 
development policy; defence equipment requirements; and defence equipment 
production and its financing from the state budget, as well as transfer technology. 
Most of these tasks went to the Directorate of Defence Technology and Industry (DIT 
TEKINDHAN), under the Directorate of Defence Potential.52 In 2010, the government 
held a national workshop on defence industry revitalisation and invited former 
President Habibie to deliver the keynote speech. In October, a Defence Industrial 
Policy Committee (KKIP) was established to formalise national policies related to 
defence procurement and manufacturing. Since then, offset revival was just a matter 
of time. 
5.3.3 Third Offset Stage – 2010-2014:  Making Offset Mandatory for 
Revitalisation of Strategic Industries 
Entering the 2010s, offset has grown because a number of critical steps had been 
taken to ensure the participation of domestic industry in public procurement.  Under 
the second term of President Yudhoyono’s administration (2010-2014), support for 
the revitalisation of defence industry has solidified, culminating in the issuance of 
Law No.15 Year 2012 on Defence Industry (LoDI). The law stipulated mandatory 
offset in the procurement of defence and security equipment from abroad, which 
took the complexity of offset implementation to a whole new level. 53  Most 
importantly, any offset programme conducted after the issuance of the regulation 
would have legal consequences.54 
While there was still no recording of commercial offset, there was growing number 
of offsets linked to arms procurement, rising from three cases during 2000-2010 to at 
least seven cases across 2010-2013. 55  However, none of the offset negotiations 
involving the procurement of submarines, corvettes, and transport aircraft met the 
threshold of 35 percent offset of the contract value. Offset in the corvette programme 
was less than the amount of the license fee required by Damen shipbuilding (5 
percent of the procurement value). 56  The value of offset in the submarine 
procurement amounted to USD 9 million only, a miniscule number compared to the 
procurement value of approximately USD 1 billion.57 
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Table 5.3 Offset in Indonesian Defence Procurement, 2010-2014 
No Procured Items 
Source of 
Technology 
Delivery 
Procuremen
t Value (in 
USD mn) 
Offset Value/ 
% from PV 
Offset 
Category 
PT DI 
1 9 C-295 Airbus Military, 
Spain 
2014 256 N/A Direct 
2 12 F-16 Lockheed Martin, 
the US 
2014 Approx. 750 N/A Indirect 
PT Pal 
3 4 Guided Missile 
Destroyer Escort 
(PKR) 
Damen Schelde, 
the Netherlands 
2017 220 Approx. 5 % Direct 
4 3 T-209 Chang Bogo 
Submarine 
Daewoo South 
Korea 
2017/2010 Approx. 
1,000 
USD 9 mn Direct 
PT Pindad 
5 37 Caesar Howitzer  Nexter, France 2014 141 N/A Direct 
6 (136) Mistral SAM MBDA, France 2014 N/A Approx. USD 
1mn 
Direct 
7 (103) Leopard + (42) 
Marder 
Rheinmetal, 
Germany 
2013-2014 216 N/A Indirect 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
The third offset stage provided the most opportunities for offset. Previously in 2008, 
the government issued the long awaited strategic papers, comprising a regulatory 
framework for defence and development and a conciliatory approach to state 
affordability through capability-based planning. The Strategic Defence Review 2009 
addressed the position regarding development, dubbing it ‘Minimum Essential 
Forces’ (MEF), and defined as the level of force able to warrant a critical strategic 
defence interest through fulfilment of 80-89 percent of military capability to deal 
with both real and potential threats. Subsequently, Defence Minister Decree No. 2 
Year 2010 on MEF was released as the first amendment of the previous position, 
outlining the fulfilment strategy for the armed forces. The document emphasises the 
stabilisation of army, development and modernisation of the naval and air forces that 
had been neglected, and the level of force required to secure the critical strategic 
defence interest. This called for a transformation in defence deployment, from heavy 
land based forces to layered-defence with a Sea Lane of Communications (SLOCs) 
orientation that was more fitting for an archipelago country. In conjunction with the 
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development of a SLOCs oriented posture, procurement planning saw major 
programmes emerge for both the navy and air force.  
In order to garner the fruits of the arms procurement planning, a ‘clearing house’ 
was introduced to ensure that procurement and production of arms would go hand 
in hand. The idea is similar to the role of the BPIS in Habibie’s era. No single entity 
held adequate authority over defence industry, let alone controlling the whole 
process into the defence value chain. Defence industries were placed under 
management of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprise, while supporting industries 
were placed under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT).58 In order to address 
this chaos, Presidential Decision No 42 Year 2012 concerning the creation of KKIP 
was issued. KKIP was established with the Minister of Defence as chief, whereas the 
minister of SOEs, minister of R&T, minister of industry, chief of TNI and Head of the 
Indonesian Police were members.59 Within less than two years of its existence, KKIP 
produced a master plan for the defence industry, a grand strategy for the KKIP, a 
national programme, and also blueprints for research on defence and security 
equipment and defence and security equipment production. 60 
KKIP’s role, however strategic, was not accompanied by sufficient institutional 
support. In order to carry on its daily activities, KKIP relied on its secretariat at DIT 
TEKINDHAN in KEMHAN. 61  This problem stemmed from the fact that KKIP 
membership “ex officio”, meant that positions in other government offices were held 
at the same time.  Membership of the Committee regarding the formulation of arms 
procurement policy was also vague, whether it was merely as a coordinator or 
decision maker. According to industry sources, the presence of the KKIP was not 
given significant authority with the exception of orders from the government.62 
Further effort to synchronise arms procurement planning and arms production has 
so far produced a ‘forced marriage’, which puts stakeholders in an uncomfortable 
situation. 63  However, LoDI has paved the way for more authority for KKIP, 
including requirement planning, R&D and engineering, management of industry, 
incentive, and cooperation.   
Furthermore, Presidential Decision No. 59 Year 2013 was enacted to accommodate 
the expansion of KKIP’s tasks. The regulation stipulated that KKIP be headed 
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directly by the President, with the Minister of Defence acting as daily chief. Its 
membership spans seven ministries and two state institutions such as minister of 
State-owned enterprise, minister of industry, minister of research and technology, 
minister of education and culture, minister of communication and information, 
minister of national defence planning, minister of foreign affairs, chief of TNI, and 
chief of the Indonesian Police. A consequence of this new organisation arrangement, 
is that decisions made by the KKIP means decision made by executive which 
represent users, fund providers, and state-owned defence industries.  
LoDI indirectly mandates substantial changes in the procurement procedure, which 
has been criticised for regulating urgent requirement and off-the-shelf (OTS) 
purchase only. Current arms procurement is regulated differently from other public 
procurement, but is not sufficiently tailored to the unique character of defence 
acquisition. 64  The defence sector dictates higher standards, engages heightened 
security considerations and secrecy, has longer life cycles and complexity that 
requires human resources with multi-disciplinary backgrounds, and sometimes is 
spared from mandatory competition. The current arms procurement regulation has 
too much emphasis on the secrecy issue, hence limiting procurement strategy into 
limited bids and direct appointments in the case of urgent requirements and minimal 
competition.  
The current procurement procedure contains several weaknesses. The procedure 
does not regulate procurement of developmental items, which entails a longer life 
cycle and R&D spending. More attention should also be given to the pre-preparation 
stage in order to foresee later problems. For example, translation from operational 
requirements (OR) to technical specifications (TS) is often criticised as the gateway 
for broker intervention. Since defence technology is highly specialised, it is not easy 
to create competition when the TS have been hardwired to a certain provider. Hence, 
it is no wonder that preference for OTS, especially foreign OTS, is preferred. Lastly, 
offset has not been accommodated in the procurement regulation.  
The current procedure also poses obstacles to national industry participation. It 
conditions that industrial participation should begin only after the requirement 
planning is hard-wired, which means industry is not involved in technology 
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assessment (that is translating operational requirements into technical specifications) 
and pricing. Furthermore, procurement contracts must be concluded within the same 
budget year, which risks industry penalties for late delivery. The absence of multi-
year budgeting means no sustainable order and funding are available for industry. 
While the second issue is soon to be addressed with a multi-year budgeting scheme, 
the first needs to be addressed with a different approach. The complexity of 
regulation, institutional arrangements, financing, and procurement, further 
convolutes the implementation of offset.  
Despite the mandatory clause of offset, confusion remains as to the technicality of the 
implementation. First, how should the offset threshold be defined? LoDI puts a 
blanket mandatory offset requirement over all arms procurement from abroad with 
no room for negotiation, no threshold of procurement value, and no clause of 
absolution.65 Second, which body should implement offset considering the clause 
applies to security and defence equipment procured not only by the military and 
police but also other ministries and state institutions as members of the KKIP. Third, 
who should bear the cost premium, the cost of investment for industry and other 
institutions as offset receivers.66 While institutional issues have been overcome, at 
least temporarily, the other issues remain unaddressed and left to the ad hoc 
discretion of the stakeholders. 
In order to address these institutional issues, a temporary arrangement was agreed 
between BARANAHAN and DIT TEKINDHAN at KEMHAN to assign the latter as 
offset executor. This move aims to temporarily fill up the gap in legal formal 
arrangements. Hosting the secretariat of KKIP, DIT TEKINDHAN has been in charge 
of industry output supervision, including technology development and human 
resources preparation. Unfortunately, DIT TEKINDHAN is not supported with 
suitable human resources for this task. As a result, it must hire professional 
consultants either from government institutions, such as BPPT or independent 
foreign consultants like Daewoo Logistics, to provide reports on the preparedness of 
domestic industry and the types of technology to absorb. 67   Among the major 
concerns with industry preparedness is the regeneration of human resources and the 
revitalisation of production facilities.  
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Despite the mandatory offset policy and major procurement planning in this period, 
offset implementation is yet to be established due to unfinished institutional 
arrangements, the lack of human resources, and practical regulations. 
BARANAHAN was determined not to violate the law, hence the reluctance to sign 
aprocurement contract if it does not contain an offset programme. To avoid the legal 
consequences of not applying offset, BARANAHAN invites participation of industry 
and/or DIT TEKINDHAN into the offset negotiations, which comes in the middle or 
at the end of procurement negotiation. 68  In some cases, as in the submarine 
procurement, industry is unable to optimise its bargaining position since its 
participation only comes after the procurement contract has been agreed. Also, in the 
absence of information on future procurement, DIT TEKINDHAN finds it hard to 
optimise industrial participation since there is not enough time for technology 
assessment to anticipate the offset programme.  
5.4 Sectoral Case Study Analysis: Aerospace, Landsystems and Maritime 
5.4.1 Sectoral Case Study: Aerospace 
There have been ten offset programmes received by PT IPTN/DI from arms 
procurement throughout 1988-2014. PT DI received seven offsets during the first 
offset stage, one offset programme during second offset stage, and two offset 
programmes during the third offset stage. In addition to this, PT DI also received 
offset from commercial procurement such as the C-212 transport aircraft from 
Spain’s Casa, Boeing 767, Airbus A330, Bell helicopter and Eurocopter, that have 
facilitated the company to move up the ladder of production (see chapter 4 p.189). 
For this research, three subcase studies have been selected: the F-16 fighter jet from 
the US company, General Dynamics, the KT-1 Wong Bee trainer aircraft from South 
Korea’s KAI, and the C-295 transport aircraft from Spain’s Airbus Military. The first 
case study is arguably the biggest offset and the first fighter jet-related programme 
that laid down the fundamental of composite manufacture capacity and the export of 
military aircraft components in PT DI. The second case is a continuation of jet fighter 
related work, but the lack of offset planning prevented optimisation of its benefit to 
the company. The third case is unique in a sense that for the first time offset was 
used for the specific purpose of acting as a ‘restructuring’ programme. 
221 
Sub-Case Study One: the F-16 Fighter Jet Programme  
The first offset stage undoubtedly was the ‘golden period’ for PT IPTN. The 
company had licensed one fixed wing aircraft NC-212 from CASA in 1976 and three 
rotary wing aircraft, NBO-105 helicopter, Bell-412 helicopter, and Puma/Super Puma 
helicopters in 1976, 1982, and 1986, respectively. Licence production of the FFAR 2,75 
rocket and SUT Torpedo in 1986 signified the preparedness to diversify skills and 
manufacturing lines to include military technology. Industrial cooperation brought 
in new technology and skills that enabled the company to assemble, manufacture 
and design new aircraft parts. Whilst in 1979, the company relied on CASA in a joint 
venture to develop the CN-235 aircraft, a decade later it went solo to launch the 
indigenously designed medium transport aircraft N250 at the Paris Le Bourget Air 
Show.   
During this period, the government poured massive investment into the company to 
recruit more aeronautical engineers. Skill enhancement had taken place through 
foreign technical assistance, internal training centres and overseas training as well as 
technology transfer and know-how in the form of sophisticated equipment, such as 
numerical control machines and application of the most advanced techniques in 
computerised aerodynamics. 69  All these investments bore fruits when Indonesia 
finally gained international trust through export of both fixed wing and rotary wing 
aircraft, such as Super Puma helicopter to Malaysia in 1988, and components of 
commercial airframes, such as the Boeing 737 in 1987 and the Airbus A-330s in 1989.  
The success of PT IPTN in becoming an eligible bidder and finally a supplier for 
Boeing and Airbus cannot be separated from offset. Through procurement of A-330s 
and Boeing 767s for Garuda Indonesia Airlines, offset was utilised to upgrade the 
company to qualify as an international bidder for these two giant aerospace firms. 
For this purpose, PT IPTN created a standalone division called a subcontract division 
to work on subcontract and offset programmes. A similar strategy had been applied 
to military procurement through the purchase of F-16s.  
Offset that accompanied the purchase from US General Dynamics was not the first, 
but it was the biggest in terms of procurement value and offset percentage during 
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Stage One offset developments. In August 1986, the Indonesian Air Force decided to 
purchase a squadron of F-16s under the Peace Bima Sena programme, with plans to 
purchase up to 64 aircraft.70 The procurement contract of eight single-seater F-16 
block A and four dual-seater F-16 block B was valued at USD 337 million to be 
delivered throughout 1989-1990. Habibie demanded 35 percent offset in the form of 
local production of airframe parts to be used for worldwide export. The offset length 
was 10 years, covering the manufacture of 200 shipsets of Flaperon, Vertical 
Stabiliser Skins, and Doors.71 This arrangement was crafted in such a way that it will 
not impact on the main procurement contract. The programme was undertaken in 
several stages, commencing with training and technical assistance provided by 
General Dynamics. The assembly was initially undertaken in the General Dynamics 
facility in the US, where Indonesian workers assembled detailed parts of the first 20 
sets.72 After this, assembly of the rest of the sets was conducted in a subcontractor 
division of PT IPTN in Bandung.  
What were the principal impacts of this offset programme to PT IPTN/PT DI when 
measured against this study’s six metrics? Arguably the offset did not contribute 
significantly to new job recruitment or job maintenance because at the time, PT DI 
was embarking on a massive recruitment campaign. It was possible that the offset 
programme was used to provide work for the employees to justify industrial 
enlargement, and not the other way around. However, as the company managed to 
agree sales contracts, for example, from Airbus and Boeing, in addition to indigenous 
programmes -such as the CN-235 and CN-250- the offset programme was viewed as 
a distraction.73 This might also be due to the fact that fighter jet technology was very 
different to commercial aircraft manufactured in the company.74 
In terms of skill enhancement, the offset work represented 800,000 man-hours in the 
manufacturing of military aircraft components - a brand new area for PT IPTN.75 The 
company learned the basics of advanced structure composite manufacturing 
technologies76, and as consequence gained the ability to manufacture six types of 
component, consisting of 3,476 units of FEAD LH, FEAD RH, Fuel Pylons, Weapon 
pylons, vertical fin skins, wing flaperons, and main landing gear doors.77 The pylon 
work was seen as one of the toughest challenges the company had ever come 
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across.78 It was not clear what was the cost of learning this new technology and who 
bore the financial burden.  
Fieldwork research yields various explanations as to the impact of this offset 
programme.79 However, it needs to be stated at the outset that it is unclear whether 
IPTN had succeeded to meet the quality standards of General Dynamics and 
whether the programme was actually even concluded80. It is possible that the the 
programme was only fulfilled through provision of training from General 
Dynamics.81 Another version would be that the programme was successful. Habibie 
claimed to have mastered manufacturing of spares for sophisticated jet fighters, 
particularly in composite technology, and offered the technology to Russia in his 
efforts to negotiate offset in the procurement of Su-30s.82 Apparently, though, the 
technology is yet to be applied to the Russian fighter jet. The objective was to get PT 
IPTN qualified as a bidder to supply on the Sukhoi airframe. This bold offer signified 
Habibie’s confidence in the ability of his company on fighter jet airframe 
manufacturing. 
Apart from the vagueness of the success of PT IPTN in manufacturing fighter jet 
components, whatever benefits came out of the offset programme proved 
unsustainable. For example, jigs and tools associated with the manufacture process 
of F-16 components were abandoned, because no other orders followed.83 Political 
issues played a role in aborting further procurement. In 1996, the government tried 
to negotiate a further procurement of up to 11 F-16s initially designated for Pakistan, 
via a low interest loan and offset of 30 percent of the price.84 However, US concerns 
regarding alleged human rights abuses in Indonesia led to a tortuous Congressional 
process in approving this sale.85 The following year saw Soeharto’s frustration with 
the US end in a decision to withdraw the demand for F-16s as well as Indonesia’s 
participation in the international military education and training program (IMET).86 
As bilateral relations of the two countries took a new low, Indonesia decided to 
diversify procurement of fighter jets by buying from Russia. This move arguably 
severed any possibility of further cooperation between PT IPTN and General 
Dynamics.  
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Sub-Case Study Two: the KT-1B Offset Programme 
Offset pertaining to KT-1B Wong Bee was the first in the aftermath of the 1997 
economic crisis that devastated Indonesia’s strategic industries. Efforts to settle the 
country’s debt of IDR 3.8 trillion led to the massive dismissal of 12,000 workers and a 
number of directors.87 The following years saw the company battling against strikes 
that slashed its productivity. Again in 2004, further restructuring reduced 
employment from 9,670 to 3,720.88 PT DI hit rock bottom in 2007 when the business 
court in South Jakarta issued a verdict of bankruptcy. Problem after problem 
throughout the early 2000s effectively wiped out remnants of the company’s glorious 
past. The company had no option but to reinvent itself, renamed as PT 
DIRGANTARA (PT DI), and abort ambitious indigenous programmes, including the 
N-250 and N-2130. Regardless, the company still retained its competitiveness and 
managed to secure orders for aircraft components from Airbus as well as other 
commercial and military aircraft companies from several countries. 
The only offset received by PT DI under the second offset development stage was 
through procurement of South Korean KT-1B Wong Bees since 2003. The aircraft is a 
single engine turboprop that can be used for both basic trainer and light attack 
missions. It has been indigenously built by Korea since 1988, to meet the 
requirements of the country’s air force. KAI received its first order for 85 aircraft in 
1999, which was delivered through 2000-2002.89 One year later, KAI managed to sell 
seven aircraft to the Indonesian air force acrobatic team Jupiter.  
Indonesia procured 18 KT-1B Wong Bee trainers in two batches through 2003-2008. 
The first procurement of seven aircraft with spares was valued at USD 60 million, 
followed by another order for ten aircraft in 2006.90 Offset was given to PT DI in the 
form of final assembly of 9 (nine) aircraft, familiarisation or modification of 2 (two) 
aircraft previously assembled in Korea, and collaboration on 1 (one) aircraft. The 
programme brought in work valued at USD 2.1 million or less than 5 percent of 
procurement contract value.91 This offset is anecdotally described as a ‘taken for 
granted’ project, meaning that PT DI was not only excluded in the negotiations but 
also was not in a position to decline the work.92 
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The offset programme consisted of several stages.93 The activity endured for seven 
years (2005-2012), longer than agreed. The first stage was the familiarisation stage, 
whereby two staff of PT DI were sent to the KAI factory in South Korea, sat in a 
classroom, and witnessed first-hand the process of aircraft manufacture - all in less 
than a week. Subsequently, a team from KAI was dispatched to Bandung to conduct 
an audit of the company’s technological capability and facilities such as the hangar 
and painting workshop. The audit concluded that PT DI met the standard of KAI 
and therefore assembly could be done without difficulty. KAI provided all the 
materials related to the assembly jobs including the tools to be used in Bandung.  
The contribution of this programme to employment in PT DI was insignificant. Less 
than ten people were involved in the manufacturing process, approximately 0.3 
percent of the overall employment in PT DI at the time. The programme also fell 
short in its contribution to skill upgrades. While PT DI learned the basics of 
advanced trainer final assembly, including that relating to ejection seat and canopy, 
such skills were not significantly value adding because the technology was perceived 
as inferior to the existing capability of PT DI. No technical assistance was required to 
oversee the work, but Korea placed a supervisor throughout the assembly process in 
Bandung.94 Most of the tools required for the work were common tools, readily 
available in PT DI. Special tools, for example tools to fit the Hartzell four-blade 
aluminium propeller, were provided by KAI and immediately taken back when the 
programme concluded. One notable contribution of this programme was the 
discipline of workers in PT DI. Apparently the assembly work was undertaken in the 
same hangar with other programmes. The strict discipline of the Koreas 
strengthened the work culture work in the hangar, and permeated across the 
different different activities outside the Korean offset programme. 
The programme also did not contribute to the creation of any supply chains, 
primarily because the Koreans supplied all the materials.  This arguably contributed 
to the tortuous progress of the programme. PT DI claimed to be able to finish 
assembly of one aircraft in less than a month; hence assembly of nine aircraft could 
have been done in less than a year. The fact that the programme stretched to seven 
years had more to do with the delay in material provision from Korea than any local 
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deficiences. PT DI indicate that there was no problem in manufacturing components 
for the aircraft, dependent on the the Koreans providing the drawings.  
Another part of the offset programme was the modification of the two KT-1B aircraft 
previously assembled in Korea. The aircraft were grounded at the Adi Sucipto air 
force base, hence PT DI had to dispatch its staff to Jogjakarta. The work began with a 
one-day session during which PT DI staff were introduced to the tools and 
operational guidelines of the KT-1B. The overall modification was concluded within 
20 days. All work under this programme was performed for KT-1B, and purchased 
by the Indonesian Air Force, and no export was recorded.  
As in the case of offset in the F-16 programme, any benefits from this offset were also 
not sustainable. There was no contact whatsoever between PT DI and KAI on further 
collaboration on the KT-1B, despite the success of the Koreans in exporting around 
40 aircraft worth USD 400 million to Turkey in 2007 and the 60 KT-1s to the Indian 
Air Force in 2010.95  Survey respondents acknowledged that the Indonesian offset 
programme did not include any clause for maintenance work to be done at PT DI. 
Even if there was, the value would not have been significant. Indonesia did not 
pursue procurement of more KT-1Bs, instead chose Brazil’s Embraer EMB-314 Super 
Tocano – an aircraft with a similar design to the KT-1B, including counter insurgency 
capability.    
Further collaboration was made possible when Indonesia purchased 16 T-15 Golden 
Eagle trainer aircraft from KAI in 2011. The Koreans offered offset similar to that on 
the KT-1B, but this time allowing detailed drawings of the parts of the aircraft, such 
as the engel and certain brackets, to be manufactured domestically. PT DI turned 
down the offer, arguing that it was not worth the necessary investment. Senior 
executives of KAI stated that although KAI want to expand its footprint in Indonesia, 
the small sales volume meant that it was uneconomical to do so.96 Furthermore, PT 
DI was beginning to be swamped by orders for aircraft both from domestic and 
foreign customers. PT DI and KAI have had further collaboration in the form of the 
KFX/IFX 4.5 fighter jet that commenced in 2011. 
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Sub-Case Study Three: the CN-295 Offset Programme 
Entering 2010, PT DI managed to escape the worst and was back on its feet again, 
enjoying the full support of government. Sales were strong and the company’s 
organisational structure reflected its business, with five divisions providing the 
manufacture of tooling and aircraft components for Airbus (A380/ 
A320/A321/A340/A350), Boeing (B-747/B-777/B-787), Eurocopter (EC225/EC725), 
and Airbus Military (C212-400, CN 235), assembly and the integration of CN235-220, 
NC212-200, NBO-105 helicopter, Bell-412 helicopter, NAS0332C1 helicopters. 97 
Furthermore, the company also provided integrated logistic support and customer 
support, maintenance, repair, and overhaul, as well as alterations for inhouse  and 
foreign products, spares support and commercial airline business.  
As a leading technology company, PT DI had been consistent in pursuing new 
technology ventures whilst suffering from a lack of adequate funding. Its R&D 
division employed around 600 people whilst most of the R&D budget came from 
profit - which recorded a tenfold increase between 2007 and 2008 as well as a tripling 
from 2009 to 2010.98 PT DI employed a three-pronged strategy: acquisition of foreign 
technology as in the case of C-295 (2012), indigenous R&D in developing the N-219 
small transport aircraft with LAPAN, and joint development of the KFX/IFX fighter 
jet with South Korea (2012-). R&D collaborations were running with at least nine 
partners from various government institutions, including the armed forces, BPPT, 
LAPAN, and other strategic industries. Throughout 2006-2010, PT DI had six R&D 
programmes, three linked to the new variant of the CN235 (Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
version for the Indonesian Navy, antisubmarine warfare for Turkey, and Maritime 
Patrol Aircraft for the Korean Coast Guard), the indigenous missile Rhan 122 in 
cooperation with LAPAN, and the conceptual and preliminary design of the N-219; 
the latter two were made possible with government financial support.  
Recently, however, the company has faced several challenges. By 2011, PT DI 
recorded employment of 4,196 people - only 67 percent of which were full time staff- 
with expertise on production, engineering, and management.99 Human resources 
were a major problem for PT DI because 42.16 percent of workers would enter 
retirement within one to five years.100  The company admitted difficulties in new 
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recruitment - due to the lack of competitiveness in offering incentives to the top 
graduates - and skill upgrading. There was a plan to regenerate and manage human 
resources to optimise productivity and ensure continuity of expertise in aircraft 
design and manufacture. The company also recorded problems with infrastructure 
and facilities, most of which have been around for 20-30 years or more. The aging 
facilities rendered low efficiency, ranging from between 50 to 80 percent, compared 
to new facilities; as a consequence, PT DI’s manufacturing capacity is limited to 12 
fixed-wing aircraft per year.101 
To address the aforementioned problem, PT DI plans a restructuring and 
revitalisation programme (PR) at IDR 1.1 trillion for the next five years, equal to 
approximately 7-8 percent of total income projection.102 In July 2011 PT DI signed a 
strategic collaboration agreement with PT PPA and Airbus Military, which includes 
an 18 month recovery plan to upgrade the company’s process, engineering, 
marketing and MRO capabilities, with the technology to build and market C-295 
medium transport aircraft. The C-295 is a stretched version of the CN-235, initially 
produced in 1998, and now operated by South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand.103 
Airbus is no stranger to PT DI as both companies have had a good relationship for 
more than 30 years, which included co-design and co-production of the 
commercially successful CN-235.104 PT DI has been the supplier of the inboard outer 
fixed landing edge (IOFLE) wing assembly for the Airbus A380 since 2002. 
The above agreement preconditioned the Indonesian government to procure the 
aircraft. In 2012, PT DI and Airbus Military agreed a government contract to replace 
the aging Fokker-27 – the workhorse of domestic flights that has suffered many 
accidents. The contract was valued at approximately USD 252 million with an offset 
clause valued around 30 percent.105 Former Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro 
proclaimed the benefits expected from this programme: 106  additional capability, 
workload, and technology transfer to the defence industry; the absorption of 2,000 
workers - almost half of the current employment in PT DI; the diversification of new 
products for the Asia Pacific market; and the generation of financial and 
management benefits to boost the performance and competitiveness of PT DI in the 
region. C-295 was renamed CN-295 to reflect the collaborative venture between PT 
DI and Airbus Military. 
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The offset work consisted of 5 (five) programmes: (1) aero structure; (2) manufacture 
of rear fuselage; (3) delivery centre; (4) skills enhancement; (5) service centre/MRO. 
Starting from mid-2012, Airbus Military dispatched experts, tooling and machinery, 
as well as IT systems, to improve the efficiency of production systems in PT DI.107 
The overall programme was expected to last 12 years. Programme three, the delivery 
centre, was prioritised due to the obligation to meet the user’s demands. By mid-
2014, PT DI had concluded delivery of five out of the nine aircraft. The work, 
included assembly, functional checking, painting, interior fitting and last flight-line 
check, was valued at USD 7.4 million with Airbus Military providing the ground 
equipment for the flight-line.108 
The first programme, aero structure, necessitated PT DI to manufacture the 
emphenage of the aircraft with a total value of USD 53 million, valued at USD 
500,000 per piece. 109  For this, the company also received intangible technology 
transfer in the form of methods of production and technical assistance worth USD 3.4 
million, and approximately USD 31 million will be reimbursed in cash for the 
payment of work packages.110  The second programme, rear fuselage, necessitates PT 
DI to manufacture components valued at USD 40 million over a 12-year period. 
Airbus Military would provide equipment worth USD 12.8 million for this 
programme. PT DI dropped the production of the skin, believed thathigh investment 
required for chemical millingwas uneconomical.    
The CN-295 programme holds a vital role as the vehicle for restructuring PT DI. The 
programme is expected to contribute significantly to addition workloads and skill 
enhancement. Assembly of the aircraft would require 120,000 man hours per unit, 
with every hour valued at around USD 25. 111  Employment created by this 
programme is hard to measure, as the company is embarking on a massive 
replacement of the aging workforce at the same time. Skill enhancement is expected 
to materialise in the form of computer-based training for the inservice programme, 
valued at USD 8 million.112 Airbus Military will provide the equipment and license 
worth USD 6.7 million, whereas PT DI is only required to provide the building in 
Bandung.113 PT DI will be given more than USD 400,000 to provide the training for 
Airbus Military for four years.114 
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Technology transfer is expected to prepare PT DI to become the maintenance centre 
of the CN-295. It is estimated that heavy maintenance will be required five years after 
sales. For that purpose, Airbus Military will provide the copy of procedures and 
international standards to support quality management services. As for supply chain 
management, it will be a daunting task to create a domestic supply chain to support 
PT DI, due to the high quality requirements requirements of the aircraft industry. In 
terms of export, PT DI and Airbus Military are still negotiating on the terms of the 
agreement to address this sensitive commercial issue. 
Table 5.4 Selected Offset Programmes in PT IPTN/DI 
No Programme 12 F-16 KT-1B CN-295 
1 Stage Stage One Stage Two Stage Three  
2 Type of offset Direct  Direct  Direct and indirect 
3 Scope of offset 
programme 
Training, 
assembly, 
manufacture six 
types of 
components  
Training, 
assembly 
Training, 
manufacture 
(empennage, rear 
fuselage), 
restructuration, 
delivery centre, 
technology transfer  
4 Source of 
Technology 
General 
Dynamics, USA 
Korean 
Aerospace 
Industry, South 
Korea  
Airbus Military, 
Spain  
5 Length of 
programme  
(1989-) 
Approx. 5 years 
(2003-) 
Less than a year  
(2012-) 
12 years  
6 No of 
employment, 
job maintained  
No  No  N/A 
7 Skills Yes  Yes  Yes  
8 Transfer of 
technology 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
9 Supply chain 
creation 
No No N/A 
10 Export Yes No Possibly 
11 R&D No No No 
12 Post contract 
relations 
No No N/A  
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
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5.4.2 Sectoral Case Study: Land systems and Ammunition 
There were seven offset programmes granted to PT Pindad through arms 
procurement through 1988-2014. PT Pindad received two offset programmes during 
the first offset stage, one offset programme during the second offset stage, and four 
offset programmes during the third offset stage. In addition to this, PT Pindad also 
received offsets from commercial procurements, such as license production of 
generators from Siemens Germany, which secured exports to Africa in 1996. For this 
research, three sub-case studies have been selected: the Scorpion light tank from the 
UK company, Alvis, the Tarantula IFV from South Korea’s Doosan, and the French 
Nexter company’s Caesar Howitzer. Offset in the procurement of the scorpion light 
tank arguably laid the foundation for capability in the armed vehicle sector. The 
second case involving Tarantula IFV was the only offset received by Pindad during 
the second stage of offset that happened to be also related to vehicle manufacturing. 
The last sub-case study involves French howitzer providing the first opportunity to 
manufacture indigenous armed vehicles as a subcontractor to a foreign vendor, 
paving the way for quality improvements and international marketing. 
Sub-Case Study One: the Scorpion Light Tank Offset Programme 
Although Pindad was originally a defence company, it was appointed as a strategic 
industry with a dual-use portfolio in 1983. As with other strategic industries, 
Pindad’s technological ability had been built upon industrial cooperation that 
included offset and license production. PT Pindad enjoyed licences to produce the 
Fusil Nouveau Type Carabine (FNC) assault rifle from Fabrique Nationale de Herstal 
(FN) Belgium in 1983. This purchase had given Pindad the capability for 
modification and indigenous design of the local acclimated version of the FNC 
dubbed Senapan Serbu or SS, that later was used as the standard assault rifle for the 
Indonesian armed forces in 1991. Other industrial cooperation on light ammunition 
was conducted with Salgaduk. 
Pindad’s commercial leg began when the company was designated to become a 
supplier of machine tools in 1984. 115  License production was conducted with 
Germany’s Siemens for generators, Taiwan’s YAM and Yeong Chin for machine 
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tools, and casting products for Thyssen RH Germany.116 Pindad formed several joint 
ventures, among others with Siemens for fabricating various high precision 
industrial components, with Lucas Industries PLC for auto and aerospace systems 
manufacture117, and with MANN for gas turbines118. Cooperation with Lucas was 
aimed to supply the needs of high precision aircraft components for IPTN, such as 
flap controls for aircraft wings and tails, flight and control systems and power 
systems. 119  Furthermore, the JV also aimed at providing components for the 
automotive industry to support the national car programme. By 1997, PT Pindad also 
acted as a key supplier to the locomotive industry, by manufacturing gear cases and 
brakes.120 The company’s competitiveness in international markets was proven by the 
export of 6,100 rail fastenings to Belgium in 1996.121  
Perhaps of the three strategic industries, Pindad has been the less privileged when it 
comes to government attention and support for arms production. Indeed the policy 
at the time was for Pindad to spend 20 percent of its capacity for arms production 
and 80 percent for commercial production during peacetime.122 In 1988, PT Pindad 
experienced production capacity expansion problems and cash flow difficulties due 
to limited capital injection and late payments by the government, while the 
company’s requirement for capital insertion of IDR 1,3 trillion was only 50% 
approved, in the form of equity investment.123 Low capital affected the company’s 
production capacity, which could only achieve 70 million out of 120 million bullets 
for the armed forces requirements per year. 124  The company failed to triple its 
production capacity and as consequence failed to seize the opportunity of meeting 
demand from the domestic market and further penetrating the export market.  
When Indonesia procured 35 Scorpion light tanks from Avis UK (1995-1998), it was 
agreed that the offset would be in the form of assembly work.125 The procurement 
itself was surrounded by controversy, with the involvement of the then President’s 
daughter as the third party and allegations of illegal mark up.126 A survey respondent 
said that this offset actually did not match with the core expertise of Pindad at the 
time, which was manufacturing high precision technology.127 It was the army as the 
user that negotiated the offset for the assembly of the light tank, albeit that the 
programme was located at Pindad, given the availability of suitable facilities and 
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tools.128 As a consequence, the company struggled to allocate sufficient workers to 
service the needs of the offset programme.129 
Around 20 staff from the various divisions were mobilised to participate in the 
training and assembling process of the 10 (ten) light tanks. Avis provided 3 (three) 
staff for technical assistance for a month, directing Pindad in establishing the 
necessary facilities and providing special tools.130 In order to optimise the learning 
process, Pindad devised a strategy to assign not just technicians, but engineers and 
trained workers, in the assembling process. The partnership with Avis did not last 
long because the company was later dissolved.  
Offset from Alvis proved to have a sustainable impact, though it is difficult to pin 
down the extent of it in the midst of other variables that also contributed to the 
development of indigenous capability in manufacturing military vehicles. 
Development of indigenous armoured personnel carriers (APC) was facilitated by 
the British embargo on the use of the Scorpion light tank in the Aceh conflict in 2004. 
Indonesia immediately withdraw the 36 Scorpions and rushed the experimental 
Pindad-made light armoured personnel carriers.131 Those involved in the Scorpion 
offset programme became the engineers and designers of the indigenous six-wheeler 
APC, which was developed in cooperation with BPPT throughout 2002-2003132 and 
received certification from the army in 2006.  
Pindad received its first order in 2007 directly from the hand of the then Vice 
President Jusuf Kalla133. Mass production of the indigenous APC - dubbed ‘Anoa’ - 
was started in 2008-2009 to meet the requirements of Indonesia’s Garuda 
peacekeeping battalion in Lebanon. The vehicle successfully attracted attention from 
international buyers, such as Brunei and Timor Leste that had ordered 15 and 4 
(four) respectively.134 By 2011, the production line employed 187 people and had 
manufactured more than 150 of these vehicles in several variants such as command, 
logistics, ambulance, reconnaissance and amphibious.135 Further development of the 
light-medium tank has been the priority for Pindad’s R&D programme.  
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Sub-Case Study Two: the Tarantula Infantry Fighting Vehicle Offset Programme 
Similar to other strategic industry companies, Pindad was not spared from the 1997 
economic crisis. After posting debt of IDR 25 billion in 1997, PT PINDAD shifted its 
focus to the production of machine tools for commercial market in order to 
survive.136 The company faced aging human resources, obsolete facilities, and a lack 
of working capital. Even with overcapacity in the manufacturing of munitions due to 
inoperability of some facilities, Pindad could only produce 70 million out of 120 
million bullets required by the armed forces annually.137 In 2007, Pindad reduced its 
workforce to 1,546.138 
The much needed government support started slowly in 2001 when the government 
obligated domestic arms procurement to dampen the increasingly felt impact of the 
arms embargo. Pindad received orders from the armed forces and police for 
ammunition and rifles, especially for military operations in Aceh province. The 
continuous demand for arms enabled Pindad to gain the necessary experience and 
feedback from the user so critical for improving its products.  
Pindad also continued with R&D activity even when the company was not in a 
position to dedicate financial resource to do so.139 Because Pindad’s market is mostly 
domestic, it chose to develop a number of variants that targete domestic needs, 
especially the armed forces. Among the strategies used for developing new products 
was reverse engineering and strategic alliances. For example, the first personnel 
carrier manufactured in 2004, dubbed the APR-IV 4x4, was built on the chassis from 
a commercial truck.140  Pindad also joined a consortium to develop a national guided 
missile with LAPAN and the Navy, with government providing the R&D funds 
throughout 2005-2007.141 Across 2001-2007 the company recorded three patents for 
ammunition, railway components, and rubber tracked vehicles. 142  The notable 
achievement under this period was in 2005 when the armed forces welcomed the 
newly launched SS2 V1 rifle with orders for 15,000 pieces to replace the rifles then 
currently used 143  and in 2007 when the then Indonesian Vice President directly 
placed an order for 150 Anoa armoured personnel carriers. 
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The armoured vehicle sector has been an area of concern due to the high level of 
dependency on foreign supply: 90 percent of armoured tanks used in Indonesia are 
imported. 144  Pindad’s roadmap for armoured vehicles was already laid down, 
targeted at producing an amphibious cannon tank by 2013. In the absence of clear 
long-term procurement plans for armoured vehicles that guarantee future orders, 
Pindad had a difficult time to push the plan further. After the success with Anoa, the 
company’s attempts to pursue development of a cannon panzer practically ceased.145 
The procurement of 22 Tarantula 6x6 Armoured Fire Support Vehicles (AFSV) from 
South Korea in 2009 was used to fill the gap in the indigenous development of a 
cannon panzer that Pindad had not been able to accomplish with its Anoa. However, 
this objective was hardly met when Pindad was only invited to the negotiation table 
after the procurement deal was signed.  
In 2011 Pindad and Busan Ltd signed an agreement that specified a Korean 
obligation to deliver 11 units of the Tarantula to Indonesia in the form of semi 
knocked down kits, to be assembled in Pindad. South Korea’s Doosan DST built the 
Tarantula using the design of the Black Box 6x6 IFV, which was claimed to be 
competitive against Turkish and Russian products in terms of performance and 
price.146  The offset programme engaged approximately 30 people from the special 
vehicle division in Pindad. Engineers, operators, and management were dispatched 
to South Korea for 1.5 months of training. No special preparation was required, as 
the assembly used standard tools already available in Pindad. The assembly process 
was concluded in less than three months under the supervision of South Korean 
staff. Because the Koreans sent the material in semi-knocked down form, Pindad 
encountered no major issues in finishing the assembly. As a consequence, though, 
there is also no significant value adding, whatsoever. From this programme, Pindad 
claimed to only learn about Korea’s work ethos and English language skills.147 No 
further relationships were reported between the two companies. 
Sub-Case Study Three: the Caesar Howitzer and Mistral Offset Programme 
By 2010, PT Pindad has successfully developed and diversified military products and 
services that included assault rifles, small calibre munitions, hand grenades, bombs, 
tactical vehicles and fighting vehicles 4x4 and 6x6x, hence the company enjoyed 
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strong growth in profit and sales to both domestic and foreign customers.148 The 
company also came out with innovations in the form of new variants of assault rifles, 
armoured personnel carriers, tactical vehicles, munitions, and mortars.149 
Despite Pindad being in a much better position, old problems still lingered in the 
company. Aging human resources - most of the company’s workforce of 2,326 in 
2011 were more than 40 years old and most were not highly educated – also there 
were obsolete facilities - most aged between 18-26 years old - posed fundamental 
problems in addition to the lack of working capital. 150  Gradual revitalisation 
occurred, starting in 2010 Pindad allocated IDR 150 billion to procure new machinery 
from Germany and France.  The company also had a high dependency on foreign 
supply chains. In munitions production, for instance, 80 percent of raw material was 
imported from Belgium, India and Taiwan.151 
Among the new products developed was a tactical vehicle of 0.75 tonnes 4x4, which 
was Pindad’s answer to a challenge thrown by the then President Yudhoyono in 
2011.152 Around 28 staff were involved in the design and production process of a 
prototype named “Komodo”- a dragon-like lizard only found in one Indonesian 
island - was introduced at the Indonesian defence expo 2012. So far, the police mobile 
brigade, Special Forces, and the amphibious surveillance battalion have used small 
numbers of the Komodo.  
Offsets pertaining to the procurement of the Caesar Howitzer and Mistral Anti Air 
Defence are unique in the sense that both programmes have been used to support the 
improvement of the indigenously made Komodo. In 2013, the Indonesian army 
procured 37 Caesar Howitzer 155 cannon and its ammunition from the French 
company Nexter for USD 108 million. The purpose was to equip Army Land 
Artillery with two battalions of 155mm calibre cannon with a 39 km range. Delivery 
has been divided into three stages: the first four units were sent in July 2013, 15 units 
in March 2014, and the rest in September 2015. The Indonesian MoD set a 
precondition for procurement of the howitzer, which was that the Nexter had to 
utilise domestic made Komodos as the platform.  
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Offset involving Nexter and Pindad has been quite exceptional compared to other 
offset programmes. First, Nexter had approached Pindad for collaboration even 
before the procurement contract was decided. Apparently, Nexter had familiarised 
itself with Indonesia’s recent offset policy in 2012 and decided to take the first step in 
identifying a potential partner. This is quite the contrary of what other foreign 
suppliers had done, which is bordering on ignoring the offset obligation.153 Secondly, 
Nexter, formerly known as Giat, had previous cooperation agreementswith Pindad 
in the development of the Anoa APS. Giat was the manufacturer of the VAB Panzer 
Indonesia procured for supporting the Garuda Contingent in the Lebanon PKO 
Mission in 2007. When the government subsequently decided to procure an 
indigenous panzer, Giat supplied the engine to power Anoa. The cooperation ended 
when two companies competed in the procurement bid for Malaysia. Nexter later 
overcame this estrangement from Pindad in order to win the procurement contract 
for Caesar Howitzer from the government of Indonesia.  
The offset agreement in Caesar Howitzer was therefore a result of business-to-
business negotiations. In this case, Pindad was positioned as a subcontractor to 
Nexter, supplying the supporting platform. Design of this platform was based on the 
Komodo and adjusted to the specific requirements of Indonesian army. Initial 
drawings and technical assistance were provided by Nexter, which helped Pindad to 
create its own design to accommodate the army. Nexter also provided technology 
related to integration of launching command and weather reports, hardware and 
software, as well as the tools unavailable in Pindad. These tools include electrostatic 
meters for testing. Nexter also provided guidance for integrating the sensor 
technology. The overall process was concluded in less than a year. 
Offset pertaining to the Mistral has been been conducted in the same manner as that 
for the Caesar Howitzer. MBDA had been aware of the offset mandatory 
requirement, and hence approached Pindad to be the potential partner to provide 
‘local content’. The two companies agreed to involve Pindad in the procurement 
programme through the manufacture of 56 Komodos and integration work. While no 
training was given, Nexter provided the tools for designing as well as technical 
assistance for the integration work. The programme began with joint design and the 
formulation of a matrix of compliance, which contained specifications adjusted to the 
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criteria of the user.  After that, the Technical Data Package (TDP) was given to Nexter 
for verification of design to comply with the contract. The TDP includes a 
management plan that specifies the quality standard with respect to how the product 
must be manufactured (production process) and risk analysis. The production 
process was planned for three years (2014-2017). One major sore point in the 
programme was the value of offset. The fact that MBDA values 56 Komodo equal to 
four of its own Sherpas APV speaks volumes on the value it put on local capability.  
In terms of employment, the offset programme pertaining to the Komodo might not 
be significant. The overall programme involved 60 people from two different 
production lines at the Pindad workshop in Bandung. In terms of skill enhancement 
and technology transfer, the contribution of these programmes is more prominent. 
Pindad acknowledged that its French counterpart had been tough during offset 
negotiations and insisted on high quality production, but because of this rigour, the 
company had learnt a number of lessons. First, the company was able to 
manufacture armoured vehicles at better quality - even surpassing thatdemanded by 
the Indonesian MoD. The fact that MBDA had acted as the first customer to Pindad 
means the company had to pass international standards From this, Pindad learnt the 
testing methods that are standard practice in the European Union.154 The overall 
programme was delayed for three months due to the verification process required by 
MBDA, such as design verification and testing that were held in France. Second, 
there was a significant amount of technology transfer. For example, Pindad learned 
the proper method of risk analysis and the integration of various sub-systems from 
MBDA. 
The offset programme also contributed to the development of Komodo because it 
began as a prototype and along the way was developed into a number of operational 
variants. In terms of the supply chain, Komodo production still depended on foreign 
technology.  The vehicle has not passed the local content certification, which means 
domestic contribution to the production is below 40 percent of the overall value 
chain. Local supply chains are ready to support its monocoque body and interior, 
such as bulletproof glass and brackets, but high value components and sub systems, 
such as the engine and transmission are still imported. Since both Nexter and MBDA 
offset programmes are still a work in progress, it is difficult to judge the 
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sustainability of the programme. Nevertheless, there has been talk between Pindad 
and Nexter on potential exports to Vietnam. Unfortunately the same thing has not 
occurred yet with MBDA, possibly because Komodo failed to pass the test run by the 
French Ministry of Defence in France.155 
Table 5.5 Selected Offset Programmes in PT Pindad 
No Programme Scorpion Light 
Tank 
Tarantula IFV Caesar Howitzer 
1 Stage Stage One Stage Two Stage Three  
2 Type of offset Direct  Direct  Direct  
3 Scope of 
offset 
programme 
Training, assembly  Training, assembly Integration, 
maintenance, joint 
production of 
ammunition  
4 Source of 
Technology 
Alvis, UK  Doosan, South 
Korea  
Nexter, France and 
MBDA, France 
5 Length of 
programme  
N/A Less than a year 
(2003-2004) 
One year (2013-
2015) and three 
year (2014-2017) 
6 No of 
employment, 
job 
maintained  
Yes  No  No  
7 Skills Yes   Yes  Yes  
8 Transfer of 
technology 
Yes  Yes  Yes. 
9 Supply chain 
creation 
Yes No Yes 
10 Export No No Possibly 
11 R&D No No No 
12 Post contract 
relations 
No No N/A 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
 
5.4.3 Sectoral Case Study: Maritime 
There were five offset programmes undertaken by PT Pal linked to arms 
procurement across 1988-2014. PT Pal managed two offset programmes during the 
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first offset Stage, one during the second offset stage, and two during the third offset 
stage. In addition, PT Pal also received offset from commercial procurements.  
For this research, three sub-case studies have been selected: the Fast Patrol Boat 57 
from Germany’s Friedrich Lurssen Werf-Bremen, the Landing Platform Dock from 
South Korea’s Dae Sun, and The Netherlands’ Damen Guided Missile Destroyer 
Escort. Offset pertaining to the FPB 57 was the first to be associated with PT Pal in 
the production of warships. This programme had created the foundations of warship 
manufacturing capability in the company. Offset pertaining to the LPD was the only 
offset received during the second offset stage. However, offset in the PKR 
programme was not the only one in the third offset stage, as there was also the 
submarine programme that has been agreed but not yet begun. This offset is 
important because it aims to set a new standard in warship production in the 
company, especially in the manufacture of corvettes that will become the backbone 
of Indonesia’s navy.  
Sub-Case Study One: The Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) 57 Offset Programme  
Under the first offset stage, PT Pal had been lavished with license production and 
cooperation both in commercial and war ship production. The company started with 
a maintenance business, then moved to shipbuilding and general engineering. The 
foundations of commercial shipbuilding were laid through license-production of 
3000-5000 DWT cargo ships and passenger ships, such as Caraka Jaya, Palwo Buwono, 
and Pax 500. For warship production, PT PAL received at least two offset projects - 
all in the form of license production - from the procurement contract relating to the 
Fast Patrol Boat 28m and 57m.   
In the procurement of FPB-57 (1988-1995), PT PAL was appointed as the main 
contractor to license produce the craft from Friedrich Lurssen Werf-Bremen (FLW) of 
Germany. PT PAL was obliged to pay a license fee equal to 2.5 percent from the 
value of work – not the value of the procurement contract - to build 12 ships.156 Being 
the main contractor meant holding considerable amounts of authority to determine 
issues associated with procurement and the choice and role of subcontractors. This is 
the preferred position of a company when receiving offset.157 
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More than 100 staff from design, production, and management was sent for training 
in Germany in several batches.158 The training was conducted in parallel with the 
production activity. FLW provided technical assistance that gradually reduced from 
20 to four people throughout the offset programme, which lasted more than two 
years. Technology transfer was undertaken meticulously in three steps: PT PAL 
assembled the first ship, co-produced the second, and built the third and subsequent 
ships completely in its own yard. Ship production, however, was another matter; it 
stretched into an extended period of years: eight units were delivered throughout 
1988-1995 and four units were delivered throughout 2000-2004.159 This long period 
was caused by stopgap government orders and the 1997 crisis. 
This offset programmes has been hailed as a success story in laying down the basic 
capability for warship production in PT Pal. Through this offset PT PAL gained the 
essential capability to produce 12 57-meter long fast patrol boats for the Indonesian 
Navy, one of which was successfully modified to deploy Chinese missiles.160 This 
capability was then used to design a 60-meter long indigenous patrol boat, produced 
for the Indonesian Navy in 2014.161 No continuation was reported in the partnership 
with Friedrich Lurssen Werf afterwards, one reason being the Indonesian Navy’s 
resentment towards Germany for its part in the military embargo.162 
Sub-Case Study Two: The Landing Platform Dock Offset Programme 
The second offset stage is best described as the most turbulent time for Pal, as it went 
from a healthy company in 1998 to one of the unhealthiest state-owned companies in 
2010.163 Production in the shipbuilding industry was hampered by budget reductions 
after the 1997 financial crisis. No orders from the government meant closing down 
warship production and relying on commercial shipbuilding, general engineering, 
and MRO to survive. While the world experienced declining charter rates following 
the 1997 economic crisis, PAL’s competitiveness in the international market 
surprisingly rose, evidenced by the rise of export sales from 30 percent in 1998 to 43 
percent income in 2010.164 The company was fully booked with commercial work 
until 2009. However, a negative cash flow continued throughout 2005-2010165 making 
it difficult to access working capital and to maintain top-notch human resources and 
facilities.166 The company’s negative cash flow - due to customer late payments, 
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predominantly the Ministry of Defence167 - rendered the company ‘unbankable’, a 
status that effectively prevented it from working on new orders. Against this gloomy 
background, offset pertaining to the procurement of four Landing Platform Docks 
from South Korea’s DSME Daewoo looked a blessing for PAL in bringing its warship 
division alive again.   
Landing Platform Docks (LPD) have emerged as key military items for Southeast 
Asian navies, providing capability to transport troops and goods for both combat 
and non-combat missions. The LPD also has the capability to carry and operate 
landing craft and helicopters. Indonesia ordered Makassar Class LPDs that were 
designed and manufactured by Daesun Shipbuilding and Engineering Co of South 
Korea. DSME Daewoo International, a trading company assisted the Indonesian 
government in purchasing naval equipment from South Korea, and also handled the 
marketing. All communication exchanges took place between PAL and Daewoo, not 
directly with the Korean shipyard. This arrangement proved to be challenging to the 
implementation of the offset programme.   
Indonesia placed a USD 150 million order with DSME Daewoo in December 2004 for 
four warships, one command ship and three common LPDS, financed by export 
credits. The chief of the Indonesian navy at the time endorsed the production to be 
shared with domestic shipbuilding, with the aim of establishing indigenous 
capability.168 The first two warships, Makassar-class LPDs based on the design of the 
earlier Tanjung Dalpele-class, were built in Busan, South Korea by Dae Sun. The two 
LPDs, 'KRI Makassar' and 'KRI Surabaya', were delivered in 2008. The last two ships 
were built in the PAL shipyard in Surabaya throughout 2008-2011. The third ship 
was reportedly worth USD 19.9 million, while the fourth cost around USD 30 
million.169 There were approximately 800 people who participated in the design and 
production of these LPDs in the Pal dockyard, and most of them were contractors.170 
From the beginning, this programme faced a number of fundamental challenges. The 
first problem proved a major barrier: language. DSME did not provide any training, 
supplying only blueprints and manuals in the Korean language, which no one in 
PAL could comprehend. The second problem was the modification of the ship’s 
design. PT PAL had to come up with its own production drawings because the navy 
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specifically requested for a stealthy design. One of the LPDs was modified to act as 
the flag ship with command and control systems, but this required PAL to take a 
different course from the original design of the LPD; it was basically a commercial 
ship design. The third problem was the readiness of the shipbuilding facility. In the 
warship division where the project was conducted, there was no crane suitable for 
lifting the heavy load of the LPDs. As a consequence, Pal was forced to divide the 
production of the ship into smaller pieces before integration, approximately 113-114 
blocks in total.171 Even though Daewoo had hired a third party consultant, MASTEK, 
to supervise the vessels constructed in Pal in 2008, numerous delays in delivery were 
inevitable.172 
Despite the aforementioned issues, PT PAL succeeded in supplying the LPDs that 
met the requirements of the user. Noticeable improvements included new features, 
such as greater payload, the ability to carry five helicopters instead of three, a stealth 
based design that displayed a smaller radar cross section, 173  and more speed 
compared to the LPD’s predecessor. The fourth LPD KRI Banda Aceh was fitted with 
a Combat Information Centre (CIC) and a fire control system that enabled the ship to 
conduct self-defence through communications with the combatant ship to protect the 
landing of troops and tactical vehicles as well as controlling helicopter landings.174 
While the programme absorbed significant numbers of workers, it did not 
significantly contribute to employment in PT Pal as a whole, because most of the 
workers were hired from domestic contractors. However, it is likely that skill 
upgrading occurred in the local subcontractors.175 In terms of skill enhancement and 
technology transfer, the programme brought significant learning in welding 
methods, as the process was different from that on commercial ships. As an example, 
welding on warships involves thin plate that is more prone to deformation than that 
of a commercial ship, which typically uses thick plates. Furthermore, Pal learnt the 
about the integration of various systems that support the capability of an LPD to 
half-submerge when launching a landing craft, vehicle and personnel (LCVP) from a 
small well-deck for landing the troops onto the shore. 176  Know-how was also 
transferred in the fitting of combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) propulsion 
systems, integrating two MAN B&W 8L28/32A diesel engines, where each engine 
was a 1,960kW drive twin shaft propulsion unit.177 The set up of engines are said to 
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be different and more challenging than the usual practice in commercial ship 
production, hence adding new skills to the company.178 
In terms of adding to the local value chain, the programme only contributed to the 
production of low value items, such as beds and doors, whereas Daewoo supplied 
high value components, such as power packs, electronic systems, and hydraulic 
systems. The high-note of the programme was its contribution to additional 
capability in designing and exporting the first stealthy warship.179 The export came 
from PT Pal receiving its first international order of two LPDs worth USD 90 million 
from the Philippines after successfully defeating South Korea and others in the 
procurement tender.180 The ship, named Strategic Sealift Vessel (SSV), is an advanced 
version of an LPD that can carry more crew, and is equipped with a mobile hospital 
as well as a parking lane for tanks, trucks, and helicopters. However, around 40 
percent of the components of the ships still had to be imported.181 
Sub-Case Study Three: The Guided Missile Destroyer Escort (Perusak Kawal 
Rudal, PKR) Offset Programme 
Entering the third offset development period, PT Pal was in poor condition. An 
assessment carried out by the ministry of state-owned industries in 2010 found that 
PT Pal was the least healthy of all the strategic industries.182 The company claimed 
that high taxation on raw material imports and product sales, as well as no export 
credit facility had eroded its competitiveness.183 Registering debt of IDR 1 trillion, the 
company tried to shift its focus to maintenance business and general engineering 
following reductions in the world charter rates, achieving only limited success. The 
government finally committed to a revitalisation of the biggest shipbuilding 
company in Indonesia in 2012, through insertion of government capital worth IDR 
2.195 trillion - the biggest commitment given to a strategic industry revitalisation 
programme at that time.184 
The restructuring aimed to recover the position of the company, restoring it back to 
its initial designed capacity; this necessitated revitalisation of human resources, the 
production facilities and information technology. The company needed to regenerate 
its workforce – many of which were above 40 years old - and upgrade skills –
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especially in the engineering division. Facilities and hardware/software were 
obsolete, with only 80 percent of docking facilities operational and 90 percent of the 
computers more than 8 years old.185 In 2012, the company laid off 800 workers as a 
precondition for restructuring the debt under PT PPA.186 
Research and development in PT Pal was coordinated under the Division of 
Technology. Insignificant R&D spending per annum and no support from 
government forced the company to carry out R&D only when a new order was 
undertaken. Other R&D efforts were conducted though collaboration – such as with 
the R&D institutions of the MoD on the FPB 40m and BPPT on mini-submarine 22m- 
and universities, such as with ITS to utilise its hydro-lab and the test modelling of the 
Missile Fast Boat.187 The company managed to gain a number of patents, i.e. design of 
the national corvette and design of welding tools. New products were also 
introduced, such as a Bulk Carrier 50,000 DWT and a chemical tanker of 24,000 DWT. 
The company claimed to be hesitant in investing further on R&D, in the absence of 
long-term technology guidance and assurances.   
PT PAL’s product and service portfolio has been quite remarkable compared to the 
time of its initial establishment. In 2010, around 43 percent of its orders came from 
abroad 188 , including Japan and Germany, while at the same time the company 
controlled around 60 percent of the domestic shipbuilding market. The company 
could not accept all orders due to restricted capital and infrastructure.189 Following 
the naval modernisation plan under the MEF that commenced in 2010, the Minister 
of State-owned enterprises ordered the company to focus on warship production190. 
The government placed contracts worth IDR 600 billion, equal to 33 percent of the 
company’s income target191 to manufacture Fast Patrol Boat 60m, a tugboat, and a 
landing craft unit.  
The National Corvette is presently among the priority programmes for 
indigenisation. In the old days corvettes were part of a protection force for a convoy; 
nowadays, though, it addresses the wider needs of asymmetrical threats, such as 
terrorists, piracy, and transnational crime, as well as protection of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and coastal areas.192 The production of the guided missile destroyer 
escort (designated locally as Perusak Kawal Rudal, PKR) is aimed to indigenously 
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supply the navy requirement for up to 16-20 ships. For this purpose, the Indonesian 
MoD secured a contract with Damen Schelde of the Netherlands and PT Pal to 
license produce four Sigma 10514 corvettes worth USD 220 million, measuring 
105.1m long, with a  displacement of 2400 tonnes.193 It was agreed that the first two 
ships would be built at the Damen shipyard, while production of the last two would 
be shared between the Damen and Pal shipyards.  
The offset model used in this programme is believed to have put PAL at a 
disadvantage. PAL was positioned as the subcontractor to Damen, not the lead 
integrator as in the case of FPB 57. As a consequence, PAL had practically no 
bargaining position against Damen. The latter demanded royalty and license fees 
equal to 5 percent of the total procurement value, but the value of work that went to 
PAL was far less than that.194 The transfer of technology is not as expected because 
PAL only received low value work, such as ‘stitching’ the ends of a block. 
Approximately 75 people are involved in the technology transfer programme and 
received training in the Netherlands. PT PAL specifically looked for new design 
capability to be used for development of indigenous products. The PKR design is 
based on the SIGMA class frigate Indonesia procured in 2007. Overall production 
absorbs approximately 300 people, both organic staff and subcontractors, working 
under supervision of Damen until the conclusion of the second ship’s production. 
Damen sent eight supervisors to PT PAL’s dockyard in Surabaya for this task. The 
production of the two PKR is scheduled to be 40 months, concluding in October 2017. 
In addition to material, Damen also provides advanced methods of production and 
jigs and tools required for the new method. The join-ring section requires a 3D 
precision measurement device that PAL does not possess, and is therefore provided 
by Damen. The latter also provides a flat panel floor which helps to ensure the 
distribution of heat during welding, so as to minimise the risk of deformity. This 
method is new to PAL and is claimed to have spin-off potential through its 
application in the production of thin plate ships such as fast boats and warships.195 
Because the programme is still a work-in-progress, it is impossible to tell whether it 
will have a sustainable impact.  PAL expects that through this cooperation Damen 
will be familiar with PAL and thus more willing to place another order in the future. 
247 
While the possibility for export to third countries exists, since Damen has already 
secured exports of the SIGMA corvette to Morocco, and negotiated with the 
Vietnamese for the sale of four ships, it is difficult to see how PT Pal will be included 
in future exports of SIGMA class vessels, as Damen has also offered offset to 
prospective buyers like Vietnam to jointly develop the ships.  
Table 5.6 Selected Offset Programme in PT PAL 
 
No Programme 
Fast Patrol Boat  
(FPB) 57 
Landing Platform 
Dock (LPD) 
Guided Missile 
Destroyer Escort 
(PKR) 
1 Stage Stage One Stage Two Stage Three  
2 Type of offset Direct  Direct  Direct  
3 Scope of 
offset 
programme 
Training, 
assembly, license 
to produce  
License to produce Training, 
assembly, license 
to produce  
4 Source of 
Technology 
Friedrich Lurssen 
Werf-Bremen, 
Germany  
DSME/Dae Sun, 
South Korea  
Damen, The 
Netherlands  
5 Length of 
programme  
(1988- ) 
License 
production up to 
12 ships  
(2008-2011) 
Three years 
(2013-)  
18 months per 
ship/ 40 months 
overall 
6 No of 
employment, 
job 
maintained  
No  No  Yes 
7 Skills Yes  Yes Yes  
8 Transfer of 
technology 
Yes  Yes Yes 
9 Supply chain 
creation 
No No N/A 
10 Export No Yes N/A 
11 R&D No No No 
12 Post contract 
relations 
No No N/A  
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database 1980-2014; Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and 
Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
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5.5 Evaluation of Offset Performance 
5.5.1 Employment 
Offset’s contribution to employment and job retention are measured by the number 
of jobs created, the type of jobs according to the level of skills and education, and the 
numbers of high quality jobs maintained (chapter 3, p.151). In their golden period, 
the strategic industries employed thousands of workers of top-notch quality due to 
the partnerships with top state universities and the scholarship programme provided 
through BPPT. In the first offset stage, the total employment in the strategic 
industries reached 40,000 people.196  In 1993, PT Pal employed 6,000 workers spread 
over five divisions: maintenance and repair, general engineering, electronics and 
weapon, R&D, and merchant ships. The same year, PT Pindad employed 5,600 
workers, some six percent of which were engineers and technicians. PT IPTN started 
in 1976 with around 500 workers and by the late 1990s it employed 16,000 workers. 
The prestige associated with the strategic industries at the time meant they had no 
issues in attracting the best graduates to work in the company.  
While the challenge in the early offset development period was to recruit educated 
and skilled workers, retaining them in the company became the challenge in the 
subsequent periods. Following restructuring in early 2010s, the three strategic 
industries lost significant numbers of skilled workers as well as the expertise long 
honed. Each of the companies faced a daunting task of massive regeneration and 
preservation of the accumulated expertise. The company that suffered the most was 
PT DI, where many of its workers had retired or were about to retire in the early 
2010s.  
As the strategic industries contracted rapidly across the three offset stages, it is 
valuable to evaluate the impact of offset on job creation and job retention.197 While 
employment is viewed as one of the principal strategic objectives of offset (p. 230), 
none of the survey respondents could pinpoint its positive impact on employment. 
Table 5.7 below shows the overall impact of offset on employment in PT DI, PT 
Pindad, and PT Pal throughout three offset stages. While job retention is noticeable 
in the third offset stage, no significant employment recorded as a direct impact of 
offset. 
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Table 5.7 Offset Impact on Employment in PT DI, PT Pindad, and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage No Yes Yes 
2nd stage No No No 
3rd stage Yes, job creation 
and retention 
Yes, job retention Yes, job creation 
and retention 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
In the first offset stage, offset was used to provide high value work to justify massive 
recruitment. This way offset acted more to prevent a ‘brain drain’ of the educated 
and trained workers created to supply the strategic industries. Although offset 
created new employment in military production at PT Pal and Pindad, the impact 
was not sustainable. The warship division at PAL was starved of orders following 
the 1997 crisis, and production was thus abandoned until the second offset stage. The 
employment impact from the Scorpion light tank offset programme at Pindad was 
not felt until the development of indigenous armoured vehicle began in early the 
2000s, which helped to create a new production line in the company.   
The second offset stage also shows no significant impact on employment in the three 
industries. Arguably, offset work provided necessary work to retain employees 
during the stopgap of government orders. In reality, offset work had not been 
significant to PT DI and PT Pindad because only small numbers of employees were 
engaged in the offset programmes; for example, ten people in PT DI and 30 people 
from Pindad. While the biggest employment impact was provided by offset on the 
LPD programme in PT Pal, it actually created more opportunities for subcontractors 
than for organic workers (p.243).  
The third offset stage shows better results for job creation and job retention due to 
the specific use of offset. For example, offset in PT DI from the CN-295 was used to 
support restructuring that included regeneration of workers, albeit that the exact 
numbers have not been verified. Offset in PT Pindad served partly to retain jobs, 
because it used available workers from existing production lines, whereas in PT Pal 
offset work was used to provide learning for current employees as part of a 
regeneration and transfer of knowledge programme.   
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Job creation and job retention have become significant issues for defence industry 
nowadays, hence should be given more attention and linked to the strategic 
objectives of offset programmes in the future. While recruitment of competent people 
does not constitute a problem for Pal198, it does for PT DI and PT Pindad. PT DI had 
difficulty in attracting fresh graduates due to its unattractive remuneration system 
when compared to the private sector.199 PT Pindad also faced similar issues; demand 
for expertise in highly specialised sectors, such as ballistic, explosives and metallurgy 
has not proved attractive to suitably qualified graduates.200 
5.5.2 Skill Enhancement  
Offset’s contribution to skill enhancement is measured by the addition of new skills, 
improvements in existing skills (such as certification), training (local and abroad), as 
well as technical assistance (chapter 3 p.151). The strategic industries have been 
recognised for playing an additional role in enhancing the skills of prospective 
human resources. According to Hill, the strategic industries - most importantly PT 
IPTN - have introduced a wide range of new skills into Indonesia through training 
abroad, expatriate assistance, as well as internal training.201 For example, less than a 
decade after PT IPTN’s establishment, the company claimed to have graduated over 
5,500 staff from its internal training programme.202 The same is also claimed by PT 
PAL, which has provided training and courses with a maximum capacity of 1,000 
students in shipbuilding, welding, boat building, electrical and mechanical 
engineering, and carpentry.203 Offset’s contribution of offset to skill enhancement in 
the three companies has been varied, as shown in table 5.8. 
In the first offset stage, offset was used to lay down the basic skills through training 
as well as technical assistance for assembly, manufacturing, and integration work. PT 
DI acquired significant capability in manufacturing new material for the fighter jet. 
While such skills were used as leverage to negotiate offset in the purchase of other 
fighter jets204, these skills eventually went to waste in the absence of new orders.205 PT 
Pal received skill enhancement in the design and welding of warships that required 
special certification. Skills pertaining to the integration of electronics and weapon 
systems enabled the three firms to be lead integrators in domestic defence 
production. However, low procurement scales and stop-gap government orders 
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hampered efforts to sustain and hone new skills generated from offset.206  Skills then 
faded when people moved to non-defence divisions - where spin-off was not 
encouraged - or leaving the company. 207 
Table 5.8 Offset Impact to Skills Enhancement in PT DI, PT Pindad, and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage Yes. Training, 
technical 
assistance, 
manufacturing  
Yes. Training, 
technical assistance, 
assembly, design 
 
Yes. Training, technical 
assistance, assembly, 
design, production 
2nd stage Yes. Training, 
assembly 
Yes. Training, 
assembly 
Yes. Technical assistance, 
design, assembly, 
integration of weapon 
systems 
 
3rd stage Yes. Training, 
technical 
assistance, 
assembly, 
manufacture  
Yes. Manufacture, 
integration of 
electronics and 
weapon systems 
Yes. Technical assistance, 
training, design, 
manufacture, assembly, 
integration of weapon 
systems 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
The second offset stage showed no significant skill enhancement for the defence 
industries (except for PT Pal), most probably caused by lack of planning and 
industrial participation in early offset negotiation. As a consequence, offset was 
isolated from the companies’ skill upgrading requirements. Instead, most offset work 
in this stage was mostly assembly work of minor technologies when compared to 
that of existing domestic industry. This is signified by the absence of extensive 
training and technical assistance in both the KT-1 Wong Bee and Tarantula 
programmes. Furthermore, the minimum procurement scales of production - only 12 
airplanes and 11 vehicles - and no maintenance contracts renders it is uneconomical 
for further investment in related skills. Only PT Pal received significant skill 
enhancement through the LPD programme, as signified by the technical assistance 
supplied over three years, enabling the design of a new ship, manufacturing, and 
integrating complex electronic systems.   
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The third offset stage has generated more skill enhancement apart from assembly 
and integration. New skills, such as risk assessment and testing, have been useful for 
PT Pindad to improve the quality of its land systems to meet European defence 
standards.208 While no training was received, the support of foreign technicians at 
Pindad proved to be as helpful.209  While PT DI did not receive significant skill 
enhancement, it incorporated offset under the restructuring programmes for more 
targeted objectives. PT Pal is the one defence company potentially receiving the 
biggest skill enhancement package through the PKR project, gaining from both 
overseas training and technical assistance. Overseas training was conducted for 
managerial and high skilled workers related to electronics, weapons and combat 
systems, as well as for operators. Still, the company claims to have a brain drain in 
the engineering division, due to challenges in recruiting and maintaining people 
with design skills - which are considered as critical in shipbuilding.210  Challenges 
remain on how to use offset to gain special skills required for the industry and to 
maintain the skills generated from offset.  
5.5.3 Transfer of Technology 
Technology transfer is measured by, first, the quality of technology transferred, 
whether it is superior, equal, or inferior when compared to that already existing in 
the three companies (chapter 3 pp.151-152). Second, the type of technology that can 
be transferred ranges from methods, knowledge (know-how and know-why), 
process, hardware, software, to ‘human ware’, like industrial discipline and 
language. Third, licenses must also be considered because they signify the depth of 
technology released by the vendor that affects the sustainability of offset benefits in 
the receiving firm, most importantly the license to export (chapter 2, p.74).  Table 5.9 
summarises the impact of offset on technology transfer in three firms. 
Entering the second offset stage, technology transfer was not significant - perhaps 
with the exception of PT Pal. Most of the manufacturing capability at the time had 
become obsolete in the absence of investment into new facilities. Through offset 
work PT DI and PT Pindad acquired know-how technology in the form of assembly 
and modification, though considered as low skill work. PT Pal received technology 
transfer in the  LPD project in the form of blueprints, jigs and tools, but the license to 
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export was not given by the vendor. 211  In addition, skill enhancement was also 
enjoyed by the subcontractors, i.e. learning how to read blueprints and methods for 
warship production. Interestingly, all three companies considered a lasting 
technology transfer to have resulted in the form of transfer of ‘human ware’ such as 
language ability and discipline212, signifying a deficiency of such values in the the 
existing workforce. 
Table 5.9 Offset Impact on Technology Transfer  
in PT DI, PT Pindad, and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage Yes, process 
technology, hardware 
Yes, know how  Yes, design, 
management, 
production, know-
how, license 
2nd stage Yes, know how, 
discipline 
Yes, know how, 
discipline, language 
Yes, design, know 
how, licence 
3rd stage Yes, management, 
production, know 
how, hardware, 
software, license 
Yes, management, 
testing, hardware, 
software  
Yes, design, 
management, know 
how, production 
method, know why, 
license, discipline 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
The third offset stage generated more technology transfer to the three firms. PT DI 
received hardware and software, licenses, as well as know how in the manufacturing 
of the rear fuselage of the N295. PT Pal received transfer of technology in design, 
production, management as well as in process for manufacturing six modules of the 
PKR. Whereas PT Pindad received transfer of knowledge on integrating hardware 
and software in the weather reading and command system, risk assessment methods, 
and in the new testing hardware and methods to improve production. All three 
companies acknowledged that barriers in technology transfer exist, in the form of 
access to licenses and transfer being limited to know-how only. Furthermore, jigs and 
tools as well as hardware/software provided by vendor have mostly been 
abandoned after the offset concluded. Not only the absence of follow-on orders 
caused this, but also the inability of the firm to apply this technology to other 
production, or spin off.213 
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5.5.4 Value Chain Creation 
Offset’s contribution to supply chain creation occurred, as signified by forward and 
backward linkages (chapter 3, pp. 151-152). Ideally this should be measured in the 
form of input and output analysis of defence production. However, the quantitative 
data are difficult to access, and thus local content214 - referring to 1) the percentage of 
domestic contribution in the value chain, 2) the existence of supply chain due to 
import-substitution of components and the participation of local subcontractors - are 
used instead.  
It has been observed by Hill that there is a phenomenon of near-one hundred percent 
‘in-house operation’ 215  that has been common across SOEs. As a consequence, 
backward linkages - most particularly to smaller component manufacturers through 
subcontracting agreements - is limited. In 1995, IPTN was dependent on foreign 
supply for both raw material, such as aluminium, and high value-added 
components, such as engines, avionics and combat systems management. The 
company had to form a special team to encourage the emergence of a local supply 
chain, but with only limited success due to the strict standards of certification.216 In 
2002, the company confessed that production of the Bell helicopter still used 50 
percent imported materials.217 PT Pindad is no different, having been dependent on 
foreign technology from high precision machinery to raw materials for munitions 
production.218 Whereas PT Pal has cultivated around 200 subcontractors, but these 
are mainly for the supply of low technology and consumables like cable, paint, and 
interiors.219 Table 5.10 below summarises the contribution of offset to supply chain 
creation. 
Table 5.10 Offsets Impact on the Creation of Supply Chains  
in PT DI, PT Pindad and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage No No  Yes, low value 
2nd stage No No Yes, low value 
3rd stage No Yes, low value Yes, medium/high 
value 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
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 In the first offset stage, the three defence industries started to manufacture military 
equipment to substitute imported products such as fixed wing aircraft and 
helicopters, fast patrol boats, attack rifles and ammunition. They contributed to arms 
procurement worth IDR 1.1 trillion equal to USD 1.2 billion across 1983-1993.220 Local 
content in transport aircraft was claimed to have risen to 80 percent by 1985221, but 
this referred only to the aircraft frame and excluded high value added systems and 
subsystems. Similarly, the contribution of local content to patrol boats has not 
surpassed 17.5 percent.222 This reflects the high degree of dependency not only on the 
import of high value components - from engines and avionics to combat systems - 
that the three firms chose not to master, but there is also dependency on raw 
materials like steel plate and aluminium.223 
The second offset stage saw no significant additions to supply chain creation, mostly 
due to the fact that the vendor supplied all the materials used in the offset 
programme when the activities were limited to assembly only. This is inevitable 
when the domestic industry is positioned as a subcontractor, with no influence on 
decision making related to procurement.224 The third offset stage offers a similar 
story, given that the three firms were positioned as subcontractors under the lead 
integrators of foreign companies. PT Pindad, however, managed to increase local 
content in land systems production due to the contribution of local subcontractors. 
While the company manufactured the monocoque body along with small parts like 
axles for the panzer, domestic subcontractors, like PT Tamindo Permai Glass, 
produced bulletproof glass and PT Indopulley Perkasa produced flat rubber tires.225 
PT Pal acknowledges that the local content in PKR production will not surpass the 
average local content ratio of 17.5 percent.226 
Promoting the supply chain through offset has not produced any meaningful 
outcome apart from the emergence of low value domestic subcontractors. Arguments 
that local supply chains could exist save at higher prices - as opposed to foreign 
imports that are competitive but low in resilience - have not convinced the main 
customer to pay the premium cost.227 Efforts to establish supply chain linkage among 
strategic industries - such as PT Pindad, PT Pal, and PT Krakatau Steel to link special 
steel and production of land systems vehicles and warships - have failed because in 
order to meet the requirement for military standards a company has to invest in new 
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equipment. This investment is not profitable when guarantees on sustainable orders 
from the government are absent. 228  High barriers to entry and the absence of 
government incentives have dampened efforts to cultivate small and medium 
enterprises for defence production.  
Lately, however, there has been some participation of domestic subcontractors in 
offset programmes. PT LEN will be participating in the production of combat 
management systems for PKR, in cooperation with Thales. The company previously 
developed combat management systems, dubbed MANDALA, which upon receiving 
certification from Indonesian navy R&D (Dislitbang AL) have been fitted into the 
navy’s fast missile boats.229 It is important to note that private SMEs also engage in 
the high technology sector, such as PT Infoglobal that develops avionics for fighter 
jets and PT T&E Solutions that provide simulators for both aircraft and land systems. 
These kinds of SMEs need to be involved in future offset programmes. 
5.5.5 Exports 
Offset’s contribution to promoting export is measured by the growth in export sales 
from the local company acting as lead integrator and as part of a global supply chain 
or as a subcontractor (chapter 3 p. 152). While the vendor often forbids export to 
third parties by retaining the license, export as a subcontractor – which signifies the 
vendor’s trust in the quality of domestic production – is more likely to be achieved. 
In both areas, PT IPTN/PT DI stand out among the strategic industries. Only 12 
years since its establishment, PT IPTN has managed to secure export of transport 
aircraft and has also received Boeing and Airbus’ acknowledgement as qualified 
bidders and secured orders to manufacture primary structures of Boeing aircraft in 
1986 (see p.221). Indonesian arms transfers are recorded by SIPRI only recognise the 
export of aircraft products. Indeed exporting as part of a global supply chain might 
only be applicable in the aerospace business, but not necessarily in shipbuilding and 
land systems due to different modes of production.230 According to PT Pal, the most 
likely form of export in cooperation with the foreign vendor is co-production with a 
division of labour where work is on separate sections of the ship.  Table 5.11 shows 
the impact of offset in promoting exports in the three firms being surveyed. 
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Table 5.11 Offset’s Impact on Exports in PT DI, PT Pindad and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage Yes No No 
2nd stage No No Yes 
3rd stage Possibly  Possibly N/A 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
The first offset stage saw different impacts on exports from the three firms. Offset in 
PT DI was directed at exports of components of the F-16 but no subsequent orders 
after the conclusion of the programme. Whereas offset in PT Pindad and PT Pal was 
not directed to exports in the short term. The second offset stage saw no exports 
attached to the offset programmes in PT DI and PT Pindad, despite further exports 
secured by the vendor (see p.228 and p.239). Export was a surprising outcome of 
offset pertaining to license production of the LPD in PT Pal, because the vendor 
actually did not provide the license to export. Regardless, the company’s success to 
export a vessel to the Philippines was achieved even though it retained a high 
dependency on the value added components of the ship. It is also possible that South 
Korea will have its fair share in the supply of components to in PT Pal’s possible 
future exports.231 
The third offset stage sees more effort to attach export promotion to offset 
programmes. PT DI has been negotiating for the marketing of the C 295 in the 
regional market, though nothing has come from this yet. PT Pindad and Nexter are 
planning to export the Komodo as a platform for Nexter’s self-propelled gun to 
Vietnam (see p. 239). While offset programmes in PT Pal are still a work in progress - 
thus its potential for export is yet to confirmed - PT Pal expects that Damen will 
familiarise itself with Pal and engage the company in the production for export to 
third countries. Even when export does not happen, attaching export to the strategic 
objectives of offset could be beneficial for the industry. PT Pindad, for example, 
gained new knowledge on subcontracting for foreign vendors and new testing 
methods to meet requirements of foreign users. Hence, the company has risen to 
higher standards.  
5.5.6 R&D 
258 
Offset’s contribution to R&D is measured by the participation of the vendor in the 
new R&D venture created in the buyer country and the R&D programme created as 
a consequence of technology transfer through offset (chapter 3 p.153). Unfortunately 
no impact has been made in this area despite three stages of offset, which could be 
interpreted as follows. First, there has been a lack of effort to include R&D as a 
strategic objective of offset. Most of activities under the offset programmes have been 
around direct offset, focusing on licensing, co-production and assembly. This is 
understandable considering that R&D was not a priority in the early period of 
industrialisation (see chapter 4, p. 177). As a consequence of such policy, there has 
been a deficiency in the technology absorbing capacity of the three firms. This 
condition has worsened during the second offset stage, when industry was not able 
to maintain a dedicated R&D unit and invest sufficiently. Second, the weakening 
influence of BBPT during the second and third offset stage (see p.211) as well as no 
access to the long-term defence procurement plan puts industry in doubt as to which 
direction R&D should follow and where to put expensive investment associated with 
it.232 Offset’s contribution to R&D is encapsulated in Table 5.12 below. 
Table 5.12 Offset’s Impact on R&D in PT DI, PT Pindad and PT Pal 
Offset PT DI PT Pindad PT Pal 
1st stage No No No 
2nd stage No No No 
3rd stage No No No 
Source: Fieldwork Research in Bandung, Jakarta, and Surabaya, April 2014-August 2015 
In the first offset stage, most of the offsets have been directed at establishing 
manufacturing capability and to gain international recognition on the quality of 
domestic production. The second offset stage saw no contribution of offset to R&D 
because priority was given to capitalise on the industry’s idle capacity. For industries 
struggling to stay afloat, R&D was not a priority they could afford (see p.245). The 
third offset stage has been criticised as ‘reinventing the wheel’, eg.  PT DI’s C-295 
programme was said to be a stretched-out version of the CN-235, rather than a 
technological break-through.233 
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The absence of offset contribution to the strategic industries is a reflection of the 
limited local technology absorptive capacity and the difficulty to move up the ladder 
of production, from adopter of technology to innovator.  
5.6 Implications for Defence Industrial Policy 
5.6.1 Offset Implementing Regulations: Government Regulation No. 76 Year 
2014 on Offset and the Upcoming Defence Minister Regulation 
Despite decades of offset practice, Indonesia neither has a guideline nor a standard 
policy - such as a threshold, multiplier or a penalty - as a reference for policymakers 
and the strategic industries. This explains the inconsistent application of offset across 
the three offset stages. Offset in the absence of formal regulation can be negotiated 
when dedicated human resources are available. Furthermore, when the vendor 
understands the importance of local content as part of a marketing strategy. In many 
cases the vendor exploits the absence of offset regulation. On the other hand, a 
formal offset policy would not be beneficial when it is used only as a stamp to 
legitimise arms procurement. Industry believes that mandatory offset is only as 
effective when it is mandatory and has a strong influence in determining the 
outcomes of procurement bids. 
While offset has become mandatory under Law No. 16 Year 2012 on Defence 
Industry, its effectiveness depends on the clarification of many elements. First, the 
Law does not define the practical elements of offset other than the percentage of 
offset, which is 85 percentcountertrade of contract value -with offset forming a 
minimum 35 percent. Without a threshold, offset must be implemented as a blanket 
policy, covering all procurement regardless of their value. The repercussions from 
such an interpretation of policy will create massive complications to the procurement 
body – which has been under pressure to expedite the procurement process. Second, 
the Law specifies the need for a number of follow-up regulations to detail the 
implementation of offset. The answer to this is Government Regulation No.76 Year 
2014 that clarifies some policy elements of offset, such as the multiplier factor, 
eligible offset receivers, as well as technology valuation. Unfortunately, the 
Regulation also falls short in providing further details. Third, neither the Law nor the 
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Regulation specifies which stakeholder is in charge of the implementation of offset. 
The offset policy is to be formulated by KKIP, but the institution depends on its 
secretariat in the MoD to do its daily work. Indeed a temporary understanding has 
been reached between BARANAHAN - the procurement agency - and DIT 
TEKINDHAN - the management agency of defence technology and industry, as well 
as the secretariat of KKIP -  but this is unlikely to be satisfactory process.  
Despite the issuance of Law No.16 Year 2012 and Government Regulation No.76 
Year 2014, many elements of offset implementation remain unexplained. The 
Indonesian MoD - as the institution in charge with offset policy formulation - is now 
preparing the next step: the Defence Minister Regulation on Offset. But there is 
concern that the government has been too focused on preparation of the offset 
regulatory framework, which remains a work-in-progress for the past five years 
since the first offset policy formulation began back in 2010. Preparation on human 
resources should run in parallel with the regulations. 
5.6.2 Wider Offset Issues 
The inconsistencies in offset implementation across procurement life cycles have 
affected the contribution of offset. Offset negotiation has not been optimal in the 
absence of agreement between government and industry on strategic objectives and 
the direction of offset. In many cases, offset demands have been rushed into 
negotiations after a procurement contract is agreed. Vendors have felt trapped, and 
are not be able to offer the best-offset package. Earlier engagement of potential offset 
receivers prior to the procurement negotiations must be considered. Evaluation of 
offset has also been absent, hence no data exist on the impact of offset and the 
associated premium cost. While offset policy elements will be addressed with further 
policy formulation, there are other wider issues that need to be considered.  
First, is the need to determine strategic objectives of offset. Determining offset 
objectives is not only a matter of synchronising the different interests of stakeholders, 
but also of interpreting grand strategy –such as long term technology policy, arms 
procurement policy, as well as industrial development planning - and there is a need 
to make outputs measurable in terms of tangible metrics, such as employment, skill 
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enhancement, technology transfer, exports, local supply chains and R&D. For this 
purpose, offset needs to be made flexible and not too focused on direct offset that 
revolves around license production, co-production and assembly work. Furthermore, 
there is a need to engage the lower tiers of the strategic industries to optimise the 
benefits of offset. 
Second, the question needs to be addressed on how to enforce offset in the most 
effective way possible. Indonesia’s arms procurement has been small in number and 
via diversified suppliers, which put the country in a weak position to negotiate 
offset. To use offset as a determining factor in procurement bids has been ruled out. 
A possible way to increase the country’s bargaining position is by elevating the 
procurement volume and rationalising the number of suppliers. Furthermore, there 
is an urgent need to improve the domestic technology absorptive capacity in order to 
reduce the risk of offset failure and minimising the premium cost created by the 
technology gap between the vendor and offset receiver.   
Last, but not least, the implementation of offset will face challenges from those 
disadvantaged by its presence. Offset requires careful institutional scrutiny and 
monitoring by independent auditing authorities, to disenfranchise those with the 
potential for corruption. In order to ‘effectively‘ implement offset, government must 
consider the development of transparency and accountability in long-term 
policymaking in all its diverse dimensions, eg technology, procurement, civil-
military industry, dual-use modelling, as well as socio-economic aspects, rather than 
focusing solely on a mono-directed defence policy. In this light, offset may actually 
lead to more accountability in arms procurement, an area traditionally characterised 
by secrecy. 
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66. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summary 
This thesis begins with a broad sweep of the literature from economic development 
to the specific themes of technology development and defence procurement, with 
emphasis on strategic choices available for latecomer developing countries grappling 
with problems of underdevelopment. To enable development to be launched and 
sustained, as the literatures suggests, capital and labour accumulation as well as 
technological progress are the primary factors in stimulating growth. Technological 
progress can be initiated through technology innovation or imitation. The first of 
these factors is characterised by a longer timeframe and a bigger risk, whilst the 
second  entails the danger of greater dependency on foreign technology. The transfer 
of technology can be obtained through various conduits, but all oblige the state to be 
open to international trade. To ensure the success of adaptation and innovation, the 
state should to have a certain level of technology absorptive capability,  in which a 
strong R&D base is fundamental. The other challenge is to adopt the right technology 
through the appropriate channel. For latecomers, state intervention through 
technology development policy is essential in the absence of thriving private sectors. 
Public procurement is a policy tool of government in both industrialised and 
industrialising countries, which is held to be useful for promoting innovation and 
supporting industrialisation. Its significant value renders huge influence onthe 
market. One element of public procurement is arms acquisition; whereby 
government mostly acts as the only buyer (monopsony) thus has direct influence on 
the structure and survival of domestic defence industry. Military technology is 
considered strategic due to its leadership in leading edge technology and spin-off 
potential; so much so that defence industrialisation is viewed as a technology 
locomotive that influences technical progress in a country. Technology transfer from 
arms procurement is therefore viewed as an imperative.  
Defence offset emerges from the power of the buyer’s market and becomes a conduit 
for transfer of not only military technology, but also dual use technology. Moreover, 
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globalisation of arms production and export means greater access for developing 
countries to participate in the global supply chain. This is a partial panacea for a 
state’s dilemma in distributing scarce resources between defence and development 
across the broader economy. The interplay of these phenomena brings development 
and defence to a new level: offset (military activity) has a contribution to the broader 
economy (development) through skills enhancement, job creation, diversification, 
creating linkages, transfer of technology, new market opening, access to global 
production network and dual-use industrialisation. Through offset as compensatory 
arrangements, military spending is no longer seen as parasitical drain on the state, 
but a sector that generates real economic benefit.  
This thesis also discusses the conceptual and empirical aspects of offset. As the 
literature in chapter 3 suggests, offset is a flexible concept that can be moulded in 
accordance to the specific interests of its stakeholders. Perceived as a part of 
countertrade, offset has grown to be the most important of this rubric’s various 
reciprocal-trading activities. In practice, offset varies widely across countries, 
whether in relation to objectives, strategies, or policies. This arguably contributes to 
the difficulty in evaluating the success of offset; and this is in addition to the fact that 
offset in arms procurement is the subject of much secrecy. Offset is implemented 
through a lifecycle that mimics that of procurement, hence offset can be divided into 
pre-offset planning, negotiation, implementation, and evaluation. From the literature 
in chapter three on comparison of offset evaluation methods, a number of variables 
have been extracted as offset success indicators; these being employment-generation, 
skill-enhancement, technology transfer, sponsorship of value chain creation, export 
promotion, and R&D. Offset outcomes can lead to an array of results, including at 
the extremes, success and failure.  
The Indonesian context is central to this study, highlighting the development and 
technological planning that has occurred in the country. The ‘context’ portrays the 
tapestry of Indonesia’s technology development and industrialisation since the 
independence through to the end of Soeharto’s New Order. The first industrialisation 
effort under Soekarno failed miserably due to political instability and constant 
military threats. The second industrialisation effort, began as Soeharto took power 
and  ended at the time of the  1997 crisis, having been influenced by several factors. 
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First, competition of influence between economic nationalist and liberalist political 
factions nuanced governmentpolicy influencing development and industrialisation 
choices. Second, two larger-than-life figures, former President Soeharto and Dr 
Habibie, shaped the course of industrialisation and technology development through 
the idea of economic and industrial take-off and the so-called ladder of production. 
These processes were implemented through selected strategic industries acting as a 
vehicle for the progressive manufacturing plan and a series of government subsidies 
to ensure economic scale of from the domestic market was achieved. It is worth 
noting that accelerated industrialisation was implemented not by economists but by 
the engineers at the BPPT. Consequently, due to their engineering backgrounds, 
transfer of technology was given a central role in accelerated industrialisation. Third, 
politico-militarys factors allowed the establishment of dual-use industry as the 
encapsulation of the military’s contribution to development in general and 
accelerated industrialisation in particular. Demand from military modernisation was 
used to support the development of strategic industries, aimed at exploiting 
technology transfer and scale. This began to define the role of offset in the 
Indonesian arms procurement process.  
Following the above contextual backdrop to this study, the aim of the study has been 
to analyse how strategic industrialisation –which later became defence 
industrialisation- has been developed and implemented in Indonesia, including the 
contribution of offset at different stages of its life cycle: development, survival, and 
revitalisation. Offset contributions to strategic defence industrialisation was 
evaluated using six performance metrics, namely, employment-generation, skill-
enhancement, technology transfer, sponsorship of local value chains, export-
promotion, and R&D. 
6.2 Conclusions 
Based on the findings of the analysis conducted in chapter five, the following 
conclusions are offered: 
1. Offset does make a positive contribution to strategic industrialisation, although 
its significance varies from one industrial sector to another and across different 
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offset periods: First Stage ‘development’ (1986-1998), Second Stage ‘survival’ 
(1998-20010), and Third Stage ‘revitalisation’ (2010-) (see chapter 5 pp.206-220). In 
general, areas in which offset contribution have been felt are skills enhancement 
and technology transfer. However, offset’s contribution has been minimal in 
employment-generation, the creation of local supply chains, and export, with no 
impact at all on the promotion of local R&D capability.  
2. Offset did not contribute to employment in the First Offset Stage (1986-1998) 
(chapter 5 pp.248-250). Offset was rather used to create work for existing 
employees, hence retaining jobs. This is similar to the employment in the Second 
stage two of offset development (1999-2010), when strategic industries were 
forced to retrench significant numbers of its employees to rationalise idle 
production capacity. While offset could have been used as a mechanism to retain 
high-skill jobs, the volume of work generated by offset was insufficient to 
prevent brain drain. The contribution of offset to employment creation rose in 
Third Offset Stage (2010-2014), when all three industries faced the challenge to 
replacing aging employees.  
3. Offset did contribute to skills-enhancement through both overseas and local 
training and technical assistance (chapter 5 pp. 250-252). Overseas and local 
training have served significant numbers of employees from the strategic 
industries, particularly from maritime industry that by nature engage generates 
big numbers of skilled workers in the manufacture of ships. While the early offset 
stages created basic new skills, such as assembly and manufacturing skills, the 
latter offset stages provide new skills to improve production and marketing, such 
as production design, risk assessment, advanced systems integration (including 
combat management and electronic warfare), and testing. Despite inflows of 
these valuable new skills, massive lay-offs during Second Offset Stage meant that 
the strategic industries lost significant human resources. Also, there was a 
stopgap in defence production in the absence of government orders and export 
sales, which meant that these skills were not sustained and honed -unless 
applicable to the non-defence sector. 
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4. Offset’s contribution to technology transfer did occur in form of transfer of new 
and superior technology, comprising hardware, software, know-how, process, 
production, method, licensing, to language skills and disciplines associated with 
human quality. While technology transfer through offset was significant in the 
First and Third Offset Stage, it had hardly any impact during the subsequent 
stages (ch 5 pp.252-253). The technology transferred was not new and there was 
only limited possibilities for spin-off to the commercial sector to sustain its 
benefit. The Third Offset Stage bring in new technology to PT Pal and PT Pindad, 
but presumably ‘reinventing the wheel’ for PT DI. Despite many potential spin-
off from offset, lack of financial ability prevented the maritime industry from 
exploiting this technology after the offset programme . 
5. Offset failed to make a positive contribution to the development of local supply 
chains, as signified by the low level of local content and the lack of emergence of 
local subcontractors (chapter 5 pp.254-256). Offset fell short in this area, as all of 
the strategic industries retained high levels of dependency on imported material 
from low added value like steel and aluminium to high valued added 
technologies like engine, radar, turret, and so on. The highest barrier to creating 
supply chains lies in the aerospace industry. In the maritime industry and land 
system sectors, local content on average is around 17.5 percent and below 40 
percent, respectively. This suggests that a wide gap exists between local industry 
ability and that of foreign contractors, as well as both the lack of incentive to 
enter subcontracting defence production work and participation of local tier 
one/two industries in offset programmes.  
6. The contribution of offset on export of arms, -signified by growth in export sales 
as lead integrator and as part of the global supply chain- has been minimal (ch.5 
pp. 256-257). This must be seen as a fundamental failure, because the primary 
objective of offset is to gain international acknowledgement as to the quality of 
domestic production. Even when exporters are the lead integrators, they are often 
not in the category of high technology supplier, thus suffering a continued high 
dependency on foreign high value added components. Opportunity to enter the 
global defence supply chain looks dismal when facing the cold fact that foreign 
vendors are pressured to relocate offset work to many other country buyers to 
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fulfil new offset obligations. While opportunities exist abound for the local 
aerospace industry to export as part of an OEM global supply chain, due to the 
nature of its production, land systems and the maritime sectors have not found a 
way as yet to do so. A different approach is necessary in defining the best form of 
export promotion and supply chain creation for each of the strategic industries. 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
1. The main factor behind the failure of offset is inconsistent implementation of 
offset as a government procurement policy tool. While offset policy basically 
exists in all three periods, there were no guidelines that would have been useful 
in the absence of a dedicated offset body. There was also no stand-alone offset 
body to plan, negotiate, execute, oversee, and evaluate offset programmes. As a 
consequence, the absence of continuing records as well as transfer of knowledge 
within stakeholder organisations makes it difficult to evaluate and generate 
feedback to improve offset practice. Belatedly, Indonesia has issued Government 
Regulation Number 76 Year 2014 on the Mechanism of Countertrade, Local 
Content and Offset in the Procurement of Foreign Military Articles. However, 
this does not mean stakeholders comprehend the policy and implementation 
aspect of offset. In the absence of offset guidelines, foreign vendors are not aware 
of the importance of offset in the procurement bid nor they are confident to 
propose long-term programmes when no clear incentive is in place. Thus, it is 
recommended that the Indonesian government urgently create a dedicated offset 
body and offset guidelines for foreign vendors to understand the ground rules. 
Preparation of human resources to implement offset should run in parallel with 
the formulation of practical regulatory frameworks.  
2. The failure of offset is partly linked to the absence of a common agreement on 
what is to be achieved by offset, in other words, ‘strategic objectives’.  This was 
clearly defined in First Offset Stage, targeting on international recognition of the 
quality of in-country production, job creation, skills enhancement, and 
technology transfer. In the later stages, strategic objectives have been indistinct. 
When industry fought for its survival in the absence of government support 
during the Second Offset Stage, offset had not delivered enough impact on job 
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retaining, skills enhancement, and local supply chain creation as well as export 
promotion, arguably critical to being competitive and maintaining or increasing 
sales. Under the Third Offset Stage, while the strategic objective of offset was 
linked to the industrial revitalisation and defence technology indigenisation 
pathways (known as ‘seven national programme’), industries were still uncertain 
with respect to which sectors  and which direct offset should attract investment. 
The current government needs to identify  which technology policy should be the 
reference for offset, dual use or exclusively military channels, if the main purpose 
is to create an independent and internationally competitive industry, as 
prescribed in Law No 16 Year 2012 on Defence Industry. 
3. In the First Offset Stage, negotiations had been more adaptable to variants of 
offset- both direct and indirect. However, this was missing in negotiation 
processes under later offset stages. Most offsets in Indonesia have been direct, 
linked to co-production or license production of the procured technology, thus 
self-limiting. This was arguably because government and user had more say on 
offset, while industry stood passively at the receiving end. Decisions had been 
made on ad hoc basis, with no clear reference to policy or objective. This has put 
industry in a disadvantageous position, having no ample time or resources to 
prepare for sustainable industrial development. There are certain risks and 
difficulties in absorbing direct offset, i.e. potentially disrupting procurement 
schedules and demanding massive investment at short notice as in the case of the 
LPD programme and PKR. Thus, it is suggested that negotiation of offset should 
be made more flexible and allow ‘room for manoeuvre’ for industry to come to 
the best-offset arrangement. While the state might determine the strategic 
guidance for offset, it should leave the negotiating process on a business-to-
business basis. 
4.  A fundamental issue behind offset failure is the ability of industry to absorb new 
technology and spin--off technology to make benefits sustainable. Under First 
Offset Stage, when the strategic industries were given massive investment in top-
notch facilities and human resources, technology absorption was not an issue 
especially when the level of technology transferred was on assembly and 
manufacturing. During subsequent offset stages, however, industries were not 
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able to maintain facilities, human resources, as well as R&D programmes; thus, 
absorbing offset became financially challenging. Where offset could benefit 
industry, it was viewed as a ‘liability’, especially when its value was not 
equivalent to the obligor’s discharge of the liability. When offset is considered, 
the government needs to take into account the cost of offset to industry and other 
recipients. The government needs to have an estimation of offset cost and make a 
long-term commitment to share burden share with both domestic industry and 
the offshore vendor.  
6.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
1. This research programme faced an array of limitations to data access, and 
availability of both time and resources, hence the focus on only nine case studies. 
But there is actually a plethora of case studies waiting to be examined, from 
which best practices and lessons can be generated for future policy reference. For 
example, offset pertaining to the procurement of BAe’s Hawk was used to 
support CASA in its bid for certification of the CN-235, which was vital for PT DI 
to export as lead integratorof the jointly developed aircraft. This kind of offset, 
which is not limited to license production and co-production under direct offset, 
offers flexibility that could be specifically-tailored to the needs of industry. This is 
an important direction for future policy research that potentially contributes to 
the optimisation of offset benefits to the strategic industries. Thus, it is 
recommended that future studies should incorporate case studies of indirect 
offset into analysis. 
2. Further research should be undertaken to broaden the unit of analysis, not to 
focus solely on the lead integrator in the hierarchy of defence production but also 
to embrace the lower levels of both state-owned enterprises and private 
industries. Arguably, this is the main area where innovation can occur and 
arguably also where offset can exert more impact on employment, skills 
enhancement, technology transfer, export, and local chain creation. The 
involvement of PT Len -in cooperation with Thales- in providing Combat 
Management Systems in the PKR programme, is a relevant example that needs 
further study. 
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3. While offset is alleged to facilitate corruption, further study on Indonesian 
implementation of offset might prove otherwise. Arguably, offset could 
strengthen accountability in arms procurement decisions by forcing in more 
deliberation to balance basic procurement criteria and military judgement. In the 
absence of a life cycle approach to procurement and transparency in determining 
the specification of weapons procurement, offset could be the key element that 
provides a long-term foresight. When ‘proper’ offset is conducted, with reference 
to both long-term military procurement planning and industrial business plans, it 
actually helps to ensure that no ad hoc or sudden procurement can occur as often 
as has happened in the past. While offset may not be the determining factor in 
determining the outcome of a procurement bid, it must be a mandatory 
precondition for joining it. Thus, it is recommended that future research should 
adopt different angles on examining the correlation between offset in arms 
procurement and corruption. 
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8APPENDIX I - Preliminary Survey (December 2011- January 2012) 
1. DATA OF RESPONDENT 
 
2. SURVEY ON OFFSET  
No Question Answer 
1 Who is the biggest offset provider in your company?/ 
Siapa penyedia offset terbesar? 
 
2 Which type of offset your company have received?/Model 
offset apa yang pernah perusahaan Anda terima? 
1. JV/JV 
2. Co production/Co-produksi 
3. Subcontracting/Subkontrak 
4. Collaboration/Kolaborasi 
5. Others/Lainnya 
Which type do you think is the most effective?/Model apa 
yang menurut Anda paling berhasil 
 
4 Type of technology transfer received through offset/Tipe 
teknologi apa yang didapat lewat offset 
1. Product/Teknologi produk 
2. Process/Teknologi proses 
3. Know-how/Teknologi know-how 
4. Teknik manajemen 
5. lainnya 
 
1 Name of Respondent   
2 Position in the Company   
3 Name of Company  
4 Date and Place of Survey/Interview  
300 
No Question Answer 
5 Does technology transfer through offset produce/Apakah 
transfer teknologi melalui offset menghasilkan 
1. Patent/paten 
2. License/lisensi 
3. Machines/mesin 
4. Education/pendidikan 
5. Training/pelatihan 
6. Turnkey/turnkey 
7. Foreign consultant/penyewaan jasa konsultan asing 
8. Management participation/partisipasi manajemen 
9. Technical assistance/bantuan teknis 
10. FDI 
11. JV 
12. Collaboration/kolaborasi 
13. Subcontracting/ subkontrak 
14. Co production/co-produksi 
15. Buy-back 
16. Others/ lainnya 
 
6 Do you think technology transfer from offset can be 
obtained from other conduit?/ Apakah teknologi yang 
ditransfer melalui offset bisa didapatkan dari sumber yang 
lain 
 
7 Do you think technology transfer from offset has dual use 
potential?/ Apakah teknologi transfer melalui offset 
punya potensi dual-use atau aplikasinya hanya pada 
bidang pertahanan 
 
8 Does your company use technology transfer from offset to 
build local technological capability? (Explain the source of 
technology, type of technology, and type of works)/ 
Apakah perusahaan Anda memanfaatkan teknologi transfer 
offset untuk membangun kapabilitas teknologi lokal (jelaskan 
sumber teknologi, jenis teknologi dan tipe pekerjaannya) 
 
9 Does your company experience problems related to 
technology transfer from offset in production or 
operation? (provide the example and source)/Apakah 
perusahaan Anda mengalami kesulitan yang berkaitan dengan 
teknologi offset dalam produksi atau operasi ? (berikan contoh 
kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
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No Question Answer 
10 Does your company experience problem in technology 
sharing with foreign partner? (provide example and 
source)/Apakah perusahaan Anda mengalami kesulitan 
technology-sharing dengan mitra luar negeri? (berikan 
contoh kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
 
11 Does your company experience problem when facing the 
government on acquisition of technology? (provide 
example and source)/Apakah perusahaan Anda 
mengalami kesulitan berhadapan dengan pemerintah 
dalam rangka akuisisi/adopsi teknologi ? (berikan contoh 
kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
 
12 Does your company generate benefits form offset. Provide 
details of the benefits using company performance in the 
last 5 years, i.e. export, product/system innovation, 
employment, skills enhacement, local subcontracting, spin 
off, etc. /Apakah perusahaan Anda mendapatkan keuntungan 
dari offset. Misalnya dalam perbaikan performa? (jelaskan 
keuntungan itu dalam performa 5 tahun terakhir, misalnya 
ekspor, inovasi produk, proses system, penambahan kerja, 
peningkatan keahlian, penguatan basis subkontraktor lokal, 
aplikasi komersil) 
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APPENDIX II -  Offset Survey Form (April-May 2014) 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF OFFSET TO INDONESIAN DEFENCE 
INDUSTRIALISATION 
Since 2010, Indonesian government has been formulating a policy to pursue 
domestic industry participation, better known as ‘offset’, in foreign procurement. 
The objective is to achieve independency in arms provision and strong defence 
industry. This strategy mirrors what took place during 1980s and 1990s, when offset 
was used to assist strategic industry, predominantly PT IPTN, PT PAL, and PT 
Pindad, to move them up along the progressive manufacturing plan set by B.J 
Habibie. Question remains on the true contribution of offset to the strategic 
industry and dual-use industrialisation. 
Curie Maharani, a PhD student at Cranfield University, is pursuing her research on 
the contribution of offsets. Curie holds Bachelor Degree from International Relations, 
University of Indonesia (UI), and Masters Degree from Defence Management Study, 
Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). She has worked to assist Ministry of Defence in 
offset policy formulation in 2013. 
The objectives of the research are as follows:   (1) to describe the offset policy, 
process, and problem   (2) to determine offset contribution to dual-use 
industrialisation, by looking at: employment created and maintained, type of 
technology transfer, backward and forward linkages (such as product diversification, 
export, local supply chain creation), sustainability of offset benefits, and spin off 
(benefit from arms procurement to non-defence sector) 
In order to carry out her research successfully, the researcher intends to visit your 
company/institution as offset receiver. The objective is to gather sufficient evidence 
to support research and compile the findings into a PhD thesis. 
It would therefore be appreciated if your company/organisation would provide 
assistance and cooperation to Curie during her research. 
For further inquiry:  
curie.safitri@gmail.com (Curie Maharani) 
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DATA OF RESPONDENT 
1 Name of Respondent   
2 Position in the Company   
3 Name of Company  
4 Date and Place of Survey/Interview  
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1. Offset’s Practices/ Praktik Offset 
Please write down the type of offsets activities that your company had ever received related to arms procurement, procurement’s value, 
year of procurement, offset’s activities, offset’s value, and offset discharge period. Mohon tuliskan di dalam tabel berikut kegiatan ofset yang 
pernah anda terima berkaitan dengan pengadaan apa, nilai pengadaan, tahun pengadaan, penyedia offset, kegiatan offset, nilai offset, jangka waktu 
offset. 
No 
Procurement/ 
Pengadaan 
Procurement 
Value/ Nilai 
pengadaan 
Year of 
Procurement/ 
Tahun 
pengadaan 
Offset 
Provider/ 
Penyedia 
offset 
Offset 
Activities/ 
Kegiatan 
offset 
Offset 
Value/ 
Nilai 
offset 
Offset Benefits for 
Industry/ 
Keuntungan offset 
untuk industri 
Offset 
Discharge 
Period/ Jangka 
waktu offset 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
2 
 
 
 
 
        
 
306 
2. The Contribution of Offset  in General / Dampak OffsetSecara Umum 
No Question Answer 
1 Which offset program methat you think is the most successfull in your 
organization, please provide reasons for your answer/  Apa program ofset yang 
menurut anda PALING BERHASIL di organisasi anda dan mengapa dinilai berhasil? 
 
2 What kind of offset that your organisation received?/Model offset apa yang 
organisasi anda terima? 
1. JV 
2. Co-production/ co-produksi 
3. Subcontracting/ subkontrak 
4. Collaboration/ kolaborasi 
5. Others/ lainnya 
 Please provide example/ Berikan contoh. 
 
3 Type of technology transfer received through offset/  Tipe teknologi apa yang 
didapat lewat offset 
1. Product/ teknologi produk 
2. Process/ teknologi proses 
3. Know-how/ teknologi know-how 
4. Management/ teknik manajemen 
5. Others/ lainnya 
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No Question Answer 
4 Did technology transfer through offset produce/ Apakah transfer teknologi lewat 
offset menghasilkan: 
1. Patent/ paten 
2. License/ lisensi 
3. Machines/ mesin 
4. Education/ pendidikan 
5. Training/ pelatihan 
6. Turnkey/ turnkey 
7. Foreign consultant/ penyewaan jasa konsultan asing 
8. Management participation/ partisipasi manajemen 
9. Techncal assistance/ bantuan teknis 
10. FDI 
11. JV 
12. Collaboration/ Kolaborasi 
13. Subcontracting/ subkontrak  
14. Co-production/ co-produksi 
15. buy-back 
16. others/ lainnya 
 
5 Do you think technology transfer from offset can be obtained from other conduit 
that could be more economical and effective?/ Apakah teknologi yang ditransfer 
lewat offset sebenarnya bisa didapatkan dari sumber yang lain dengan cara yang lebih 
murah dan efektif? 
 
6 Do you think technology transfer from offset that your organisation recieve can be 
obtained without offset?/ Apakah transfer teknologi yang diterima organisasi anda 
melalui offset bisa didapatkan tanpa offset? 
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No Question Answer 
7 Can you identify and explain variables that  supports offset implementation 
throughout  the following staged: /Dapatkah anda mengidentifikasi dan menjelaskan 
variabel-variabel yang mendukung kesuksesan program offset tersebut dalam tahapan 
offset berikut: 
1. Offset planning/ perencanaan offset 
2. Preparedness to receive offset/ kesiapan penerimaan offset 
3. Negotiation and communication/ negosiasi dan komunikasi 
4. Evaluation and government assessment/ evaluasi dan penilaian pemerintah 
 
8 Do you think offset planning has considered dual use potential of offset (can be 
applied in comercial field) or is it just for defence field?  / Apakah perencanaan offset 
mempertimbangkan faktor potensi dual-use (dapat diaplikasikan di bidang komersil) atau 
aplikasinya hanya pada bidang pertahanan? 
 
9 Does your company use technology transfer from offset to build local 
technological capability? (Explain the source of technology, type of technology, 
and type of works)/Apakah organisasi anda memanfaatkan teknologi transfer dari offset 
untuk membangun kapabilitas teknologi lokal (jelaskan sumber teknologi, jenis teknologi 
dan tipe pekerjaannya) 
 
10 Does your company experience problem in absorbing the technology from offset? 
(provide example and source of problem)/ Apakah organisasi anda mengalami 
kesulitan dalam menyerap teknologi yang didapat melalui offset? Bagaimana 
mengatasinya? (berikan contoh kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
 
11 Does your company experience problem in technology sharing with foreign 
partner? (provide example and source)/ Apakah organisasi anda mengalami kesulitan 
technology-sharing dengan mitra luar negeri?  Bagaimana mengatasinya? (berikan contoh 
kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
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No Question Answer 
12 Does your company experience problem when facing the government on 
acquisition of technology? (provide example and source)/Apakah organisasi anda 
mengalami kesulitan berhadapan dengan pemerintah dalam rangka akuisisi/adopsi 
teknologi ? (berikan contoh kesulitan dan sumbernya) 
 
13 Does your company generate benefits from offset? i.e. perform enhancement/ Apa 
keuntungan yang organisasi anda dapatkan dari offset, misalnya dalam perbaikan 
performa?  
1. Export/ ekspor 
2. Product’s innovation/ inovasi produk 
3. Process innovation/ inovasi proses 
4. System innovation/ inovasi sistem 
5. Employment/ penambahan kerja 
6. Skill enhancement/ peningkatan keahlian SDM  
7. local subcontracting/ penguatan basis subkontraktor local 
8. Spin off/ aplikasi komersil 
9. Others/ lainnya 
 
14 What kind of offset benefits that  sustain after the conclusion of offset discharge?/ 
Apakah manfaat offset yang organisasi anda rasakan memiliki keberlangsungan setelah 
kewajiban offset selesai, melalui: 
1. Subcontracting/ subkontrakting 
2. New collaboration between offset’s receiver and provider unrelated to offset 
program/ kerjasama baru antara penerima dan penyedia offset yang tidak 
terkait dengan program offset 
3. Others/ lainnya (sebutkan) 
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3. Contribution of Offset per Case Study 
No Variable Indicator 
Example (please fill up in accordance tou your 
experience of offset engagement)/ Contoh (mohon 
diisi sesuai dengan program offset dimana anda pernah 
terlibat) 
1 Employment 
(lapangan 
kerja) 
Number of job created/maintained by offset (jumlah tenaga 
kerja baru atau yang dipertahankan karena offset) 
Number of quality job created/maintained by offset  (jumlah 
pekerjaan dengan keahlian tinggi/khusus yang diciptakan atau yang 
dipertahankan karena offset)  
 
2 Skill 
enhancement 
(peningkatan 
keahlian) 
 
Improvement in worker skills (peningkatan keahlian) – jelaskan 
jenis keahlian tersebut 
Education/training received by worker (pendidikan atau 
pelatihan untuk pekerja)- jenis training, lama waktu, tempat  
 
 
3 Technology 
Transfer 
(transfer 
teknologi) 
Quality of technology transferred (kualitas teknologi yang 
ditransfer) 
New technology or old technology (teknologi baru atau lama) 
Superior technology/equal/inferior compare dto existing one 
in the company (teknologi lebih tinggi/setara/lebih rendah dari 
kemampuan yang sudah ada di perusahaan) 
Type of technology (tipe teknologi: metode, know how, know 
why, marketing, etc) 
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No Variable Indicator 
Example (please fill up in accordance tou your 
experience of offset engagement)/ Contoh (mohon 
diisi sesuai dengan program offset dimana anda pernah 
terlibat) 
4 Value Chain Number of component exported as subcontractor  (komponen 
yang diekspor sebagai subkontraktor) 
Type of component and number (Jenis komponen dan jumlah) 
Number of component produced domestically and name of 
the components (Komponen yang bisa dibuat dalam negeri untuk 
menggantikan komponen ekspor) and number of component that 
is still dependent on import (Komponen yang masih tergantung 
pada impor) 
Backward linkage 
Domestic subcontractors (Suplai komponen dari perusahaan 
domestik  lain) 
 
5 Export Growth in export sales (peningkatan jumlah ekspor) 
Participation in global supply chain (partisipasi dalam rantai 
suplai global) 
 
6 R&D 
Sustainability 
Participation of vendor in R&D ventures in buyer country 
(partisipasi vendor dalam kegiatan R&D di Negara pembeli 
alutsista) 
 
  R&D programme created as consequence of technology 
transfer through offset (Program R&D yang tercipta dari 
kemampuan yang terbangun akibat alih teknologi dari program 
offset) 
 
 
